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The catastrophic depression of 1593-1^97 vividly
dramatized the failure of the existing financial systen and
«aaphasized the widening chasm between the rich and the poor.
The Pullman Strike of 1&94 symbolised the social
effects of an economic system rationalized in terras of
cial Darwinism* The strike began as a local dispute, but
gradually expanded into a nationwide railway boycott. oon
the federal government was involved. For these reasons the
strike was of great public interest and attracted much
ent in the magazines.
The lt>90 , s were an important decade for periodicals.
Of all the mass media, "none experienced a more spectacular
enlargement and increase in effectiveness than the maga-
2
zincs." Furthermore, in both the general monthly and
weekly journals of opinion and reportage, an increasing
number of articles dealt with current events and public
affairs
.
This is a historical study of the performance of the
periodical press in the lS90*s. Specifically, this study
examines the reporting and interpretation of eight journals




The fundamental purpose is to contribute an his-
torical perspective to the evolution of interpretative
reporting.
Robert B* Harper has studied the development of
news interpretation in five case studies involving labor
conflict during the period 1914 to 1966. Harper points out
that several journalism historians have agreed on when
interpretative reporting became an important journalistic
development; but these same historians "have not very
thoroughly answered the question of when interpretative
reporting first began or how it developed •* Harper believes
there may have been different forms of news interpretation
prior to '-orld War Ur
Journalism historian Theodore Peterson, assessing
the role of magazines, concludes that they have "not only
interpreted issues and events but also put them in national
perspective •• Another scholar, 1 oland . olseley, comments:
"A newspaper informs mainly by printing the news. A maga-
zine informs chiefly by printing explanations of news and
descriptions of conditions." Similarly, journalism pro-
fessor John Schacht notes that journals of opinion often
provide a fuller interpretative treatment than other media:
-iere theae aagazines may claim primacy, then, is not in
spreading information, but in assessment of information and
in their conclusions regarding it."

j cording to journalism historian T.dwin Fmery,
several magazines of opinion, at the turn of the century,
were important in the trend toward interpretative reporting
which emerged after World War I and became significant in
the 1930»s. 5
This study examines the proposition that the
journals of opinion in the 1390*3 were instrumental in the
development of interpretative reporting. This proposition
is examined by evaluating the manner in which these journals
covered the Pullman Strike of 1394 • The study focuses on
the nature, adequacy and extent of their interpretative
reporting. Journals of opinion—as opposed to other types
of magazines—were selected for analysis because of their
•nphasis on public affairs. The Pullman Strike was selected
as an historical event because it attracted nationwide
interest and extensive comment in the press.
A second and broader purpose of this study is to
develop knowledge about the magazines of the 1&90* s, an
area of study that has been overshadowed by emphasis on the
sensational newspapers of the period, and the muckrakers
which came to prominence after 1900. Historian Allan Kevins
asserts there is a need for research into the role of the
press—its public service function. In a sense, this
analysis of the periodical press provides a case study of
the role played by journals of opinion in explaining the
social issues of the 1(590 •
vi

This study cannot definitively assess the social
role of the journals of opinion during this period, never-
theless, an attempt is made, not only to evaluate the
interpretative reporting of these periodicals, but also to
determine what functions they performed with respect to the
public during and immediately after the strike.
As a matter of interest, it should be noted that
this study complements an existing thesis, John I.. Finnegan's
*Th© Press and the Pullman Strike: An Analysis of the
Coverage of the Railroad Boycott of 1394 by Four Metro-
politan Daily Newspapers," completed in 19&5» Finnegan
found strike reporting in the daily press to be highly
7distorted and sensationalize
Objectives
This study evaluates the performance of eight
journals of opinion and reportage and examines the manner in
which they interpreted the Pullman Strike and associated
issues.
Three questions have been posed to guide the in-
vestigation:
(1) How did the coverage provided by the journals compare
with the Report on the Chicago Strike by the U. S. Strike
amission, and related sources?
(2) What were the significant differences, if any, between
the weeklies and monthlies in their reporting and inter-




(3) V.hat social functions were performed by the journals of
opinion during and immediately after the strike?
Periodicals and Content to be otudied
Professor John Schacht has described the character-
istics of a "journal of opinion and reportage
j
M its content
deals priinarily with public affairs in a broad sense, in-
volving politics, economics, and social and cultural rela-
tionships:
This interest involves both the reporting of such
affairs (though in some cases on a limited scale)
and an analysis and evaluation of—and recommenda-
tions concerning—its own news and that of other
sources."
These are the journals studied*
. ionthly Reviews lieeklv Journals






(1215-1545) Mation (1365 )
Review of Reviem Outlook (1#7Q-1935)
"(1591-1 »7)
jut historians are in substantial agreement that
these particular journals are of primary importance for their
coverage and discussion of public affairs in the l$90 f s*
Chapter I provides background concerning these
journals, as well as an historical perspective of the strike.
Content to be evaluated consists of all pertinent
articles, editorials and "letters to the editor" relating to




Comparatively little research has been conducted in
the i*ield of periodical press perforiaance . A review of
.Trm-m^j^y* AhPtractS j the Journal! sra quarterly Index , and
other bibliographic aids reveals that only four of seventeen
press performance studies discovered involved a qualitative
evaluation of the periodical press*
In establishing an appropriate research rnethod for
this study, the author has drawn fron procedures developed
or explained in three other studies*
Definitions
r purposes of this study the definitions of
"interpretation" and "issue" are as follows!
(1) "Interpretation" is defined as the attempt to report or
12
explain cause or effect relationships*
John f . DeMott summarizes the distinctive character-
istics of interpretative news stories: they have nany kinds
of opinion, especially concerning cause and effect; they
have greater depth, extensive background, exposition and
description. According to Curtis h* .SacDougall, interpre-
tation involves explaining "why;" it is an objective
appraisal that provides perspective ; it explains the social
background—the root causes—of an event.
(2) "Issue" is defined as a topic of controversy.
For purposes of analysis there are three types of
ix
srij
issues; (a) immediate issues are those discussed by the
participants in the event; (b) underlying issues are those
issues which, though possibly recognized to some extent by
the event's participants, were subject to far less atten-
tion and discussion; (o) related issues are those which
•merged from the basic event and were discussed primarily
by the Strike Commission, historians, or the mass media.
Historical Standard
An historical standard is established by con-
structing a chronology of the "landoark history** of the
Pullman Strike. 1
*
urces for the standard include* the lieport on the
Chicago Strike of June-July lt>94 » a document prepared by the
U. S. Strike Commission which investigated the dispute;
President Grover Cleveland's The Government in the Chici
Strike of 1 CJ94 ; Alrnont Lindsey's comprehensive study, the
Pullman Strike: The tudy of a Unique Experiment and of a
Great Upheaval (1942); and several other primary and
secondary sources.
Analysis of Coverage
An historical narrative is developed in Chapter il*,
the landmark history is established and the reporting of
the journals of opinion is summarized. During the discussion,
three types of deviation from the historical standard are






and where); (2) significant omissions of information; and
(3) judgments not consistent with the historical record.
The landmark history of the strike is extrapolated and pre-
sented in Appendix ]
-
Analysis of interpretation
The important issues in the strike have been iden-
tified by inspection of the historical record and the con-
tent of the articles and editorials included in the study.
These issues are explained in Chapter III, an interpretative
analysis of the strike which expands the historical standard
Chapter IV is an appraisal of the adequacy and
extent to which the journals attempted to explain cause or
effect relationships concerning the f^T^^^te and underlying
3ues in comparison to the historical standard* Chapter V
is a similar analysis of the related issues as explained by
the journal .
Evaluation qf Coverage and Interpretation
Chapter VI evaluates the perfon-iance of the journals
qualitatively against the following framework i (1) extent
of coverage—significant omissions; (2) interpretative dis-
tortions and inaccuracies of fact; (3) objectivity and
fairness, including qualities such as "tone" (the general
extent to which content revealed emotionality, concern, or
reassurance), and "authority" (particular groups referred to





Llowing the performance evaluation, several
reasons are offered to explain weaknesses in coverage and
interpretation. The journals are assessed in terms of
editorial values (e«g*, economic, political or humanitarian)
and the extent to which advocacy may have impeded objective
interpretation
•
As the strike began to collapse, the journals pro-
posed a variety of recommendations concerning labor rela-
tions* These are summarized in Appendix III and discussed
in relation to the social role of the periodical press in
the raid-lS^s.
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The Periodical Press of the 1890*5
The l890's were a decade of hard times in the midst
of a period of extraordinary industrial and financial
development. "American society was growing more and more
coaplex, aid economic and political problems were multiplying
as the century approached its end."
The number of newspapers and magazines was rapidly
increasing during these years. Journalism expanded into
every field ard area* In 1390 there were slightly more than
4,400 periodicals. By 1900 that number had increased to
somewhat more than 5,500. Popular education was producing
an increasingly literate public during the eighties and
nineties. The technology of printing was steadily Improving.
Postal rates were more favorable. National marketing and
magazine advertising were beginning to provide periodicals
with a broader financial base. And middle-class readers
were taking more of an interest in the socio-economic
2problems associated with the new industrial order.
During this period several highly successful, low-
priced magazines began to appear. In 1&92, Frank A. Munsey
began Issuing Munsey's I'-tagagine , a fully illustrated monthly
costing twenty-five cents. The following year the Ladies
'
Home Journal » at ten cents a copy, reached a circulation c
seven hundred thousand. ^cClures began publication. Two
years later it was being sold at ten cents a copy, along
with Cosmopolitan . From 1895 onward there were many ten
cent magazines in the field. Several of these became leading
muckrakers in the 1900 , s."r
By 1S94, the Korth American Review was well established,
having been founded in l£l5« It was the first general
monthly to seriously discuss topics of current public in-
terest. Between the years 1##6 and l391 t however, it found
competition from three new monthly journals of opinion: the
Arena , the Forum, and the Review of Reviews. These news-
.^. —
—
urn w . ii — - 1 1——., * m ti<i»« i ini« » ——«»«—.——
oriented magazines became increasingly concerned with
coverage of current events, by the tine of the Pullman strike
they had circulations rarging fron 25,000 to #5, J00.
iposiums, in which authorities presented varying points
of view on a leading issue, were common among these journals
in the nineties.
Several weekly journals of opinion and commentary
were also beneficiaries of the rising demand for magazines.
Less timely than the newspapers, but featuring more reporting
than the monthlies, were the Kation , Harper* s Weekly , the
Independent and the Outlook . These were the leading weeklies
in the coverage of current affairs, founded during the
years 1357 to 1#70, by the l#90 f s their circulations were




Both the weeklies and the monthlies were active in
reform movements that reached their fruition in the muck-
raking era. Throughout the nineties they printed an in-
creasing number of articles exposing political corruption
in city, state and national government. The Arena , fen
and North American Review were especially active in tfe
field; Harper's Weekly and the Independent I ought for refc
5
of the civil service.
The threads of the muckraking tradition were evident
in all the magazines of the 1690* s. "In various forms,
exposure of social ills appears in both general and
specialized periodicals.** Poverty, slums, monopolies and
factory conditions came under attack. The hard times
following the Panic of It^j—the march of "Coxey^ Army**
and the violent strikes of the period—brought discontent
into the open, focused public attention on economic and
political problems, and furnished material for magazine
articles. Animated discussions of these issues were con-
7ducted mostly in the journals of opinion and reportage.
These periodicals, which had relatively small but
influential audiences, along with certain newspapers were
the direct forerunners of progressive muckraking.
In the newspaper press, two developments contributed
to the rise of muckraking, (l) The "New Journalism" of
Pulitzer and Gcripps emphasized the social service function
of the press. "Editorial support for the common man and
for the community interest, rather- than for a particular

4o
party or group, grew widespread in the lgtfO^s aid 90 , s."
(2) Sensationalism such as that found in the yellow journals
—
Pulitzer f s world and Hearst 1 s Journal—"thrived on crusading
forays into the underworld of vice and scandal; its rapid
development ... worked to the incidental advantage of
reform."10
The reporters who covered such stories of social
conflict as the Pullman Strike, and lesser ones, gained
experience which unquestionably prepared them for a later
11
role in muckraking.
Events during President Cleveland's second term,
1892-96, in 1ott*s words, "called forth voluminous magazine
commentary •" Current affairs were followed more closely.
Of particular interest to the public was the Pullman
12Strike. Several magazines of this period were instrumental
in forcing the serious consideration of social issues upon
the American people. These were the monthly and weekly
journals of opinion ard reportage.
The Journals of Opinion and Reportage *
The V.eekiies
Two important weeklies of the period which dealt with
public issues (yet are not included within the scope of this
study) were the Literary Digest and Public Opinion . They
*A summary of the characteristics of these journals
is presented in Table 1, page 11.
9k
orfw
"were not, in basic intention, current-events periodicals,
but rather weekly eclectics that surveyed editorial opinion
13
and condensed and arranged it for the information of readers •*•
Nevertheless, since they contain useful opinion summaries,
they may be cited infrequently during the study when
necessary for the purpose of comparison or contrast.
According to historian Frank Luther tiott* four
weekly journals of opinion and coiimentary were early leaders
in the movement toward coverage of current events or
analysis of news. Three of these—-Harper * s v> eekly , the
Independent and the Outlook—could also be classified as
"general illustrated raiccellanies." These were not "pure*
journals of opinion; all printed some fiction and included
articles on subjects other than current affairs. However,
few of the leading weeklies of the lS90*& were strictly
14
concerned with discussions of public affairs.
The fourth journal to be studied, the Nation , was a
weekly edition of the New York Evening Post . Although
seldom illustrated, it was often more timely than its
15
competitors.
The Nation—the only 19th century journal of opinion
now surviving—was established in 1#65 under the editorship
of Edwin L. Godkin. In the original prospectus, Godkin
emphasized that his journal would provide a critical
scrutiny of current events. It would discuss important
Mi
i
issues, especially in their legal, economic, and consti-
tutional phases, with more moderation than the party press:
The Nation will not be the organ of any party,
sect, or body. It will, on the contrary, MUM an
ernest effort to bring to the discussion of
political and social questions a really critical
spirit, and to wage war upon the vices of violence,
exaggeration, aid misrepresentation by which so
much of the political writing of the day is
marred.17
In 1881 Godkin sold the Nation to the New York
Evening Post ; for the ne;<t thirty-three years it was issued
as a weekly edition of the Post * Wendell Phillips Garrison
became the general editor and was primarily concerned with
current literature. Godkin, however, regained as political
lw
and advisory editor.
Although the Nation 's circulation in the lS90» s was
never above 12,000, it was a journal of substantial in-
fluence. According to PYank Luther tfott, "The power of the
Nation came not frorr the number of its readers, but fro:
.
their station and influence and from the frequency which
19it was quoted." '
Godkin 1 s social and political views permeated the
Nation. A believer in Victorian English liberalism, Godkin
stood for a laissez-faire economy arid the highest possible
standards for public officials. He advocated unrestrained
capitalism, women^s suffrage, public education and civil




In labor disputes, Godkln v s attitude was that "labor
:>t not be allowed to usurp the prerogatives of the natural
21
aristocracy of a free society." The Nation took capital 1 s
side against labor, attacked trade unionise, and opposed
the eight-hour working day. Godkin believed that the "iron
laws of supply and demand" dictated wages; he denied laboi
22
right to dictate its own price.
^e fi&tion enthusiastically supported President
Cleveland. According to historian John Chamberlain, "the
true apostles of laissez-faire in the eighties and nineties
were the Cleveland Ijemocrats." .-*iny of then were also
2jfollowers of Godkin 1 s commentary.
Harper* s v. eekly was founded in 1357 by Fletcher
Harper, who managed it until his retirement in 1-375 • One
of several "general illustrated miscellanies," it was called
a "Journal of Civilization" and was the best of its clar
Offering news, editorials, pictures and essays, it provided
a vital illustrated history of the years from 1^57 to 1916.
It became a strong political and social force.
James Playsted V/ood credits the journal with con-
tributing to the development of modem pictorial journaliL .
Harper's \ eekly used full page pictures that always told a
story. The aim of its pictures and illustrations was
accurate graphic reporting. Vood calls it "the precursor
25
of today 1 s weekly pictorial and news magazines."
;
...-
«Somewhat more popular than its monthly cousin
(founded in 1#5Q)> the weekly had been designed largely as
a vehicle for the political discussion which Harper* s tonthly
eschewed
•
Political cartoonist Thomas Nast was hired in 1#62.
His illustrations of events, persons and social conditions
had a powerful impact . His greatest work consisted of a
cartoon campaign against the famous Tweed Ring of Tammany
Hall in New lork. Nast also popularized the Republican
27
elephant and the Democratic donkey as political symbols.
During the Pullnian Strike, Harper f s Weekly featured
many superb illustrations of the federal troops and railroad
violence in Chicago by the famous artist, Frederic Remington.
In 1$94 Henry Loomis Nelson became general editor.
Carl Schurz, an independent, wrote the leading political
editorials. Although Harper * s . eekly was intended to be
an independent foran, "it is as a vigorous political journal
of conservative tendencies that it was most noteworthy." v
Two weeklies, originally oriented to religion,
became journals of opinion before their demise. One was the
Independent , begun in I84B as a weekly Congregationalist
paper. Published in New Tork, it was edited from 1&70 to
tf?f by Henry C. Bowen.29
Although it featured interdenominational religious
news, it also gave attention to current events and the
•.
ibJEtq*:
issues of the day. The Independent printed some fiction and
had departments devoted to fine arts, education, and science;
but it emphasized public affuirs. Normally it supported
Lepublican candidates for President.
With a circulation of approximately 15,000, the
Independent maintained an important position among American
periodicals. In j)ott f s evaluation, "It was one of a very
small group of religious papers to hold a comparatively
general audience in a period which saw most such periodicals
31degenerate into denominational news letters."
In October 192# it was merged in the Outlook , a jour-
32
rial which had paralleled the Independent in various phases.
Tne Outlook grew out of the Christian Union , founded
in 1^70 by Henry V/ard beecher. Like the Independent , it was
published in New Tork and began as a specialized religious
journal. I hen Lyman Abbott became managing editor in l£tfl,
he made the weekly somewhat more a journal of opinion and
reportage. "There was some political commentary, Republican
33in sympathy, yet denunciatory of official corruption.**
In 1693 Abbott discarded the old name and christened
the weekly the Outlook . This marked a major change in
emphasis from religious news to the broader field of public
affairs. Circulation gained and passed the 30,000 mark in
1394. By then the journal had correspondents in Washington,






became strong in cogent on national affairs, as well as
34biography and literary criticism.
Although Abbott was sympathetic to reform and to the
social gospel, his weekly did not engage in the exposure of
35
corruption as a practice • Nevertheless, "the editorials
and articles he published helped to shape the rising sense
of dissatisfaction with politics and industry in America •*
The Outlook , according to historian C- C. Regier, helped
pave the way for the rise of the muckraking movement.
The magazine reached a peak of circulation, and of
influence, in the Theodore Boosevelt eraj Roosevelt himself
served as a contributing editor from 19Q$ until 1914. The
Outlook merged with the Independent in 1926, Because of
declining circulation, the Outlook and independent , as it
was then called, became a monthly. A victim of the
37Depression, it finally ceased publication in 19j5*
The lonthlies
Four non-fiction monthly reviews of the l#90 , s con-
tained articles, the majority of which dealt very closely
with the critical issues of the day: the Arena , the Forum ,
the North American fteview and the Review of Reviews . Some
of the greatest editors in the history of American magazines,
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The Arena "was more bold and persistent in its pre-
sentation of current social issues than any other review of
the nineties. " rounded in 1389 &n£ published in Boston,
this monthly was edited by benjamin Orange Flower, whose
39
chief interest was in social re/or .
Flower, a believer in "Progress," aiiied at promoting
happiness for all people, rie hoped the Arena would
. . . present great vital movements and theories of
the hour, giving emphasis to the sides and views
which, because of their conflicting with entrenched
privilege or the rising tide of reaction, or on
account of their being too new and unconventional
tG be popular, were for prudential and financial
reasons denied a free hearing in current periodical
literature. 40
The editor of a competing journal said of Flower*
s
monthly, "It is an open arena for the discussion of subjects
tabooed by the forma and the North Airterican . There is nore
41
audacity about the Arena than its older rivals."
^*n€ Arena played a pioneer role in the development
of muckraking, Without hesitation it exposed corruption and
urged social, econordc and political reform. During the
1890* s it was a crusading magazine; it adopted the technique
of multiple crusades which had been developed by Pulitzer.
Particularly during the hard times of the :uid-nineties, the
Arena attacked the evils of poverty, sweatshops, slu,
,
unemployment , and child labor; it crusaded against trusts
and other combinations of wealth. And it urged reform*
such as the initiative, referendum and recall, to increase








Unlike Godkin, the editor of Arena did not sub-
scribe to laisses-faire doctrine. Flower was dedicated to
the goal of making American industry "democratic." He waged
an unceasing war upon "the interests'*—the powerful cor-
porations that decreased economic freedom and corrupted the
political process. An advocate of social justice, Flower
generally defended labor unionism, usually without reser-
vation; he favored the ends sought by labor, but opposed
the use of violent or oppressive measures in attaining those
ends. He supported government ownership of utilities and
43transportation lines. #
In 1$94 the Arena * s circulation was about 25»000.
To further the spread of its ideas among the educated
community, up to 2,000 copies were sent each month to
magazine and newspaper editors. In subsequent years, al-
though its circulation once exceeded 30,000, the journal be-
44
came financially weak. It was last issued in August 1909*
According to ;-tott 9 *0n the whole the Arena was a
truly liberal and significant journal. Its circulation was
never large, but it reached many leaders of American
thinking and (through schools, editorial offices, and
libraries) many leaders-to-be." It was the only journal
. 46
to muckrake consistently by plan in the 1890* s.
Less radical than the Arena were two monthlies that
discussed the great questions of the day, the Forum and the
North American Review .
...







Founded in l££6, the Forum was first edited by
Lorettus S* Metcall* a /nan trained on the North American
staff* Metcalf f s editorial policy consisted of four basic
principles! (1) to present articles by experts on topics
of greatest timely significance; (2) to provide a symposium
for debates on a variety of social, political and economic
problems; (3) to print several articles in each issue
designed to attract reader interest; and (4) to edit
47
severely all manuscripts*
When Walter Hines Page became editor in 1391, he
said the purpose of the forum was "to provide discussion
about subjects of contemporary interest, in which the
raagaaine is not partisan, but merely the instrument •*
Page continued to emphasize the use of expert writers and
the magasine debate technique. Ke concentrated on articles
dealing with economics, sociology and politics, with
secondary emphasis on education, religion, science, history
49
and literature. '
The influence of the journal was probably greater
than its circulation indicated. By the time Page quit as
editor in 1395, the Forum had attracted some 30,000 sub-
scribers. The prestige of the magasine in the l$90*s was
extensive. It was used in schools and colleges in connection




7he *'Q**u^ absorbed . entury in 1930, then was itself




in 1950* In its best days, writes Mott, "the Forum aade an
admirable contribution to free and open discussion of great
51public questions.*
The North African Review , similar in its editorial
policies to the Fprum, was established in l£l5. When Lloyd
Bryce became editor and publisher in 1$39» the North American
had a circulation of 17#000. Under his direction the journal
reached its peak circulation of 76 t OOO t several years before
the Pullman Strike. Like Page at the Forum, Bryce emphasized
52
controversy, symposiums aid joint debate.
As i'fott described the editor,
Bryce was a Democrat in politics, while his
predecessor had been a Republicans but the [North
American) Review was kept nonpartisan~or raEner
bipartisan, for it continued to present both sides
of most controversial questions. The new editor
was a man of wealth, a novelist, a, liberal, and a
raember of Congress from New York. 5-*
ile Bryce was editor, until l£96, the Itorth
^aerican Review was lively, successful, and frequently con-
tained important discussions of current issues. It was a
publication of real power and influence because it was
54
read and studied by the leading men of the country. In
the words of a competing monthly, it was regarded by many
to be "at once the highest and most important platform upon
which current public issues can be discussed, than is any
55
other magazine or review. ""^
allowing the Depression, the North American Review
finally ceased publication in 194

16
Different in concept and fonuat froia the other three
monthlies was the Review of reviews . A forerunner of the
dern newsweekly, the Review emphasized informed discussion
of current events and contributed to the trend toward
eliness in the contents of popular magazines It began
in %$% as the American version of W. T. Stead 1 I London




,ead founded the original riagazine in England in
1890. A year later, Dr. Albert Shaw began publishing the
iew in New York as an American affiliate. Each Review
was independent of the other in editorship and ;-;ethod, yet
there was a close relationship between the two journals. In
the estimation of i'rank Luther Rott, the American version
was Hfar superior to its English parent in nearly every
respect."
The Kevlew > unlike the monthlies mentioned above,
used digests of articles which had appeared in other
periodicals, though it also printed articles of its own.
The section, "Leading Articles of the ionth, " presented
condensations fro-.i the chief reviews and magazines of the
world. In its department entitled "The Progress of the
rid," the Review included an editorial analysis of current
events. This section was devoted mainly to politics and
59
eeono *







end in 1937, maintained a high standard of fairness and
unemotional rationality in his news -and comment* Although
he avoided exposes and all-out attacks on social evils,
Shaw kept his readers informed of muckraking revelations.
Gradually he built up the Review 's circulation. By 1894
he had nearly 85,000 subscribers. By 1906 circulation more
than doubled that figure.
The problems attendant on the hard times of the
early nineties, plans for the relief of the un-
employed, agrarian unrest, the free coinage of
silver proposal
f
and social reforms in the cities
were prominent [in the Review] .61
Shaw approached these topics from a fairly consistent
Republican viewpoint.
The Review of Reviews , by summarizing, explaining
and judging the news, was a pioneer newsmagazine. By pro-
viding historical background, and delving into areas neg-
lected by newspapers, the Review contributed to the develop-
62
ment of news interpretation.
As the Review observed in 1929*
Its aim has always been to bring to its readers a
monthly statement of events at home and abroad,
with a reasonable interpretation of those trans-
actions that constitute history in the making.
' e have sought to support an intelligent and
high-principled conduct of the governmental and
social affairs of the United States, regardless
of party .63
The General Labor Situation
The Pullman strike began as a local dispute in the
town of Pullman, several miles south of Chicago. It
, L-JC
-,
•.. ma : ,-,. mdM
Ate l- l ^ .. arittiflHttJS
Uescalated by stages into a general strike of the railroads
centered in Chicago, and it spread westward until it covered
two-thirds of the United States*
Freight trains ground to a halt. Mails were delayed.
Property was destroyed. Perishable foods rotted in boxcars.
People were killed. i-iobs rioted. Kearly all the forces of
law and order, civil and military, were involved.
"The fury with which labor and capital battled in
1#94 was the outgrowth of years of mutual distrust and
hate. . • ••* Workers had long suffered such conditions as
miserable slum housing conditions, long hours, dangerous
64
and unsanitary working conditions, and inadequate wages.
During the post-Civil r*ar period, laissez-faire
economic doctrines permitted few restraints upon capitalists,
except those imposed by vigorous competition* It was the
job of big business to nake profits. One way to increase
profits was to keep down costs. Since the cost of labor was
substantial, one sure way to reduce expenses was to slash
65
wages paid to workers.
Following the Panic of lo73, strikes assumed the
character of major industrial upheavals. In July 1877 the
nation was shaken by a railway dispute of major proportions.
Angered by repeated wage cuts, the employees of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad precipitated a series of spontaneous
66
strikes that broke out in dozens of localities-.'
>i
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These strikes were the first to induce massive
federal intervention. I. §• troops were ordered into the
states of ^Maryland, Indiana, Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
Mssourl and Illinois. In Chicago, police and state militia
battled 5,000 enraged rioters* Six companies of the 9th
U. S. Infantry and two more companies of the 22d Infantry
were standing by. The governor had formally requested
military assistance from President Hayes. After some
hesitation, the President had authorized the use of regulars
against Chicago rioters. A precedent was set: the V. .
Array had been used to back up police and state militia.
This procedure became a vital part of the strategy of the
fry
federal government in 1#94«
Upon termination of the strikes of l#77 f there was
no consensus as to what should be done to prevent such
disorders in the future. There was some serious discussion
concerning the problem of creating better relations between
employers and their men. However, as far as the editors
of Nation and Harper's Weekly were concerned, one conclusion
was clearly evident: the need for a larger U. S. Army. 7
The years 1&78 to 1S65 were relatively quiet. But
violence returned again to Chicago with the Hayraarket Riot
in I&y, 1836. Following a bomb explosion at Haymarket
Place, eight leading anarchists were placed on trial and
pronounced guilty. Though four of the anarchists were
hanged, three lived to receive their pardons from Governor
fitsJ





John P. Altgeld in 1#93» Conservatives were shocked. As
a result, Altgeld was bitterly criticized as an *anarchist,"
a label that was reapplied by some journalists during the
70
Pullman Strike.'
The outbreak of the Burlington Strike in February
1#S£ brought the nation once again face-to-face with the
threat of a major transportation tie-up. But the railway
workers lacked unity. They failed to fight together in
boycotting the Burlington; the dispute never got beyond the
"serious threat" stage • Nevertheless, the strike had
several important consequences: (1) the Burlington Railway
established an insurance system, the purpose of which was to
give employees a financial stake in the company and deprive
them of a financial stake in organized labor; (2) the use of
the judicial injunctive process to suppress strikes began
to develop; (3) the first federal railroad labor act was
signed; it provided the alternative of voluntary arbitration
or of a presidential fact finding commission which might
71
recommend a settlement*
As will be demonstrated in later chapters, these
outcomes have relevance for the Pullman Strike. George
Pullman could have established some means of providing his
employees a financial stake in the Pullman Company. He did
not. The injunctive process became an essential component
in the federal strategy. And President Cleveland could have
either encouraged arbitration or established a fact-finding






neither* Instead, he appointed a commission to investigate
the strike—after it had substantially run its course.
There was little labor peace in the half-dozen years
following the Burlington Strike. During the l890 f s, the
primary period of great strikes was that of 1892-1894. In
the silver and lead mines of the Coeur d* Alene district
of Idaho in 1892. a dispute over unionisation led to violence
that was put down by federal troops. Benjamin Harrison was
the first President since Hayes to use the U. S. Army in a
labor dispute. Grover Cleveland would do the same, two
72years later.
The year 1892 was also the year of the great Homestead
Strike. Steel-mill workers clashed with the Carnegie nteel
Corporation over reduced wages. Pinkerten guards backed by
the Pennsylvania militia forced workers to call off the
73
strike and return to the mills as non-unionists. '* Like
Carneigie, the Pullman Company was vehemently opposed to
organized labor unions.
A milestone development for labor was the formation
of the American Federation of Labor in 1336, an alliance of
a number of trade unions of skilled workers. During the
Pullman Strike, the A.F. of L. would voice sympathy for




By 1892, labor leader Eugene V. Debs was convinced





thought it fostered civisiveness and competition, rather
than cooperation for the collective good. Since the proble
encountered by railroad employees were common to all, Debs
believed they ought to belong to one organisation—a union
capable of asserting its united strength in the protection
of every member. Accordingly, he resigned from the Brother-
75hood of Locomotive Firemen to establish such a union.
The American Railway Union (A*k«l'.) was organized
at Chicago on 20 June 1893 • Its purpose: Mto protect and
promote the interests of its members as wage earners through
organization and legitimate cooperation." Mwabership was
open to all white employees who served on railroads, except
high officials. The A.K.U. consisted of a general union and
of local unions. The general union was formed of represen-
tatives of local unions. A strike could be declared only
76by a majority vote of the locals involved.
Under the leadership provided by Lebs, the American
ilway Union by 1694 was powerful* About 150,000 railroad
•employees were •bers. The A. 11.1*., representing labor,
would become the Liajor contestant against capital during the
Pullman Strike.
In establishing the A.! .1
.
, Debs was prompted by one
other vital consideration. Railroad capital and management—
at least in Chicago—had become an organized coalition.
Debs felt that a management concentration of power demanded






The twenty-four railroads terminating in Chicago
had formed the General Manager 1 s Association (G. :.A.) in
1686- Its aim was to take united action concerning railroad
or labor problems centering at Chicago in which members had
a common interest* By 1£93 one of its primary concerns was
to establish approximate uniformity in wages and to develop
a firm policy toward labor. In ilarch, 1S93* the G.M.A.
successfully prevented a switchmen , s union from initiating
a strike. The rmn abandoned their demands and accepted the
old wage schedule.
By the time of the Pullman Strike, the General
Manager's Association had developed effective strike-breaking
machinery. Its members operated more than 40,000 miles of
road and employed over 220,000 men. The combined net
earnings for the 24 member roads in fiscal year 1&94
exceedec million. The G.;<UA., representing organized
capital, would be a formidable opponent in the fight against
Debs* A.IUU. 7£J
The Panic of 1&93 signalled the beginning of an
acute depression that would be severely felt by Pullman
workers. The industrial market collapsed, business opera-
tions were drastically curtailed, and unemployment increased
sharply. As historian Almont Lindsey notes, "The winter of
1393-94 was filled with tragedy for thousands, and during
such a crisis the people grew restless and critical of the
79




Two lesser disorders and a general strike of coal
miners preceded the onset of the Pullman Strike.
One of these disorders was an eighteen-day strike
against the Great Northern Railway involving the newl>
organized American Railway Union. When James J. Hill,
president of the Great Northern, refused to discuss the
matter of wage cuts with A.h.U. officials, the union called
a strike on Ij April, 1894* Hot one freight train moved
over the line during the tie-up j no blood was shed. The
strike ended on ^y 1 when both sides accepted the ruling
of a board of arbitration. The decision was almost a com-
plete victory for Debs f A.R.U. Seventy-five percent of
SO
current pay cuts were restored.
This triumph for the young A.R.U. gave its members
a false sense of confidence that the union could deal
effectively with management in the subsequent Pullman Strike.
In response to the widespread unemployment emerging
from the Panic of l$9j t Jacob S. Coxey, a manufacturer-
reformer from Ohio, sponsored a march by an army of unem-
ployed to petition Congress for appropriate legislation.
Thousands of idle men travelled to Washington D. I. ftn
various parts of the nation. Though peaceful in intention,
the movement assumed lawless proportions when other indus-
trial armies from the West began to seize trains and to run
them toward the nation 1 s capital.
The United States government was swift in retaliation.






by court injunctions enforced by federal troops. President
Cleveland was apparently determined to use the full force
of his authority to crush the spirit of rebellion. "Common-
wealers* who had seized trains were arrested by federal
agents for obstructing and retarding the passage of mails.
In Washington, Coxey*s petition went largely unheard. The
81government refused to let him spea* at the capitol.
Magazines took the movement more seriously than
newspapers. The Review of Reviews reported that marchers
had the sympathy of the American people, who recognized
the protest as a gesture of economic desperation. In
contrast, the North American Review was alarmed; it said
Coxeyism was a "menace.**
The final prelude to the Pullman Strike was a general
strike of coal miners, called by the United Mine Workers on
21 April 1894 while the Coxeyites were still marching, in
five states the militia were called out to suppress vio-
lence. Again the federal government intervened to prevent
interference with mail.
In Illinois, Governor Altgeld demonstrated his
willingness to use state troops in meeting emergencies. In
response to requests for help from sheriffs in various parts
of the state, "Altgeld sent troops when there seemed the
slightest basis for anticipating trouble." Troops were
authorized to assist local officials in preserving the
peace, quelling riots and executing the law, but they were






allowed to be used Tor strike-breaking purposes. The
governor was "unalterably opposed to the practice of using
the arced forces in the interest of one economic group
against another. . . •• *
Altgeld f s position regarding the use of federal
troops would become a significant issue in the Pullman
strike
.
The Situation at Pullman
The United .line Workers went on strike in April,
1&94, when mine owners refused to restore MfM to the
previous year's level. Like the miners, workers at the
Pull.ian Palace Car Company, in Pullman, Illinois, had
suffered severe wage cuts as the Depression deepened. The
Pullman Strike broke out in May, 1894, after Cieorge Pullman
had tried to reduce the wages of his workers without
effecting a corresponding reduction in the rents charged
in the conpany , s "model** town.
The Pullman Palace Car Corporation was organized in
1S67- Over the years George Pullman had built up a unique
and highly successful business. The company constructed,
rented and repaired Pullman "palace cars" (dining, parlor
and sleeping cars), it also manufactured and sold on con-
tract general types of cars. In 1394 Pullman sleeping cars
were operated on about 125,000 miles of track, three-fourths
of the railway mijftsge of the United States. The Pullman
Company was financially sound; its financial reserve







oilowing the Panic of lc93» wages were drastically
reduced, but profits distributed as dividends actually-
increased.
,es Paid Dividends
Fiscal year 1893 17,220,000 $2,520,000
Fiscal year 1*94 $4,470,000 .2,880,000
Change -$2,750,000 + 360,000
Frora July 1393 to July 1894, wages had declined by more than
$2,000,000, yet dividends had increased by $360,000* *
Wage reductions per se might not have been so hard
on the workers if rents had correspondingly declined. But
this was not the situation at Pullman, where the entire
town—land, houses, churches and all—was owned by Geor
Pullman. The town, built between 18S0 and 1#34, was
established for several reasons: (1) to consolidate repair
and construction facilities! (2) to accommodate the thousands
of Pullman workers in an attractive, well-planned community
which would prevent labor unrest over bad housing; and
(3) to be a business investment expected to earn at least
86
six percent on the entire cost.
The town of Pullman included repair shops, a hotel,
an arcade, athletic grounds, a library, paved streets,
parks, and brick tenements. The town had a complete sewage
and water sy stein. Lnder the paternalistic regime of George
Pullman, the company town was kept neat and attractive.
7









In the spring of 18)4 these workers were not happy.
Pullman had reduced their pay five times in less than a
year, without at the same time reducing rents in his
•odel** town. For many workers, their income was so small
that every bit was needed for food and clothing; after
paying their rents they had from $1.00 to $6.00 left on
which to support their families for two weeks. Rents were
20 to 25 per cent higher in Pullman than in Chicago.
Gradually the employees became convinced that their
grievances could be redressed only through a united effort.
The American Railway Lnion offered a tremendous appeal to
the restless men at Pullman. They were able to join the
union because the Pullman Company owned several miles of
railroad. In i«krch and April 1&94 the workers at Pullman
89joined the A.R.U. in large numbers.
Although the A.K.U. strongly advised against a
strike, the Pullman employees decided to present their
demands to the corporation: reduction in rent, correction
of shop abuses and the restoration of wages to the pre-
depression level.
On Tay 7 a forty-six member grievance committee
called on a vice president of the Pullman Company, Thomas H.
Wickes, to whom the demands were presented. A spokesman
for the group a»ked that wages be restored to the June 1#93
level, or that a reduction in rent be made (along with a
raise in pay) to enable workers both to meet their rental
payjnents and to support their families.
nim
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The company refused, maintaining that business con-
ditions did not justify any change • V/ickes said that re-
duction in rent was impossible since the company was earning
only three per cent on its rental investment. Wages could
not be raised since the company was losing money on its
construction contracts. Although Wickes offered to let the
committee review the financial records of the company, the
offer was ignored because the men felt the records had been
falsified.
The committee met with George Pullman on May 9- He
reiterated the position taken by Wickes: rents could not
91be lowered} wages could not be raised.' Pullman's uncom-
promising attitude increased the determination of the
workers to strike.
On May 10 three members of the grievance committee
were laid off by a foreman for alleged lack of work. That
night the grievance committee, disregarding the advice of
the A.R.U., voted unanimously to call a strike. On l*ay 11
the strike began. Some 4,000 employees walked out* To
demonstrate their intention that the strike remain non-
violent—that no Pullman property would be destroyed
—
300
strikers were assigned to guard production and repair
facilities. George Pullman promptly closed his shops and
'42
left for the East.
During the period I1ay"ll to July 4, 1$94, no
violence or destruction of property by strikers or syrapath-
1
30
izers took place at Pullman. Dot until late June did many
persons except the Pullman employees give more than passing
attention to the strike. For its first month, the dispute
was of major interest only to the Chicago press, which
generally was sympathetic to the cause of the workers. The
Aaerican Railway Lnion, striving to gain the support of
public opinion, urged workers to avoid unruliness. By
mid- June the strike had lasted over a month, yet workers
93had nothing to show for their efforts.
The Situation at Chicago
Beginning on June 12, however, pressure began
building in Chicago to force the Pullman Company into a
settlement—even if it meant escalating the strike on a
wider scale. On that day over 400 delegates representing
the 465 local unions of the American Railway Union met to
begin their first regularly scheduled convention. Several
days later the delegates voted to consider the Pullman
situation. A committee of strikers appeared before the
convention and submitted a long list of their reasons for
the strike. Wage reductions, high rentals, and Pullman's
94failure to redress grievances were the main issues.
The A.R.U. recognized that wrongs must be corrected
in lawful and orderly ways, it was carefully geared to
settle grievances in a harmonious fashion. In the event
issues could not be resolved by mediation, only a majority








decided to seek arbitration with the Pullman Company. On
June 16 a committee of delegates met with Vice President
Wickes and requested arbitration. He told them the Pullman
Company would never arbitrate. I ;ilarly, when the Civic
Federation of Chicago urged conciliation, \ ickes rejected




On June 21 the delegates, under instructions fr<
their local unions, unanimously voted that the members oj
the A.r.U. would refrain from handling Pullman cars on
June 26 unless the Pullman Company would consent to arbi-
tration. Eugene Debs, president of the A.R.I'., later
testified that "the strike was practically ordered by the
rank and file of the membership . . . the delegates acted
by their express authority and instruction." Me emphasised
that the delegates—not Debs—had ordered the strike.
According to historian Marry Bernard, the A.k.U. members had
nothing to gain for themselves by risking their jobs to
help the Pullman workers j the local unions voted to boycott
because of sympathy for their class.
The next day three members of the A.k.U. called upon
Viel.es and presented their ultimatum. The Pullman Company
flatly refused to deal with the A.R.U. or to submit anything
to arbitration. ' At that moment the Pullman Strike changed
from a local issue to a matter of national concern.
The General ilanager*s Association responded quickly




boycott by a united effort among its members in the interest
of railroad contracts aid "for the benefit of the travelling
public. . . ." 96
On June 26 the boycott was initiated.
Switchmen would refuse to couple Pullman cars, in-
spectors to examine them, and engineers and brakemen to haul
any train carrying the cars. Service would be tied up until
the Pullman Company negotiated, or the railroads stopped
using Pullman cars . w
The boycott started slowly, but then spread rapidly.
Switchmen at the Illinois Central refused to attach Pullman
cars to trains. Their subsequent discharge resulted in a
strike of the remaining union men.
The General Manager's Association adopted the policy
of discharging any man who refused to handle Pullman cars,
even though he may be willing to do all his other work.
Although no strike was declared against the railroads,
employees voluntarily initiated a strike in retaliation
against railroads who implemented this policy. As the
boycott spread it became a contest between the A.R.U. and
the G.M.A. But once initiated, the boycott also became
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THE STRIKE AKB THE PERIODICALS:
A SU3MARI OF COVERAGE
On June 26 Debs sent telegrams to all parts of the
nation. He told local unions Pullman cars were not to be
handled and he urged non-violence, since violence could
alienate the public and provide justification for military
intervention. With his headquarters at Uhlich»s Hall in
Chicago, Debs coordinated the boycott and resulting strike
until he was arrested in July.
Railroads could have left Pullman cars off their
trains, thereby avoiding trouble but at the same time
accomplishing the strike's purpose. The General Manager's
Association, however, decided to resist the boycott. In a
resolution issued to the public, the managers set forth
their reasons for this decision: to discontinue the use of
Pullman cars on passenger trains would be not only an in-
convenience to the travelling public, but also a violation
2
of existing contracts with the Pullman Company.
Railroad workers were in general sympathy with the
cause of the Pullman employees, and predisposed to strike.








• • . disturbed and apprehensive condition • • •
resulting from wage reductions on different lines,
blacklisting . . . and from the recent growth and
development of the General Manager's Association,
which seemed to them a menace. ->
When some employees were fired for refusal to handle
Pullman cars, many local railroad unions took the opportunity
to express their own grievances.
Hence the Pullman Strike was rapidly transformed
from a boycott to a general strike against the railroads.
There were several contributory factors: (1) sympathy for
the Pullman workers among railroad union employees; (2) the
firing of railroad employees who refused to handle Pullman
cars; and (3) the frustrations of railroad workers brought
on by bad working conditions.
As the boycott spread it became an issue of national
concern. The first big story of the Pullman Strike to reach
readers in the East was printed in the Hew York Times on
June 27. in early July the journals of opinion began
serious coverage of the strike.
Editorially, the four weeklies were unanimous in
their denunciation of the A.R.U. and the boycott. The
Outlook declared:
The issue is an absolutely simple one: it is
whether the highways of the Nation are to be con-
trolled by the American Railway Union, reinforced
by murderous mobs, and the right to travel . . .
is held at the pleasure of the American Railway
Union aid its officers .5
^n* Nation asserted that "the present boycott is an






90* re oJ Jr."*-
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Tn€ Independent called the boycott "senseless and
inhuman,** and added, "The railroad companies must resist it
7
to the bitter end.*'
Harper's Weekly denounced the boycott as the "basest
of crimes," and said it was "an attempt at blackmail on the
highest scale." The Weekly probably expressed the senti-
ments of most of the conservative press when it exclaimed,
"Until the rebellion is supressed, all differences of
opinion concerning its origin . . • are irrelevant to the
9issue of the hour, and must wait for the future."
The General r&nagers and Federal Attorneys
The employees of the Northern Pacific and Santa Fe
lines joined the strike on June 27.
By then Mayor John P. Hopkins had ordered his
entire 3#000 man police force to total readiness, with
orders to preserve the peace, protect property and prevent
violence
•
The strike expanded rapidly. By June ZB almost
1#,QQQ workers on six railroads had walked off their jobs.
The General i^anager f s Association, headed by Everett
St. John, directed all efforts on behalf of the railroads
toward victory over the American Railway Union. In daily
meetings to plan strategy against the strike, the G.M.A.s
(1) began to coordinate with civil and military authorities;
(2) set up a committee of lawyers to initiate legal pro-
ceedings; (3) started hiring replacements for strikers; and
Mi
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(4) established a publicity bureau to provide the press with
information designed to build public support for their
cause
.
To manage anti-strike activities, the General
Managers appointed John M. Egan *director of resistance** on
June 2#. Everett St. John presided over the daily meetings,
but Egan was charged with executing all strike policies.
The next day, 4,500 railroad workers met at Blue Island,
i-tore than one-third decided to support the American Hallway
Union. In response, the General rflanagers promised they
would blacklist any worker who joined the A.R.U. strike or
12
refused to perform any of his duties.
On about June 29 the legal committee of the G.M.A.
recommended immediate proceedings against the American
Railway Union for interference with mail and interstate
commerce; and it decided to seek injunctions to restrain the
strikers. The General Managers agreed; federal assistance
was needed. The association relayed its legal recommen-
dations, along with a request for more federal deputies, to
Thomas F. Milchrist, United States district attorney in
Chicago. 1^
.lchrist was fully cooperative. He told the G.M.A.
he would invoke the conspiracy section of the Interstate
Commerce Law in prosecuting those who obstructed interstate
freight, furthermore, he asked the railways to supply his








way with the movement of trains carrying the mail, or who
14
cut off Pullman or other cars from mail-carrying trains.
During the Great Northern strike in April, the
Justice Department had issued an opinion regarding mail
trains j in effect, every car of any train carrying mail was
part of the mail train and thus entitled to federal pro-
tection. Under this precedent, any employee who cut off a
Pullman car from a train carrying mail was subject to
15punishment by the federal government. #
These preliminary dealings between the G.M.A. and
U. S. District Attorney r&lchrist received only slight
coverage by the journals. The appointment of Egan as
•strike manager* of the G.M.A. was reported only in Harper*
s
Weekly .16
In a telegram to Attorney General Richard Olney on
June 30» I^ilehrist reported that .aail trains in the suburbs
of Chicago were, on the previous night, stopped by strikers.
He recommended that the U. S* Marshal in Chicago be authorized
to appoint a special force of deputies to help protect the
17
mail trains. '
Olney had served as attorney for the Chicago, Quincy
and Burlington Railroad} he viewed the strike as an attack
against railroad property and a threat to corporate control.
Olney authorized the U. S. Marshal, to swear in as many men
as were needed, and he appointed Edwin Walker as a special





Walker had served as a general counsel for the
Chicago, . Ilwaukee and St. Paul Railroad. He was then a
20
legal adviser to the General Onager* s Association.
The Outlook , though it omitted V/alker by name, and
referred to him simply as "a prominent lawyer at Chicago.
. . .
M was the only journal to report (correctly) that he
had been appointed in response to a recommendation from the
21General Manager* s Association to the Attorney General.
Walker* s appointment received no mention in the other
journals.
Although Valker was assigned to assist Hilchrist, it
soon became evident that talker, in close liason with the
G.M.A., was the real director of affairs for the Justice
22
Department in Chicago. Despite his importance to the
federal strategy, Walker »s role in the strike was almost
completely ignored by the journals of opinion.
Before the day was over, U» S« Marshal John Arnold
had begun to swear in a force of special federal deputies.
During the period June 30 to July 5 several thousand men
were deputized, many of them loyal railroad employees
furnished by the G.n.A. 2^
By 1 July 1S94, nearly 50,000 men were on strike.
Of the 24 railroads centering in Chicago, few escaped
involvement . As the strike gained momentum, railway
trai sportation became increasingly disrupted. Freight
trains hauling boxcars loaded with perishable food supplies
were soon unable to move. '
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Olney urged U. S. district attorneys to take all
measures necessary to prevent the stoppage of mail and
punish the guilty • He suggested that injunctions against
the strikers be obtained that would, in his words, "have
the effect of preventing any attempt to commit the offense •'
The Attorney General 1 s plan for suppressing the
strike was not confined to strictly legal tactics . In a
telegram to Edwin Walker, Olney said that he felt the best
way of dealing with the matter was "by a force which is
overwhelming and prevents any attempt at resistance."
Harper's Weekly , in one of several personality
sketches, referred to Richard Olney as "the moving spirit
of the government . • * his cool and steady brain has dis-
covered and given vitality to a doctrine of the authority
27
of the national government • "
Walker and MilChrist drafted the petition for an
injunction. They asked the federal court to enjoin all
interference with the mail and to prohibit all interference
with interstate commerce under the provisions of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.
The injunction, issued by a United States Circuit
Court, was extremely comprehensive* Officials of the
American Railway Union and all other persons "combining and
conspiring" with them were "restrained, commanded, and
enjoined absolutely to desist and refrain from in any manner




the business. . . n of the railroads The injunction
listed a myriad of specific acts prohibited. It even
restrained Debs, president of the A«R»U*» from "sending
out any letters, messages, or communications directing,
inciting, encouraging, or instructing any persons whatsoever
29
to interfere with the business. . . ."of the railways.
On July 2 the injunction was issued and served on
Debs and other officials of the A»R»U. This was not the
first time the union had faced such an order. The A.E.U.
experienced a similar injunction during the Great Northern
Strike aid had successfully ignored it. Debs intended to
ignore this one as well*
While federal attorneys dealt with Debs, the General
Mwiager*s Association decided to take more direct action in
order to draw the U. 0« government into the struggle. Part
of the G.-i.A.^s policy had been to arouse the anger of the
travelling public by aggravating the transportation tie-up.
On July 2 the Ger.eral ,-lanagers decided gradually to withdraw
31passenger trains from service* This decline in railway
traffic would be attributed to the boycott and strike "in-
stigated" by Debs and executed by members of the A»R.U.
Part of the strategy developed between Walker and
the G#M.A« involved the rationale that the A.R.t. was inter-
fering with the mails. On July 1, however, the mail trains
had free passage. In fact, the A#R.U# had even offered






None of this strategy or this collusion between the
•A* and Walker was reported in the weeklies* They
apparently accepted at face value "strike manager* Egan*s
assertion that the strikers had •"fought** the railroads to
a "standstill •*'•*•*
Before the day was over. Special Attorney Edwin
Walker had telegraphed Olneys **It is the opinion of all
that the orders of the court cannot be enforced except by
the aid of the Regular Array." In response, President Grover
Cleveland directed that federal troops be prepared to move
to Chicago.*34
The next day (J. S. Marshal Arnold wired Olney* A
mob of several thousand had rioted in the Rock Island yards
at Blue Island, Illinois • A mail train had been ditched.
The marshal had read the injunction to the mob and commanded
it to disperse. The mob responded with jeers and hoots,
then threw several baggage-cars across the tracks. Arnold
reported*
I am unable to disperse the mob, clear the
tracks, or arrest the tnen who were engaged in the
acts naned, and believe that no force less than the
regular troops of the United States can procure the
passage of the ;iiail-trains, or enforce the orders
of the courts.
Attorneys Walker and illchrist, plus a federal judge en-
dorsed Arnold* s ssessage.
At this time, Illinois Governor Altgeld was sending
troops to various points as requested by local authorities.
He was prepared to wmm state troops to Chicago if the need




. Arnold's telegram, however, made no mention of the
availability of local police or state militia.
In Washington, the President met with his Cabinet-
Secretary oi" Iter Daniel Lamont, General Nelson A. ililes, and
Secretary of State Walter Q. Oresham opposed the use of
federal troops. Attorney General Olney, however, was in
complete agreement with the telegram he received from
Chicago. President Cleveland decided to intervene. He
ordered troops to Chicago under the authority of sections
5293 and 5299 of the Revised Statutes of the United States .
Governor Altgeld had not requested U. S» troops, nor had
President Cleveland consulted with the governor in arriving
at his decision.
Federal Intervention, Official Protest
and Violence
At 4i00 p. . J July 1894 Army Headquarters telegraphed
the order to Port Sheridan that directed Colonel R. E. A.
Crofton to move his entire command to Chicago. Olney wired
Walker and Gilchrist to ensure that troops were used "within
the lirats provided by the Constitution and laws.*1 Troops
were ordered to protect federal property, prevent obstruction
of the mails, prevent interference with interstate commerce,
and enforce the mandates of the federal courts*
During that night some 1,200 U. S. Army regulars
were brought into Chicago, 'the Fifteenth Infantry, Troops
B and K, Seventh Cavalry, and Light Battery E, First
,IJTXftL
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Artillery . . .," according to the official report* The
only journal to provide an accurate summary of these units
was Outlook .^
^
By the corning of Independence Day the regulars had
set up camp on Chicago's lake front* General Miles arrived
and assumed conamnd.40
Harper* s Weekly described Miles as "a nsan • . . of
perfect loyalty, of trained capacity, of sound judgement,
unmoved by fear or passion, independent of political pressure,
uninfluenced by prejudice, a ruler of others and of himself**
According to Aliaont Lind^ey, "Prior to July 4 the
situation in Chicago did not go beyond some sabotage and an
occasional densonstration that was quickly suppressed by the
police." As the troops arrived the city was quiet* Although
many trains did not .nove, this was in no way due to threat-
42
ening boos; it was due to insufficient crews*
Soon, however, the workers heard of the arrival of
the federal troops. Aggressive crowds began to form*
Vandalism increased, and mobs at the Union Stock Yards
halted the ntovement of all railway cars containing meat or
livestock* -*
Outlook was the only weekly to report that disorder
in Chicago increased after the arrival of the regulars*
Attorney General Olney told reporters, "fee have been
brought to the ragged edge of anarchy and it is time to see
whether the law is sufficiently strong to prevent this con-




On the tenth day of the boycott , July 5, Governor
Altgeld wired President Cleveland a long, vigorous protest
on the presence of federal troops in Chicago. The Governor
said it was "entirely unnecessary and . • . unjustifiable."
He pointed out that a marshal in southern Illinois had twice
requested state troops, that the troops had been quickly
provided, and that the same course of action was open to
the marshal at Chicago* Altgeld asked for the immediate
withdrawal of federal troops and saidt
Should the situation at any time get so serious
that we cannot control it with the State forces,
we will promptly and freely ask for Federal
assistance* . . -*°
Cleveland made a terse, formal reply* He said that
troops were sent to remove obstruction of the mails, to
enforce the processes of the federal courts, and to cope
47
with "conspiracies" against interstate commerce*
The Nation said Altgeld* s protest was perfectly
understandable. He was the "anarchist" governor who had
pardoned three Haymarket prisoners a year earlier j "it is
only natural that he should sympathize with anarchists who
have not yet be%n sent to prison."
Harper* s Weekly was equally outspoken: "In the light
of burning property and amid the howls of furious throngs
bent on cutting off the food of his citizens . . .*• Governor








The Independent and the Outlook both supported the
President, but were more moderate in their denunciation of
Altgeld. The Independent referred to Altgeld* s protest as
an "untimely and impertinent rebuke • . .," and justified
federal intervention with the assertion that for a week or
longer "the strikers have gone on . . . destroying property
50
at a rate of two or three million dollars a day."'
Outlook less passionately declared, "It is no time
for a public debate concerning the powers of the Federal
Government," and urged men of all parties "to sustain the
51President ... in enforcing law and punishing crime."
That afternoon General Miles reported a mob of more
than 2,000 had overturned about 20 freight cars, which
obstructed all freight and passenger traffic in the vicinity
of the stock yards. He added,
The injunction of the United States court is
openly defied, and unless the mobs are dispersed
by the action of the police or they are fired
upon by United States troops, more serious trouble
may be expected, as the mob ie increasing and be-
coming more defiant. 52
o anding General J. M« Schofield replied, telling
Mies to protect ti. S. property, but to leave the preserve-
53tion of peace to city and state authorities.
The Rock Island railroad reported having trouble from
a mob of several thousand which was moving eastward along
the line, overturning cars, burning station houses and
destroying property. The Outlook , in an exaggerated




Hayor Hopkins telegraphed Governor Altgeld and asked
that the First Regiment of Chicago be alerted for possible
duty within 24 hours. Altgeld complied with Hopkins*
request immediately and ordered Brigadier General Horace A.
I heeler to take appropriate action in support of the mayor
.
By then the police force had increased to 3>500 men and was
fully engaged in breaking up mob violence. And Hopkins had
Issued a proclamation prohibiting riotous assemblies and
directing the police to stop people from interfering with
55
the railroads.
Late that night, a colossal fire of unexplained
origins destroyed the seven largest buildings remaining from
the 1393 World 1 s Fair in Jackson Park. The result: one man
dead and four injured. Harper's weekly was the only journal
to report the fire. It accurately declared that the "origin
56
of the fire is a puzzle that will never be solved."^
On Friday, July 6, Governor Altgeld renewed his
protest against federal intervention. In an even longer,
even stronger objection, he wired the President:
Your answer to my protest • . • evades the question
at issue—that is, that the principle of local
self-government is just as fundamental in our
institutions as is that of Federal supremacy.
Altgeld charged the President with assuming a legal right
to order federal troops into any community of the United
. . . whenever there is the slightest disturbance,
and . . . without any regard • • . as to whether the
community is able and ready to enforce the law
itself. 57




The governor repeated his belief that state troops
were adequate to deal with the situation and again asked
58for the withdrawal of federal troops.
Cleveland sent a one sentence reply. He denied
that he had transcended his authority and concluded:
... it seems to me that in this hour of danger,
• • • discussion may well give way to active
efforts on the part of all in authority to restore
obedience to law and to protect life and property #59
Following Cleveland's response to Altgeld's second
telegram, the Nation declared:
President Cleveland's method of dealing with
Governor Altgeld is a model one. He wastes no
time in arguing with him or in defending himself
against his attacks, but . . . sets him before the
country in his true light as the friend and
champion of disorder.""
Harper's Weekly expressed similar views. It called
Altgeld a "demogogue" and a "crank;** said he has made
himself a "counsel for those opposed to law;" and asserted
that his protest to Cleveland "wholly misrepresented the
facts as they were known to exist in Illinois ..."
The Independent made no mention of Altgeld* s second
protest. The Outlook , however, gave a concise, objective
/To
account of the incident.
By then the struggle involved 21 states and terri-
tories. The federal government had sworn in thousands of
deputy marshals; over 16,000 federal troops were being used
to protect the nation's railroads. Although the American
Railway Union had advised against strikes on roads that did
ratfj
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not use Pullman cars, some of the local unions had decided
to strike on their own initiative based on local grievances. **
Governor Altgeld was not alone in his protests
against Cleveland. The governors of Missouri 9 Colorado,
Texas, Oregon and Kansas issued similar complaints that
64federal intervention was unwarranted.
Prior to the rioting on the Mock Island line ard
the overturned freight cars at the stockyards, damage to
railroad property amounted to less than $6,000. ftone of
the railroads had asked either Governor Altgeld or Mayor
Hopkins for help. On July 6, however, railways began to
65
request state troops and police.
That morning, Governor Altgeld received a telegram
from officials of the Illinois Central that indicated a
riot was in progress. He told the president of that rail-
road to ask the mayor to seek assistance from the state.
Then he relayed a message urging Hopkins to ensure that
police and state troops dealt with the situation before
federal troops could be reinforced. Shortly thereafter,
the mayor wired the governor with a request for four addi-
tional regiments of state militia. Altgeld responded
promptly. Over 4,000 state troops were ordered into the
city.66
The weeklies differed in their accounts of this
episode. Hone mentioned that the additional Illinois troops
were requested by the mayor after Altgeld had urged him to





on the Governor for militia, which were rather reluctantly
furnished. ..." The Outlook accurately reported that "the
State militia was immediately ordered out." The Independent
67
and the Nation failed to report the incident.
Despite Hopkin's proclamation, lawlessness was
prevalent along the railroad lines* Rioting mobs had
demolished train stations, cut telegraph lines, and set fire
to more than one hundred box cars. Incendiaries had ignited
the cars with torches and the wind had fanned the flames
through row upon row of tightly packed cars, stored in the
outlying yards. Railroad property valued at $340,000 was
destroyed.
United States soldiers were kept busy in four
locations dispersing mobs and supporting the marshals in
69
making arrests of those violating the court injunction. 7
The artist Frederic Remington, with the V* S. Army
in Chicago, covered the strike for Harper* s Weekly in
several features with accompanying illustrations of the
military. In one account he related,
When infantry niust walk through a seething mass
of smells, stale beer, and bad language, they
don ft understand. The soldier idea would be to
create about eleven cords of compost out of the
material at hand.7^
That afternoon, in a telegram to the Secretary of
War, General Mile© reported:
Of the twenty-three Csic] roads centering in
Chicago, only six are unobstructed in freight,
passenger and mail transportation. Thirteen are
at present entirely obstructed, and ten are
&M1
running only mail- and passenger-trains . Large
numbers of trains moving in and out of the city
have been stoned and fired upon by mobs, and one
engineer killed.71
Late that night at the railroad yards in South
Chicago, an epidemic of fires destroyed some seven hundred
cars. As the devastation reached its climax, more and more
state troops were deployed to clear the tracks, protect
72property and restore order
•
The most serious incident of the strike occurred on
July 7» A crowd had gathered at 49th and Loomis Streets.
A company of state troops stood guard as a work crew
attempted to raise an overturned box car. After a time,
the mob threw stones and fired several shots at the guards.
The soldiers were told to load their weapons. V/hen four of
the troops were wounded, orders were given to fire at will.
The result: four persons killed and 20 wounded. This was
73the peak of violence in the Chicago phase of the struggle. ,J
Three weeklies reported this confrontation. The
Outlook and Harper* s Weekly each reported that it was the
state militia which had engaged with the rioters. Their
accounts differed as to the number killed and wounded, with
the Outlook * s estimate closest to official reports. The
Independent was vague as to which troops were involved
(i.e., "the soldiers meant business*'), and said the incident
happened on July S.' 4
die the militia was engaged with rioters, General





eight U. S* Army companies to protect trains bringing food
75
and mail to the city. They began to clear the tracks.'*^
As the day drew to a close it became evident that the
violence of the past 4S hours was waning* Chicago had
survived several tragic, but limited spasms. The city was
shaken, but police and Illinois troops, with slight backing
by the regulars, had effectively put down most of the mob
disturbances. Sensational news stories, however, distorted
these developments beyond their true perspective. Many
newspapers gave the impression that most of Chicago was
convulsed by revolution and that President Cleveland and
76the federal troops were saving the city. 1
The Collapse of the StrikeWPiin ^i H mm i !*<» mufciwn -w «... # !—
—
! « .1
On July 8 President Cleveland issued an Executive
Proclamation. He warned all persons having anything to do
with unlawful assemblages to disperse and return home by
77




All the weeklies reported the proclamation.
According to Harper's Weekly , it "fairly electrified the
country. There had been nothing like it since Lincoln's
call for volunteers. . . ." Remington, in a separate article,
probably expressed the military reaction to the proclamation
when he remarked, "Chicago should have been put under
martial law immediately; a few rioters shot, and this would
7''
all have been over before now.'
SJJk
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At Uhlich Hall, headquarters of the American Railway
Union, representatives from more than 100 locals of the
Chicago trade unions met* They decided that another attempt
should be made to induce the Pullman Company to accept
arbitration* If the grievances of the Pullman workers were
not settled by July 10, a city-wide general strike would
79be called.'
The following day a subcommittee composed of repre-
sentatives from the Chicago trade unions and aldermen from
a committee appointed by Mayor Hopkins called upon the
Pullman Company* They proposed the creation of a board of
arbitration consisting of two judges, two Pullman officials,
and a fifth member acceptable to both sides. This proposi-
tion was flatly rejected; the Pullman Company again asserted
there was nothing to arbitrate*
The only journals to report the Pullman refusal were
#1Outlook and Harper's Weekly .
On July 10 Illinois troops at the Union Stock Yards
succeeded in clearing a blockade which had halted the
movement ef boxcars loaded with meat* Trains on the Rock
Island Railroad began to run* Additional federal troops
arrived In Chicago, increasing the total there to nearly
2,000* *
Ichrist and Walker met with a special grand jury
and asked for indictments against Eugene Debs and other
A.R.U. officials on the grounds of conspiracy in the ob-






later, Debs and three of his associates were indicted. They
were quickly apprehended, but a few hours later they were
released on bail. J
While Debs and his associates were in the custody of
the court, several law officers raided his headquarters,
seized his books and papers, and delivered them to the
office of U. S. District Attorney Milchrist. The following
day, however, a federal judge declared this to be an illegal
iiprocedure and ordered all of Debs' personal papers returned.
Although all the weeklies reported Debs' indictment,
none reported the Illicit aspects of the raid on his head-
quarters. The Mation observed!
The fact of the arrest of the head of the con-
spirators, the swift measures taken to collect
overwhelming evidence against them, and the prac-
tical certainty that they will be convicted in due
time • • • could but have an immediate and powerful
effect. Debs . . . could not palm himself off as
a Dictator much longer. 5 *
Harper's WeeKly reported:
The United States attorney had some of the
best legal talent in the city to assist him in his
work . . . The papers and official documents of
the union were seized by the Federal authorities,
and the quartet was jailed. They *ere soon bailed
out. 80
Elsewhere the Weekly proclaimed:
When men combine to effect an unlawful pur-
pose, even by acts each of which may be in Itself
no offense, they are guilty of conspiracy, and all
who abet them, knowing their purpose, share their
guilt.?
Outlook 's account included an explanation of the legal
rationale upon which Debs was indicted. Rather than urging
*f onon
60
a hasty conviction, however, Outlook cautioned,
A serious danger, now that the strike is over,
is that the law will be stretched, if not violated,
in popular passion against the strikers* . • . It
is a great deal better that the officers of the
American Railway Union be acquitted of crime,
despite the injury they have inflicted on American
commerce, than that they should be convicted by
stretching the law. . . »88
As for the Independent , its report was concise and
straightforward
.
Out of sympathy for the cause of the A.R.U., labor
leader James Sovereign issued a call on July 10 for a
general strike of the Knights of Labor. It proved a futile
90gesture, however, for the Knights refused to act.
All the weeklies except Nation reported this in-
cident involving the Knights. Harper* s, Weekly reported it
in a separate feature about Sovereign. The Independent
gave it a brief mention. The Outlook , however, was the
journal to offer Sovereign 1 s reasons for declaring the
91
strike in sympathy with the A.R.U.
The congress of Chicago trade unions soon learned
that Pullman had refused to arbitrate. A city-wide general
sympathy strike was called, effective July 11. It failed
miserably. With Debs under arrest and the military in firm
control of the city, only about 25,000 workers responded
92to the call, "tost returned to work the following day.
Meanwhile, in Washington, the Senate adopted a
resolution expressing full endorsement of the "prompt and
vigorous" measures taken by the President to deal with the






amendment supporting the principle of arbitration in re-
93
solving labor disputes, but it failed to pass.
The Nation was quite pleased: "The Senate had • . •
shown that there is no sympathy with anarchy outside the
three or four Populist cranks" who tried to weaken the
94
resolution.
On July 12, rtayor Hopkins of Chicago and .'-Sayor
Pingree of Detroit called upon Vice President Wickes at the
Pullman Company. They presented telegrams from 50 other
mayors throughout the country concerning the strike and
asking George Pullman to arbitrate differences with his
men. Wickes repeated the official Pullman position that
there was nothing to arbitrate. He told them the question
of "reopening the shops at Pullman, and carrying them on
at a ruinous loss, was not a proper subject for arbitra-
tion." 95
That same day, the executive officers of labor
unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor met
at Chicago. The purpose of their meeting was to consider all
aspects of the strike and to decide what policy, if any,
should be adopted. Samuel Gompers presided over the meeting.
Debs, freed temporarily on bail, appeared before the
conference and explained the position of the A.H.I. He
asked Gompers to deliver a message to the G.M.A. from the
A.R.U. proposing an end to the boycott on condition that the
strikers be permitted to return to their jobs; if the offer
96













The conference, though sympathetic with the cause of
the American Railway Union, rejected Debs 1 request. As the
Strike Commission explained:
The conference concluded that the strike was
then lost; that a general sympathetic strike
throughout the country would be unwise and in-
expedient. . . .97
Furthermore, the A.F. of L. delegates recommended that all
striking men return to work. They were, however, in favor
of a rapid settlement. That afternoon they wired President
Cleveland, urging him to bring an end to the strike with
fairness to both sides. The President neither acknowledged
nor answered their request.
Having failed to gain the full support of the
American Federation of Labor, Debs asked Mayor Hopkins to
deliver to the General Manager* s Association the A»R.'
proposal which Gompers had declined to transmit. The mayor
was willing to try.
The next day, July 13 $ Mayor Hopkins and a Chicago
alderman called on the General Manager's Association and
presented the document to G.il.A. chairman Everett St. John.
A short time later the document was returned to the mayor
with the explanation that the G.M.A. was unwilling to
accept any communication from the A.R.U. John Egan, strike
manager of the G.M.A., asserted that the document was in-
sulting: it originated with the A.R.U. which had "attacked
railway companies, " was "whipped, * and yet sought to "dictate





In the opinion of Eugene Debs, the proposal was
returned because the G.i<I.A. "wanted to crush and annihilate
the American Railway Union at whatever cost to the public."
The Independent and Harper* s Weekly each reported
this final effort to end the strike by an agreement, but both
101
reports were sketchy*
The Weekly criticized Mayor Hopkins, who "instead of
putting forth, at the beginning, his whole power to enforce
the laws, played the dawdling part of a feeble mediator.
*
Neither the Weekly nor the Independent reported the earlier
effort of Hopkins and Pingree to secure arbitration with
Pullman. The Outlook , however, covered both incidents, and
102did so in a more complete account.
As Friday, July 13, came to a close there was little
doubt that the strike in Chicago had been virtually broken.
All rioting had ended and roost trains were running on
schedule. ;4obs had succumbed to the combined forces of
the police, militia, marshals and U. S. troops. With the
arrest of Eugene Debs, the courts had deprived the A.R.U.
of effective leadership.103
On July 16 a resolution was introduced into the
U. S. House of Representatives. Similar to the Senate
resolution of July 11, it expressed approval of the efforts
of President Cleveland and his Administration to end the
strike. Representative Lafe Pence, a Colorado Populist,







Attorney General Olney, as a former railroad lawyer, to
order indictments and injunctions against union officials.
Congressman Richard P. Bland of Missouri also opposed the
resolution. He protested the "omnibus" nature of the
federal injunction and asserted, "The whole arm of the
State authority should be used in suppressing violence be-
fore the Federal Government should intervene. . • .*'
Despite these objections, most congressmen felt that
Olney was merely performing his duty; the resolution was
adopted.
Before the day had ended, the Hew York Times pro-
claimed: "Strike is Dead."105
Harper's Weekly criticized Congress for its tardy
support of the President:
It was only after the popular response to the
President's order to the troops and his telegrams
to Altgeld that Congress found its voice sufficiently
to denounce violence and commend the President for
enforcing the laws of the United States.106
The Nation, in a similar editorial tone, concluded:
now that the emergency is past, "no one will have any
feeling but amused contempt for a House that falls a-fighting
a fortnight too late."10?
On July 17, one week after Debs and his top A.R.U.
officials had been arrested and charged with conspiracy,
they appeared again in federal court. This time they were
charged with contempt of court in having disobeyed the





tine to prepare its case. Despite the strenuous objections
of Edwin Walker, the court deferred the hearing until
July 23. Bondsmen were present, but the defendants waived
10&bail and spent a week in jail.
The weeklies oade brief mention of the incident, but
gave fuller coverage of the legal proceedings as they later
developed.
Throughout the major struggle in Chicago, the Pullman
strikers had remained quietly in the background. On 1$
July, io94, the management of the Pullman Company posted a
notice on the gates of the shops
t
These shops will be opened as soon as the
number of operatives taken on is sufficient to
make a working force in all departiaents.109
All former employees, except strike leaders, had the
opportunity to reapply for work provided that they would
renounce their membership in the A.R.U. The strike had
gained the workers nothing, and cost them a great deal;
they were forced to accept their old wage scale and pay the
110
rents as in April.'
Pullman employees lost soiae $350,000 in wages;
striking Chicago railroad employees lost over $1,000,000
in wages. The cost to Chicago railroads was nearly $700,000
in property damage and expanses, and more than $4,600,000
in passenger and freight revenue. By the time the strike
ended in Chicago, 12 persons had been killed, 71 indicted,












After the strike collapsed, Independent commented,
"The act of the American Railway Union was an impudent
attempt at dictation and coercion, and the whole country
112
rejoiced in its failure."
A summary of the key events in the Chicago phase
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THE ISSUES: AM FXPLAKATIOB
On 19 July 1894, state and federal troops began to
leave Chicago- On August 6 the last of the Illinois militia
was ordered home. At the height of the struggle, more than
14,000 armed forces, including police and deputies, had been
on duty.
Elsewhere throughout the country the strike gradually
collapsed. Grand juries were summoned, Indictments drawn,
and hundreds arrested for contempt. Few persons were
2
actually found guilty.
With Debs under indictment, the American Railway
Union steadily declined in power.
At Pullman, Illinois, most of the workers who quit
the A.R.U. were re-employed and by August 24, more than
2,300 men were back at work.^
To place the Pullman Strike in proper perspective,
three topics remain: (1) the legal action against Debs;
(2) th* Report of the U# S. Strike Commission; and (3) reper-
cussions of the strike.
fogene Debs and the Federal Courts
Although Debs had been charged with conspiracy to









to these charges were never completed. On 14 December
1#94, however, Judge William A. Voods—one of the judges
who had Issued the injunction against the strikers--found
Debs and hi© associates guilty of contempt. Debs was
sentenced to six months in prison*
I ollowing an appeal to the Supreme Court, hearings
began in ;arch 1895* Two basic questions were raised*
(1) whether the government had the authority to prevent
forcible obstruction of the mails and interstate comsierce;
and (2) whether a U* 5. court of equity was authorized to
issue injunctions. On 27 May 1#95 the Supreme Court issued
its decision: both question© were answered in the affirma-
5
tive and the proceedings of the lower court were upheld.
Eugene Debs returned to prison to complete serving
his sentence. By the tine he was released iron confinement
he had become a determined Socialist, convinced that only
a thorough revision of the prevailing economic system could
right the wrongs of the working class.
The Report of the U. S. Strike Commission
Under the provisions of a federal law passed in
1&&8, President Cleveland on 26 July 1$94 appointed a
three-roan commission to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the strike. Carroll D. Wright 9 1« 3. Commissioner
of Labor, was in charge of the investigation. Hearings
began in Chicago on 15 August 1&94, and for the next two







In addition to its findings, the U* S. Strike
Commission made specific recommendations, several of which
were: (1) that a permanent federal strike commission be
established, with authority to investigate, make recomiaen-
dations and decisions concerning railway disputes} (2) that
states be encouraged to consider the adoption of some system
of conciliation and arbitration; ^ (3) that labor unions be
fully recognized by law in order to "prevent their follies
by conferring upon them the privileges enjoyed by corpora-
10
tions, with like proper restrictions and regulations;**
(4) that employers be urged to recognise labor unions,
since "while the interests of capital and labor are not
identical, they are reciprocal? * (5) that employers should
voluntarily raise wages when economic conditions permit such
a change, but that if wages are reduced, workers should be
12given the reasons*
The Strike Commission did not favor government
ownership of railways as an immediate solution to the
problems of labor* However, if railroads continued to con-
solidate, there would "at least have to be greater Government
regulation and control of quasi-public corporations than
we have now." ^
The Report of the Strike Commission was made public
in November, 1#94, and provoked much comment in the press*
Repercussions of the Strike




falre economic assumptions prevailing in the l£90 f s. it
created precedents, implications and controversies that
influenced the course of labor relations long after 1894*
First, the strike led to the death of the American
Railway Union* Labor began a shift to trade unions*
Second, the use of federal court injunctions in
dealing with labor disputes became institutionalized, a
15
trend that was not reversed until the 1930*e»
Third, states began to e:xperiesent with the creation
of boards of arbitration and eventually enacted legislation
responsive to the needs of laborers*
Tourth, in 189$ Congress passed the Frdraan Act,
which provided for the voluntary arbitration of railway labor
disputes by a three-wan ad hoc coiamlscion* According to one
historian, this law was evidence of a changed attitude on
the part of the government, that force was no longer accepted
17
as the ultimate answer to railroad strikes*
inally, in the Hational Industrial Recovery Act of
1933 (and related New Deal legislation), industrial workers
were guaranteed the right to organise and bargain collectively
through their own representatives* As recommended by the
Strike Commission, labor unions were at last "fully recog-
nised by law."
Arising from the "original" strike at Pullman,
ilmth
7S
Illinois, were the issues of wages, rents, shop abuses, and
the refusal of company officials to arbitrate*
Wage Reductions
The principle cause of the Pullman Strike of 1894
was a radical reduction of wages fostered by a depression in
business conditions* following the Panic of 1$93 , the
market for Pullman cars decreased; employment dropped from
4,500 men to less than 1,100 workers by 1 November 1S93*19
From September 1&93 through April 1&94, in order to
meet the competition and keep the plant running, Pullman
reduced the prices for his cars an average of 25 per cent*
Because of this drastic policy, the company managed to
secure sufficient contracts to keep the construction shops
operating* As of April 1#94, the working force had in~
20
creased to nearly 4,200 men.
During this period the Pullman Company lost almost
$52 f OOO on its construction work. In comparison, the loss
to labor by the reduction of wages paid on this work was
21
over $60,000—an average pay cut of 25 par cent*
Concerning this reduction in wages, several questions
need to be asked*
(1) Cou24 the Pullman Company have absorbed the
$52,000 loss in revenue without reducing wages? The con-
struction department, in which the company suffered this





conducted by the company. It employed only about 20 per
cent of the total work force. The majority of the employees
worked in the operating division, which, despite the de~
22
pression, continued to earn substantial profits.
According to historian Aliaont Lindsay,
The revenue from the operating division in
1&94 was sufficient to have absorbed all losses
sustained in the construction department, to have
?erraitted the payment of regular dividends, and
n addition to have left a surplus of over
$2,000,000.23
(2) Was the financial loss to the company fairly
shared between raanageiaent and labor? The evidence suggests
it was not. As noted above, the Pullman Company did con-
tract work during September 1^93 to frtey 1694 at a loss of
$52,000 below shop cost for labor and materials. The cost
of building a car was about 75 per cent of total production
cost. let the company passed more than its entire loss—
$60,000—to labor in the form of reduced wages*
As the Strike Commission observed, "Three-quarters
of the loss for the company and the balance for labor would
have more fairly equalized the division of the loss on
25
these contracts." Had Pullman shared the loss to his
company in this manner with his employees, they would have
lost in reduced wages only about 25 per cent of the $52,000,
or $13,000. The average wage reduction would have been
closer to five per cent.
(3) In justifying his refusal to increase the wages





• • • the aggregate cost of a piece of work must
not exceed its selling price. . • • This company-
can not control the selling price of cars, and it
can not pay wore for making them than it can con-
tract to sell them for*26
Pullman claimed he waa eelling his cars at a price
below the cost of building them. Assuming the cost of
materials to be a "fixed* expense, in what ways other than
wage reductions could he have reduced construction costs?
He could have reduced the "cost" of his managers*
While Pullman workers in the shops lost about 25 per cent
in wages, the salaries ©f officials, supervisors and foremen
were not reduced at all* Reductions in these salaries, said
the Strike Commission, "would have relieved the harshness
of the situation and would have evinced a genuine sympathy
with labor in the disasters of the tinies." '
Second, Pullman could have accepted a lower level
of corporate profit. Despite declining revenue, the Pullman
Company suffered no loss on its own earnings* During fiscal
year 1694, the company had a surplus of $2,320,000 and paid
2£>dividends of eight per cent* Commenting on this matter
before the Strike Commission, a leader of the employee
grievance committee said: H , >r. Pullman claimed he was
losing money, and then two days afterward declared a
[quarterly] dividend of $600,000, and that made the men
29
Bttch more determined to strike*"
(4) How did Pullman distribute the wage reductions
among the various departments? The Strike Commission con-







of its financial condition, "to the lowest point possible
to be reached in the department most seriously affected by
the depression;"-^ the commissioners asserted that such a
reduction was not relatively fair to repair shop employees.
Ifcreover, the percentage of wages reduced in each
workshop varied considerably* Painters, for example, lost
an average of 13 per cent; freight-car builders lost 41
31per cent* As Reverend William H. Carwardine, pastor of
a church in Pullman at the time of the strike, noted,
The cuts seemed to fall unequally on different
classes of employees, the scale changed so often
that the men were in a constant condition of
wonderment as to what would be the next move.
The worst feature was that . • • they did not
have the opportunity to put in full time .32
(5) Why had Pullman continued to operate his factory
if he was losing money on construction contracts? Pullman
asserted that he had done so mainly for the unselfish
reason of keeping his men employed .-^ The Strike Commission,
however, rejected this contention:
The commission thinks that the evidence shows
that it Cthe company]] sought to keep running
mainly for its own benefit as a manufacturer, that
its plant might not rust « . that it might be
ready for resumption when business revived with
a live plant ar.d competent help, and that its
revenue from its tenements might continue .34
(6) V'as it fair for the employees to demand their
old wage scale? The Strike Commission blamed the company
for reducing wages excessively, but said, "The company was
hardly more at fault therein than were the employees in





According to Reverend Carwardine, however , the
employees never really expected to obtain the old wage
scale; they did, however, expect that at least "the Company
would agree to lessen the severity of the cut in wages • . .,
and then to reduce their rents. • • • "'
Rents
Concerning George Pullman, one observer in 1&94
wrote: "The wages he pays out with one hand, the Pullman
Palace Car Company, he takes back with the other, the Pullman
Land Association ••••" The company controlled both wages and
rents, yet the two were not coordinated to insure residents
had something to live on. Wages were sharply reduced but
rents remained constant.
The average rental in Pullman was $14.00 including
the water fee. Luring the depression, rents had gone down
elsewhere, but not in Pullman. This the workers considered
unfair. Rents were up to 33 per cent higher than in other
nearby towns and 20 to 25 per cent higher than in Chicago.
One Pullman employee testified before the Commission that
comparable accommodations in a nearby town could be obtained
at about $6.00 a month.
^
The Pullman Company maintained that its rents could
not be reduced. The company expected to earn a six per cent
return on the cost of its tenements, but claimed to be
earning less than four per cent. Furthermore, said Pullman,






were free to live elsewhere and were not required to rent
in the company town.
In the opinion of the Strike Commission, "The
Company f s claim that the workmen need not hire its tenements
and can live elsewhere if they choose is not ertirely
40
tenable. " Reverend Carwardine said that workers were
expected to rent company houses. He cited instances of
employees who had told him they were urged to live at
Pullman or be laid off. One strike leader testified that
men were "required" to live at Pullman as a condition of
•aaployoent. The Strike Commission found that employees
believed they would be given work preference by renting at
Pullman; thus the> felt some compulsion to rent in the
41
model town.
Pvesidents of Pullman were also subjected to several
abuses in connection with their rentals. For instance, as
the Strike Commission noted, tenants were required "to pay
^or all repairs which are either necessary ... or which
the company chooses to make."
To increase the probability that the company would
collect its rentals on time, workers would be given two
checks: one for the amount of rent; the other for the
balance due in wages. Although employees were free to cash
their checks elsewhere, the Pullman Bank, where they were
paid, also collected the rents. The town bank, as the




collecting it by the knowledge on the part of the tenant
43
that by arrears he may lose his job.** J
Some witnesses before the Strike Commission testified
that at times workers received checks for as little as four
cents to $1.00 above their rent. The Pullman Company pro-
duced no evidence to counter this charge* Although the
company was lenient toward those who could not paj their
rent, and attempted no evictions during the strike, tenants
44felt they could be evicted on short notice.
Concerning this grievance, the Strike Commission
concluded
:
The demand for some rent reduction was fair
and reasonable under the circumstances. Some
slight concession in this regard would probably
have averted the strike, provided the promise not
to discharge men who served on the committee had
been more strictly regarded.45
Shop Abuaes
In addition to wages and rents, a third category of
employee grievances was that of shop abuses, what Carwardine
described as "unfair and tyrannical dealing on the part of
certain foremen . • .," toward the Pullman workers.
Blacklisting, nepotism, favoritism, intimidation,
and arbitrary dismissal of laborers were among the complaints
prevalent. "There is a constant feeling of insecurity,"
wrote Carwardine; "Men have put in years of hard, laborious
work only to be dismissed without a mofient's warning, and
47




When Pullman cut wages, yet left rents unreduced,
discontent among the workers sharply increased. Inequality
in wage cuts and lack of full time regular employment
exacerbated this discontent. As workers became more re-
bellious, shop rules became more stringent, tthen friction
minted between well-paid foremen and under-paid laborers,
shop abuses became a major complaint.
What made these abuses seem so intolerable, was
that no system existed by which employee complaints could
be registered and investigated impartially. Apparently, no
adequate structure for the expression of grievances was
49
ever considered.
As one historian put it, "The Company was determined
not to share power with the employees, and in consequence,
few opportunities for meaningful communication between labor
50
and management were developed."*^
The workers of the Pullman Company, after months of
frustration, finally presented their complaints to the
management on 7 May 1694- The grievance committee that set
with Vice President V'ickes, and subsequently with George
Pullman, was told that rents and wages could not be adjusted,
but that complaints of shop abuses would be promptly in-
51
veetigated.
Wickes testified that he began the investigation on
May 10 and that he had intended to devote "half of each
working day to that business until completed.** That night,
,a*»j\ii.Hy, jj ;-.-..-. •-.. .».-, .»•&* *J3 : ^ : ' »
>JtSfiOO ':
'
mhowever, after three men of the committee were laid off
for alleged lack of work, the local unions voted to strike
52
and the investigation was dropped.
Pullman's Refusal to Arbitrate
Despite Pullman's promise to investigate shop abuses,
he absolutely refused to submit the questions of wages ar.d
rents to arbitration. As far as he was concerned, wages
could not be raised because the company was already losing
on its contracts j rents could not be reduced because the
company was not earning its six per cent return on the cost
of tenements.
Four times following the onset of the strike, the
Pullman Company was implored to arbitrate: first, a pro-
posal from the Chicago Civic Federation in early June;
second, an ultimatum from the American Railway Union—either
arbitrate or suffer the consequences of a boycott; third,
an offer from the Chicago trade unions; and finally a
sincere appeal from two mayors in raid-July. Each plea was
rejected. Company officials said there was nothing to
arbitrate
•
The mayors of Chicago and Detroit—with telegrams
from 50 other mayors urging arbitration—were not the only
public officials to express concern for the cause of labor.
In the Senate on 10 July 1394, a Kansas Populist, Sen.
William A. Peffer said, "The time has come for employers
r o v 9«#ori
W
7themselves to learn that the best way to handle these
situations [labor disputes3 is by fair treat<;tent of their
*.„. . . .-»
Why did the Pullman Company consistently maintain
this dogmatic position, that there was nothing to arbi-
trate? Pullman insisted that wages must be determined by
the law of supply and demand, that management must be free
to make economic decisions based upon business reality,
and that these decisions must be trade in a manner to safe-
54guard capital.
Nevertheless, evidence concerning the issues of
rents and wages suggests that Pullman could have at least
compromised with his men* He could have slightly raised
wages, slightly reduced rents, lowered his eight per cent
dividends, or, if necessary, drawn upon his $2,000,000
surplus from fiscal year 1394
•
Ostensibly, Pullman was not willing to arbitrate
because business conditions did not justify any adjustment
in wages or rents. A more basic reason for refusing to
arbitrate, however, was his hostility to the idea of con-
ferring with organized labor. (This attitude was equally
evident in the refusal of the General I*anager f 8 Association
to consider an A.R.ti. proposal to end the strike.)
When Wickes was asked by the Strike Commission
whether employees had the right to have a union represent





right; yes sir* l/e have the right to say whether we will
55
receive then, or not*"
^oth Pullman and V.ickes were fundamentally opposed
to the idea of negotiating policy decisions with ei'iployees*
Presumably, even if Pullman conceded the company was
financially able to adjust wages or rents, he would have
resisted efforts to arbitrate because a principle was in-
volved* As Pulln*an expressed it, "A man should have the
56
right to manage his ewn property **"^
Vice President Wickes, chief spokesirian for the
company during the strike, rejected one offer of arbitra-
tion in these terms i
There is a principle involved * * . It is that
employers must be permitted to run their business
in their own way, and without interference from
their employees or from anyone else* 5?
the Pullman Company did not recognize that labor
unions had any place or necessity in the "model * town* The
limit of a laborer*s rights was to work or quit on the terms
offered. The Strike Commission declared:
This position secures all the advantage of the
concentration of capital, ability, power, and
control for the company in its labor dealings,
and deprives the employees of any such advantage
or protection as a labor union might afford *->©
Underlying Issues
Although lees frequently discussed by strike par-
ticipants, the underlying issues of paternalism and a lack
of democracy in Pullman, Illinois, contributed significantly
to the discontent leading to the strike
•
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Paternalism
Pullman was a town in which the corporation was
omnipresent and exerted a pervasive influence over the
lives of residents.
The so-called "Pullman system** was intended to be a
harmonious blend of industrial efficiency and a gracious,
attractive living environment • In exchange for all the
town f s attractive features—a theater, a library, parks,
gardens, churches and sanitary facilities—the inhabitants
paid not only in high rents, but in a sacrifice of indi-
vidual freedom*
Reverend Carwardlne said the town was not what it
pretended to bet
It is a sort of hollow mockery, sham, an institu-
tion girded with red tape, and as a solution to
the labor problem a very unsatisfactory one . . .
while it possesses some excellent features, still
It© deficiencies overbalance its beauties • • .
It is a civilized relic I ropean serfdom.00
What were some of these deficiencies?
(1) Pullman refused to allow employees the right to
61
buy land or build homes in the company town*
(2) Tenants were required to sign a lease having a
•ten-day clause*** It enabled the company on short notice
to get rid of undesirable renters, and served aa a powerful
incentive to keep Pullman inhabitants from opposing company
policies.
(3) As previously mentioned, the Pullman Bank Issued
two checks to employees, one of which was made out in the






amount of rent due. Before a worker could leave the bank
he was pressured to pay his rent without delay
.
(4) There was no system of public relief. Those who
were unemployed, too old, or too poor to pay rent were
expected to leave. •*
(5) Although the company normally provided medical
care to employees who were injured, if the company deter-
mined an injury to be "unavoidable,** the employee would be
6«i
required to pay the full cost of his hospital bills.
(6) To insure that town residents conformed to
company policies, a system of espionage and surveillance




In summary, the company subjected Pullman residents
to constant corporate control.
Absence of Democracy
Related to paternalism was the absence of democratic
procedures by which residents might contribute to the
policies affecting the town*
The Pullman Company maintained coercive political
control over the town. All local officials, except members
of the school board, were appointed by the corporation.
When elections were he^d# and George Pullman felt that his




The First Amendment rights of labor agitators and
radicals wore often violated; PulJUnan prevented them fro*
speaking by refusing to let then rent or use public halls. '
The Strike Commission said the exclusion of inhabi-
tants from any participation in management of the town way
have prevented their grateful acceptance of the advantages
of living in Pullman.
tolated Issues
Once the boycott and railway strike began, several
related issues became prominent* These were discussed
primarily by the Strike Commission, the mass media, poli-
ticians or hictorians. They include: (1) the Chicago
Boycott and Strike, (2) the "Omnibus Injunction," (3) Fed-
eral Intervention, (4) Violence, and (5) the End of the
Strike *
The Chicago Boycott and strike
Why did the American Railway Union decide to boycott?
The Pullman strike was a month old when delegates to the
A*K*U. convention met in Chicago. Hone of the grievances
expressed by Pullman workers had been resolved, and the
company had refused even to consider a discussion of wages
or rents*
Many of the men at Pullman had joined the A.
during ifereh and April, 1#94, in an effort to gain a more
powerful bargaining position vis-a-vis the corporation. In
M
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raid-June, spokesmen for the workers presented the A*R*U*
convention with their complaints against the company*
The officers and directors of the A.R.U. counselled
against any further escalation of the dispute; they knew
that the times were inopportune for a strike* Humerous men
were unemployed and stood ready to accept almost any offer
of work. ^
Nevertheless, A.R.U. delegates felt sympathy for the
plight of Pullman workers. The union had been successful
in its strike against the Great Northern and was overcon-
fident. Acting upon instructions from their locals, the
delegates voted unanimously to boycott Pullman cars if
Pullman would not agree to discuss settlement of the
70
workers • complaint s .
What caused the strike among railroad employees?
The boycott became a general railroad strike after the
General lianager , s Association decided to resist both the
A»R*U» and the boycott. The G.M*A* declared it would fire
any railroad employee who refused to handle Pullman cars,
even though he might be willing to perform all other duties*
It began to import workers Xrom the East to fill positions
vacated by those who struck or were fired, and initiated
legal proceedings in cooperation with the U» S» attorney in
Chicago*' 1
The employees of the 24 railroads subject to the






sympathetically. Like the Pullman employees, they too had
been the victims of repeated wage cuts and had similar
grievances against their employers* When the railroads
began firing A.R.U* members for their participation in the
72boycott, many local unions voted to strike in retaliation*'
According to George V* Howard, vice president of
the American Railway Union,
The cause of the trouble • • between the
railroad companies and their employees was the
declaration on the part of the general managers
of the various roads that they would back Pullman *"3
As the Strike Commission noted,
The contracts between the railroads and the
Pullman Company as to the Pullman cars created
such close relations between them as to increase
the natural synspathy of organization between the
members of the American Railway Union upon rail-
roads and their brothers at Pullman* 74
\\y did the General Manager f s Association decide to
resist the boycott? Officially the managers maintained
that the boycott was intolerable because it would incon-
venience the travelling public and it represented an attempt
by a labor union to dictate which cars the railroads could
or could not haul. Furthermore, to discontinue the use of
75Pullman cars would violate existing contracts* ,y
According to historian Gerald Eggert, this statement
concerning contracts was an excuse rather than a reason
for resisting the boycott:
The sample contract presented to the United
States Strike Commission at the close of the
disorders . * • revealed that the companies had
complete discretion in the use of Pullmans* The
n
94
contract made no mention of how many Pullman cars,
or when, or on what classes of trains they were to
be uced# It simply provided that whenever sleeping
cars were used they had to be leased from the
Pullman Company .7°
One commissioner asked G.M.A. chairman St. John
whether the railroads were Hr»e to leave Pullman cars off
any class of trains they desired. St. John replied, "We
are. We are not required to operate any of the Pulliuan
cars upon trains where the cars are not required. It is
77
entirely at the option of the cosipany.*'
'
Quite naturally the managers were opposed to dis-
continuing the use of sleeping cars; it obviously would
have been harmful to their business. Nevertheless, they
chose to explain their resistance to the boycott, not in
these candid terms, but with the rationale that contracts
required continued use of Pullman cars.
Perhaps a more fundamental reason lor G.M.A*
opposition to the boycott was the managers* desire to pro-
tect their official prerogatives. The G.i'.A. was hostile
7S
to the A«R.U. because it threatened those prerogatives.
This hostility to the union was evident in St.
Johnf s testimony before the Strike Commission:
As I understand it, . . .the American Railway
Union is an effort to combine within its own order
all employees of all branches of organized labor
upon the various railroads. . . . J think there is
no necessity for an organization of that kind.79
To surrender to the A.R.U. boycott might have led
to legal action against the managers by Pullman. Certainly
the exclusion of sleeping cars would have inconvenienced
:?j
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passengers. But more important, in the view of historian
Gerald Eggert,
Surrender would have vastly strengthened the
A.R.U. and Debs* Resistance, on the other hand,
involved no legal risks whatever and promised to
check, if not eliminate the power of the A.R.U. 8^
Debs defended his union before the Strike Commission:
The General I&nagtr's Association was in-
stituted for the declared purpose of cooperating
together in reducing wages* Now, then, we take
the view that if they have a right to combine to
reduce wages, we have a right to combine to resist
the reduction. If a strike ensues ... they are
as much responsible as we are. If they make a
reduction that results in a strike, they are at
least as culpable as the employee s.**
The Strike Commission implied that at least part of
the blame for the railroad strike could be attributed to
both George Pullman and the General .Managers,
... employers who obstruct progress by perverting
and misapplying the law of supply and demand, and
who, while insisting upon individualism for workmen,
demand that they shall be let alone to combine as
they please and that society and all its forces
shall protect them in their resulting contentions. 8^
The "Omnibus** Injunction
The General i%nager f s Association—an organization
the Strike Commission said was illegal and unjustifiable
—
was determined "to crush the strike rather than to accept
any peaceable solution through conciliation, arbitration or
en
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otherwise." * The G.M.A. accordingly sought to create con-
ditions that would lead to federal intervention.







to be fully cooperative. The G.K.A., in conjunction with
the l. S. attorney in Chicago, Thomas rilchrist, decided
that the federal government should first intervene through
the courts. It was agreed that a court injunction was
needed that would have the effect of making all strike-
related activities illegal. This strategy was fully
supported by Attorney General Olney.
The Interstate Commerce Act of l£#7> and subsequent
Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1690, prohibited any combination
in restraint of interstate commerce. They also provided
the statutory basis for issuing injunctions by U# 8. courts
$5
to prevent violations of these laws. ' According to one
historian, there is no evidence in congressional debates
that Congress ever intended these laws to be evoked against
labor. Nevertheless, in April 1&94 a federal judge inter-
preted the Anti-Trust Law by ruling that a strike, when
directed against a railroad, was a combination in restraint
of interstate commerce, and hence, illegal.
Although the Sherman Act seemed designed to prosecute
trusts, Attorney General Olney saw no reason why it should
not apply to labor unions. This was quite natural. Olney
had been a corporate railroad lawyer. As he himself de-
clared, his motive was to "make it [the strike] a failure
everywhere."
In pursuance of this objective, he appointed Edwin
valker as a special 17. S. attorney in Chicago. Walker had







job by Olney upon the recommendation of the G.M.A. Walker
was thoroughly coniinitted to the cause of the railroads and
acted accordingly. Concerning Y/alker's appointment
,
Clarence Darrow, who defended Debs at his trial, declared,
"The government might with as good grace have appointed the
attorney for the American Railway Union to represent the
United States."
With the full support of both Olney and the G.M.A.,
federal attorneys Walker and Milchrist drafted the petition
for an injunction under the provisions of the Anti-Trust
Lav.89
Federal courts and the law in the lS90 f s generally
worked to the disadvantage of organised labor, "being better
calculated to protect property, including the property of
corporations, than to protect the wage earners in their
90
union activities,** as one historian explained. Conse-
quently, when Walker and Milchrist approached federal judges
Peter 3. Grosscup and William A. Woods, they found the
judges fully cooperative; the judges even assisted the
91
attorneys in perfecting the bill for an injunction.
As noted earlier in this study, the injunction was
extremely comprehensive. It applied to all persons within
the jurisdiction of the court who were involved in ob-
structing the movement of mail or interstate commerce on
almost every railroad connected with the G. l.A. One pro-





any employee to quit his job. Any attempt to violate the
injunction could result in a citation for contempt and
summary punishment by the court.
According to historian Harry Barnard, this "omnibus**
injunction was only a means to get the U. S. Army into
Chicago. All that was needed to justify the intervention
of federal troops was a single, clear violation of the
prohibition against interference with the mails. When the
injunction was issued, Debs ignored it. but when U. 3.
Marshal Arnold read the court order to a large crowd at a
railway yard, the crowd soon became an angry mob and
deliberately blocked the rails with overturned boxcars.
The mails were reportedly obstructed. On that basis
President Cleveland sent in the regulars.
Despite the fact that there was nothing in any law,
express or implied, that a mail train necessarily included
Pullman cars, the Justice Department had ruled that a mail
train comprised all cars hauled by such a train. Under this
ruling railroad officials could claim that Pullman cars were
normal components of mail trains. Federal officials, in
turn, could declare that any person attempting to detach
a Pullman car from such a train was guilty of obstructing
the mail. 94
The A.R.U. claimed that the G.M.A. ordered Pullman
cars attached to mail trains, which normally travelled







public opinion against the union. This assertion is de-
batable* But there is some evidence that railroad officials
were determined that no mail train would leave without its
regular cars. Any interference with a Pullman car on such
a train was construed as obstruction of the mails, in
violation of the injunction. Offers of the A.L.L. to run
95
mail trains that excluded Pullman cars were ignored. *
As the strike developed labor unions adopted
resolutions criticizing the policies of the federal govern-
ment, condemning the injunction and the use of the V. S.
Army. It appeared as though the government had combined
96
with the corporations to crush labor.
One historian suggests the U. S. Government could
have avoided taking sides by insisting that railroads move
97
the mail on trains without Pullman cars. Had this policy
been followed, it would have been difficult to find strikers
in violation of the injunction, hence, there would have
been less justification for the use of federal troops.
The "omnibus" injunction not only prohibited inter-
ference with the mail, it also enjoined strikers and union
officials from urging workers to join the struggle. Because
Debs ignored this provision and continued to send out tele-
grams to local unions, on 17 <?uly 1&94 he was cited for
contempt. The Strike Commission commented,
It is seriously questioned, and with much
force, whether courts have jurisdiction to enjoin
citizens from persuading each other in industrial




Is generally recognized among good citizens that a
mandate of a court is to be obeyed until it is Q .
modified and corrected by the court that issued it.^
Federal Intervention
As the Pullman Strike evolved into a general strike,
Governor Altgeld was closely monitoring the situation in
Chicago. He was determined to use his full authority to
maintain peace; he conferred frequently with officers of
the Illinois militia and was prepared to send 100,000 men
to Chicago if necessary.
One historian observed, "Altgeld showed his will-
ingness to prevent any cases of actual rioting but refused
to become a convenient pawn for the General Manager*
s
Associate,- ** sov.rnor eou^ to purau* an^
course, favoring neither labor nor capital. Perhaps,
knowing this, the G.M.A. determined to seek the help of the
federal government, rather than rely upon a governor known
to have pardoned anarchists*
Though Altgeld opposed the use of troops for
strikebreaking purposes, he had effectively deployed state
militia during the coal strike which preceded the Pullman
dispute. There is no reason to doubt that he would have
sent state troops to Chicago if called upon to do so by
local authorities. On 3 July 1&94 Altgeld was unaware of
any requirement for military forces in Chicago. At that
time, despite the disturbance at Blue Island, there were no
serious disorders at Chicago. Yet, when he was subsequently
OJ
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convinced of the need for troops, the governor initiated
102
the action that led Mayor Hopkins to request their support.
While Altgeld was preparing to send out the Illinois
militia, U. . arshal Arnold wired Attorney General Olney
that the U. S- Array was needed to ensure the passage of mail
trains and enforce the injunction. The marshal had not
asked local or state authorities for help. And he had made
no mention of the availability of state troops in his
telegram. Endorsing the message were three respected
federal authorities! Judge Grosscup, U. S. Attorney
.Milchrist, and Special Attorney Walker, all of whom had
perfected the injunction at the request of Olney and the
G.M.A.1(«
President Cleveland justified the use of the I. S.
Army by an explanation that federal officials were determined
... to overcome by any lawful and constitutional
means all resistance to governmental inunctions as
related to the transportation of mails, the opera-
tion of Interstate commerce, ard the preservation
of the property of the United States.104
On the 4th of July 1#94, citizens of Chicago dis-
covered that some 1,200 U. S. Army soldiers had been moved
into the city the preceding night* (Subsequent reinforce-
ments brought the total up to about 2,000.) Sometime that
day, Altgeld learned for the first time that these regulars
105had been called in. He was surprised and outraged.
Section 4 of Article IV of the United States




request of a state legislature or of the governor (when the
legislature is not in session), snail protect that state
106
against domestic violence.
It was not by invoking this clause that the President
acted • The legislature of Illinois was not in session and
Altgeld had not asked for federal aid. It was rather by
virtue of the authority contained in Sections 529$ and 5299
of the Revised Statutes of the United States that the
I'ni im 111 ill » « m i 11 m 1 m 1111 » urn 1 11 in ili um 11
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President sent troops to Chicago. '
When Altgeld protested the use of the V. S. Army in
Chicago, he said the statutes Cleveland had invoked to
justify his military policy contemplated the use of federal
troops in a state only after militia had been used first.
Section 5299 of the Revised Statutes states, in
part, that federal intervention is justified when state
authorities *» # . are unable to protect, or, from any
cause, fail in or refuse protection of the people . . « w
from domestic violence. * (Emphasis added
.)
In explaining his replies to Altgeld, Cleveland
justified his military policy as necessary, not only to
protect mails and safeguard interstate commerce, but also
because the governor had "refused* to deal with the Chicago
situation* The President, however, gave no evidence to
110
support this assertion. As indicated above, the evidence
suggests a completely different conclusion—that Altgeld was








In responding to Altgeld f s protests, President
Cleveland Ignored almost every argument against federal
intervention. Almont Lindsej explained,
The President deemed it better strategy to
convey to the nation that the present was no time
to quibble over constitutional technicalities and
that everybody should unite against the common
danger of anarchy.Hl
Coramenting on Cleveland* s position, another historian
concluded
t
Cleveland 1 s account of the episode shows slight
knowledge of the situation in Chicago, an utter
disregard of the constitutional rights of Illinois,
and the contempt which men who think they are right
often show toward their opponents.112
Governor Altgeld was not the only Illinois official
surprised at the arrival of federal troops in Chicago. In
testimony before the Strike Commission, Mayor Hopkins
commented,
1 want to say that I was not advised or counselled
with when they [the U. S. troops] were brought
here, and up to that time nobody notified me they
were not receiving adequate protection.
Like the governor, iJayor Hopkins believed that if troops
113
were needed, state troops should have been used first.
If U. S» Marshal Arnold or the railroads were having
so much trouble with mob rioting, why did they avoid calling
on the mayor for police protection? Why did the G.jI.A. seek
the support not only of federal troops, but also of U. S.
deputy marshals?
According to Lindsey, the G.M.A. suspected Mayor
Hopkins of sympathizing with the strikers. The managers
•?J
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sought to build their case for the use of federal armed
forces by portraying the mayor and his police as pursuing
a very lax policy toward strikers. Special Attorney Walker,
closely affiliated with the G.M.A., "endeavored to establish
the complete failure of the local government to perform its
duty during the early phases of the crisis.*'
By discrediting the mayor and his police, the G.M.A.
evidci tly hoped to convince the public of the need for
U# 5. troops to suppress the disturbances.
Contrary to the claims of Walker and the G.il.A.,
Hopkins probably used every means at his disposal to
preserve peace and end the strike. He fully mobilised his
police force and issued a proclamation aimed at dispersing
mobs. Twice he tried to settle the dispute, once by arbi-
tration with the Pullman Company, and once as a mediator
between the A.R.U. and the &•***•
*
According to the Strike Commission, allegations of
116police negligence were not proved* Before I . . troops
arrived, city police evidently handled all difficulties
with relative ease. Superintendent of Police iirennan told
the Strike Coasaission, "In no case at any time during the
strike were the police forces insufficient, wherever they
went, to disperse any mob found." '
Even before Cleveland ordered federal troops to
Chicago, Attorney General Olney had authorized a special




were hastily sworn in during early July. They were selected
11$by the railroads and deputized by liarshal Arnold.
The railroads even paid the salaries of these
deputies. Olney, however, insisted that any railroads which
had paid these officers must be reimbursed; he felt this
was needed to protect the government from any charge of
partiality. The cost of these Chicago deputies to the
federal government was about $125,000.**' The Strike
Commission noted,
[Deputy marshals! acted in the double capacity
of railroad employees and United States officers.
While operating the railroads they assumed and
exercised unrestricted United States authority when
so ordered by their employers, or whenever they
regarded it as necessary. They were not under the
direct control of any Government official while
exercising authority. This is placing officers
of the Government under control of a combination
of railroads. It is a bad precedent. . . .I2°
Violence
mmmmmm+mmmmm* 1 1 imm
After I . . troops arrived in Chicago, the te^po
of violence increased. Property damage, lawlessness, and
injuries reached their peak on 7 July 1#94- At least 12
persons in Chicago died in strike-related confrontations.
Contrary to popular expectations, the Strike
Commission did not place responsibility for violence on
strikers. It blamed the railroads, who were determined "to
crush the strike rather than to accept any peaceable
121







. . • real responsibility for these disorders
rests with the people themselves for not adequately-
controlling . • . corporations, and for failing to
reasonably protect the rights of labor and redress
its wrong3.*22
A report to the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence (1969) concluded the single most
important cause of labor violence in America has been the
refusal of management to recognize labor unions for the
123purpose of collective bargaining* v
In more specific terms, this report declared!
The responsibility for violence rests largely
on the behavior of George Pullman. ... He was
unwilling to allow his workers the slightest in-
fluence upon the decisions of the company which
greatly affected their welfare.124
From Pullman 1 s refusal to arbitrate with his men
arose the sympathy of the A.R.U. and its decision to boycott.
The A.R.U. decision, in turn, provoked a strong
reaction from the G.M.A., which viewed the boycott as an
attack on vested railroad interests in Chicago. The 1969
report to the National Commission (Violence in America )
asserts, MThe immediate cause of violence was the determina-
tion of the General .Manager's Association to defeat the
125
sympathy strike." # The G.iUA. decided to fire any em-
ployee who refused to handle Pullman cars.
The special federal deputies—selected and paid for
by the railroads under the supervision of the G.M.A.—may
also have contributed to the violence in Chicago. According
to testimony before the Strike Commission, police officers
.;:o .xJ OJ ....
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caught several deputies engaged in acts of lawlessness and
incendiarism. Superintendent of Police Brennan testified
that frequently his force had occasion to arrest deputies
126for indiscriminate shooting.
Apparently, in the haste of recruiting, many
applicants were accepted on the sole basis of their appear-
ance, without even a check to determine their citizenship.
As a result, many thugs, drunks, and other disreputable
persons were sworn in. On July 9 C. S. Attorney Walker
even reported that most of the deputies were "worse than
useless."127
The rioters were not, in most cases, strikers or
former railroad employees. *4ost of the violence, said the
Strike Commission, was due to the work of the "lawless
elements," augmented by "shiftless adventurers . . .
12$
criminals and objectionable foreigners.** Unemployment
,
insecurity, and accumulated resentment against corporate
employers apparently combined to form a spirit of rest-
lessness among these "lawless elements.** The arrival of
U« S. troops probably aroused the indignation of these
people and may have provoked the formation of aggressive
12 9
crowds. As the Strike Commission noted, "The strike
presented an opportunity to these elements to burn and
plunder, and to violate the laws and ordinances of the
city, State, and nation. ni
The Strike Commission blamed the strikers for such





cars; it concluded that "strikers were concerned in the
outrages against law and order, although the number was
131
undoubtedly small as compared with the whole number out."
Despite evidence that few strikers were involved in
rioting and property damage, the G.M.A. credited the strikers
with full responsibility for all violence. According to
Lindsey, not only the CM.A., but also the press deliber-
ately built up the impression that strikers instigated
132
violence and anarchy. *
As for the A.R.U., the Strike Commission said there
was no evidence that the officers of the A.R.u*.
... at any time participated in or advised in-
timidation, violence, or destruction of property.
They knew and fully appreciated that as soon as
mobs ruled the erganiged forces of society would
crush the mobs add all responsible for thera in the
remotest degree, and that this meant defeat. 1-^
When Mayor Hopkins testified, he even said the A.R.U.
had helped the city arrest those who were doing violence. -*
The role of the I'. S. Army in quelling the distur-
bances was not extensively discussed by the Strike Commission-
ollowing the strike, the Commanding General of the
Army commended the troops for their "vigorous action • . .
and . . . great forbearance . when subjected to all
sorts of insults and indignities, designed to provoke
retaliation. . . .» J"' V General Miles said the action of
federal troops in Chicago, "where mob violence and a reign
of terror existed • . • saved this country from a serious






Governor Altgeld, however, agreed that federal
troops and their officers were no doubt good men. But he
also said,
So far as can be learned, their persistence did
not prevent the burning of a single freight car in
Chicago . . . yet during all this time the impres-
sion was made on the country that President Cleveland
and the federal troops were saving Chicago! 1-''
Altgeld might have added that it was the Illinois
militia who, on July 7, shot at a mob killing several and
wounding more. After that confrontation, violence in
Chicago declined*
End of the Strike
The Pullman Strike died during the period July 18
through August 2. According to Debs, the federal injunction
caused the A.R.U. defeat. As he declared during Ms trial,
The strike was broken . • . not by the Army and
not by another power but simply and solely by the
action of the United States Court in restraining
us from discharging our duties as officers and
representatives of our employees. -^
Contributing to the end of the strike were several
otuer ractorr. First, a large number of men were unemployed;
railroads were able to recruit freely among these jobless
workers, thereby replacing A.R.U. members who were fired
or joined the strike. Second, many of the skilled workers
such as the brotherhoods and Knights of Labor opposed the
boycott. Third, organized labor was decidedly a minority
interest; most Americans were unwilling to accept unions
such as the A.R.U. and evidently suspected them of harboring
<-»T
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subversives and agitators, i'ourth, the armed forces,
primarily the Illinois troops, were a potent factor in
139
ending the strike. ^
The leadership that directed the organized effort
to crush the strike, however, originated in the G.M.A. Had
it not been for the initiative and determination of that
organization, the strike might have remained non-violent;
and employees might have gained a voice in corporate
decision making.
It was the G.M.A. which brought the federal govern-
ment to bear upon the strike. Neither the G.M.A. nor the
government made any attempt during the strike to create a
negotiated settlement.
The Strike Commission described the G.M.A. in these
terras:
The Association Is an illustration of the
persistent and shrewdly devised plans of corpora-
tions to overreach their limitations ar.d to usurp
indirectly powers and rights not contemplated in
their charters and not obtainable from the people
or their legislators. 1^
The refusal of the G.M.A. to negotiate with the
A.R.U., said the Strike Commission, •« . • seems arrogant
and absurd when we consider its standing before law, its
assumptions and its past • . • action."
As for the government's evident disinterest in ending




It can only be assumed that Attorney General Olney
In 1#94 wanted to do more than merely end the
disorders; he wanted them halted by giving the
railroads a complete victory over the A.Jl.lU**2
As noted earlier in this study, it was Olney who, in an
apparent effort to arouse public opinion against the
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THE JOURNALS INTERPRET THE STRIi,
WDUII AND ifflDERLTIKG ISSUES
2n its opening article on the Pullman Strike, Harper's
Veekly remarked, "Such rebellions against social order and
the principles or civilisation will grow more dangerous,
unless the intelligence of the country shall come to under-
1
stand their causes and find ways to remove them."
This chapter is a discussion and analysis of the ade-
quacy and extent to which the journals attempted to interpret
the immediate and underlying issues of the Pullman Strike.
Immediate Issues
Wage Reductions
Why were the workers at Pullman dissatisfied with
their wages? Harper's Weekly gave this explanation:
Possibly the workmen at Pullman have been made too
comfortable, and have been cared for too well.
They have come to believe implicitly in the stories
of the enormous profits of their employer. They
doubtless argued that as long as wages had been
kept up to a certain scale throughout the past
depression, they should be now maintained until
better times. This false reasoning was undoubt-
edly at the bottom of the general dissatisfaction.^
liation , however, explained that wages had declined
in response to market conditions associated with the
depression ard the "iron law of wages." The conditions of
) ...
.




the rarket are sometimes hardi "Anybc be fights against
them, or who assumes thc> do not exist . . . will go
supperless to bed and . . . get no other rewards lor his
pains.*' Pullnan has no control over the wages of his
employees, hence, it is in their best interest to "grin and
3bear" the wage cut.
veral journals evidently used a Pullman Conpany
press release explaining how the corporation was losi
money. According to the Review or Ke views ,
r. PuULnan's works . • . had taken several
contracts at exceedingly low prices in order to
keep the wheel ing. Wages had been cut down
on the theory that work at reduced pay would be
more acceptable to the Pullman employees than a
period of no and no pay.*
Harper's i eekiy reported the cornpany "reduced wages,
and accepted orders . . . tfhieh could not be filled without
a severe loss, but which would serve at least to keep the
working force employed so as to bridge over the hard tines.'
'
Forum gave a similar account and commented, "The attempt to
make any eraployer pay wages for producing things which he
can sell only at a loss is not coi&iendabie • It is a
ruinous policy."
in a separate article, however, forun did mention
the fact that salaries of Pullran managers were not reduced
7
when employee wages were sharply cut
.
Could the Pulln;an Company have drawn frora its cor-
porate profits or reserve funds to increase wages? Outlook





"The . . . Company has a surplus of more than $16,000,0:
. . . it has declared this year a dividend c
, ,000 on
its capital stock of $36,000,000* . . •*' Outlook suggested
that Pullman f s testimony, having indicated such large
corporate profits, did much to arouse sympathy for striking
workmen
»
^e Nation , however, denied that Pullman could have
drawn upon his profits to increase wages:
Jfr. Pulliian has no right to make gratuities of
the ruoney of his shareholders, who are largely » » .
persons of slender :;jeans. « . . he is a trustee and
• « . has no right to take an unbusineesli
step . • . he ;ust he the judge of what is business-
like and what is not.*
Those who believe that workiaen are rightly entitled
to a 3hare of the profits of their labor, declared nation ,
have assumed a belief professed by the "ethical school" of
political economy. This doctrine has had a great deal to
do with arousing discontent arwng wage earners? when it
became diffused among them, "they at once felt that they
were suffering great injustice. ..." because their share
10
of the profits was not larger.
oncerning the weak financial condition of the
construction depart:uent, Nation declared:
No argument for re
.
wages in a non-pay
i
business can be derived fro. i the fact that sotne
other branch of business [i.e., the operati
division! carried on by the sa:.«e company make
a profit*11
far tone, expressing full support of the






The wages offered seen to be all that could be
afiorded. It was a kind). ,o the work or
the company to accept orders at a ] Ly to
keep them oj'spli. it oakee no difference that
the company was still paying large dividends*
.0 dividends could be paid on these (~ Q u;truction]
contracts. The dividends were paid on . . « the
profits of running I an care all .lit.
This is an entirely di ad of business
and has a right to a i profit .... [These]
comfortable dividends • . • have absolutely nothing
to do with the wages to be paid to wo: in the
car shops.12
Both pation and Harper's Leekly expressed the view
that if Pullman had simply closed h' ops there would
have been no strike »r*
The ' eekly put it this way:
If the Pullnian Corapa; i .. , ad of
their working-men • . employment at a reduced
rate of wa^es* had siraply said to them. '' e are
sorrj our businee alien Off that i
longer have onployisont for youj we are compelled
to close the works, and you will have to shift for
yourselves until we get profitable orders enabling
us to take you back"— if the company had done
this ... in a cold businesslike way, there would
have been no trouble. 14
Outlook concluded its discussion of wages with an
opinion similar to that of the Strifes ~sion, that the
men had no right to denjanc -oysent at higher wages when
15the company was losing money.
Harper *s l.eekly asserted, "The Pullnian corporation
has always treated its workmen well • . • they have no fsicj
real grievance and no justification for the demand they
if-have recently i:iade«" Whether Pulliaan workers were
justified in demanding the \- of 1S93 is a rnatter of







is a matter of fact. Clearly, the men at Pullman had
several genuine conplairnV
Rents
The review of Reviews explained that
The chief complication eeemr? to have arisen out
of circumstances that » »
-
[Reduced wages did not
bring reduced rents* . . . practically twelve
thousand Pulli-ian tenants are at the nftrey of their
employer, who is also their landlord.-'-'
Harper's Weekly again suggested that workers had
little to co!: plain of: "Rents were calculated on a five~
fsic~J per~cent basis, and were lower [sic] tlian rates
current for dirty, unsanitary houses in the tlm of
Chicago.* (According to the Strike FliwlBiren rem,
were 25 per cent higher, and were expected to earn the
company six per cent.)
Hation claimed that rents in Pullman were about
the sanre as those in adjoining town . ihis false
premise, listIon explained why the company could not have
reduced its rents: if the corporation had lowered it
rents for those who lived in Pulliran, in fair:. it would
have been bound to nJM an "equivalent present" to those
who lived elsewhere* neighboring landlords would then
have had a grievance, and
• . . would have had a just clc i the PuiLcan
Company for a sum equal to their diminished re-
ceipts, rhort, there would have been no end
to the absurdities and injust i iiich would have
resulted frora any such attempt to up to the





According to independent , it is very likely the
rents were too hii^h: "They always lag behind a falling or
a rising ziarketj but that is not peculiar to Pull-on and
20
will cure itself." (Contrary to this assertion, the evi-
dence clearly Indicates that the Puli> an corporation deter-
mined the rents with no regard for the current i-tarkst*}
Nation and Independent each expressed the official
corporate view; as Nation declared, it was a "fact that no
worknian was conpelled to stay in Pull/nan. . . ." Independent
21
added, *Xt the rente are too high tenants need not reiaain."
lie this view was, no doubt, a policy of the Pullrian
Company, the evidence shows that the men believed they were
under pressure to reside in the "model" town.
Bone of the journals commented on such rental abuses
as the requirement that t« ;ust perioral all repairs,
even those the co;npany chose to have done, or the so-called
»«ten-day" clause. i:or was there any moation of the pay
syz . ' y wliich worker-tenants received two checks, one of
which was for rent, the other for the remaining wages.
When Debs asserted that Pulliaan was starving hi
employees to death (probably in reference to workers who
received wages of several dollars or less on paydays),
Nation called fc .atenent "a deceptive lie." In a similar
vcin, foruri concluded: considering the advantages of the
town oX Pullnan, "and the present low prices of the ordinary
requirements of life, it can scarcely be said that the
22
oaployees were working at •crtarvation wages'."
n
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Samuel Gonpers, in an article for ?iorth A. xrican ,
explained why t orkars decided to strike. The grievance
rlttee had shown Pullrian i it was absolutely im-
possible to live on the wages I ed; that a ruddle ground
should be sought? that if wages were to be reduced the rents
should also corue down* M \:hen Pull«an reAised to consider
the request, and several riea of the committee were fired,
the strike was declared. *
livliiii of RsvlOMB expressed an attitude si:nilar to
that of the Strike Cossiaission (though published in advance
of the Strike Report):
A temporary rec m of on the same
percentage as the re -or; of wages would fas
see. ed to sons esaplc .sion that
would have been repaid by the increased fidelity of






Only one journal reported shop a! as a signi-
ficant corplaint ar.ong the workers, and did so only after
hearings by the Strike ion had begun. onitor-
ing testimony of witnesses, independent noted that
• . • the under officials especially, the foremen,
bosses, etc., were very I id cruel in their
treatment of the laborers, while it was practically
impossible to gain access to . r. Pullran elf
and the higher Officials! . . . every effort to set
forth the actual state of things resulted^n the
black listing of the complaintants. • • •
The lack of reporting concerning these abuses by the










in trying to uncover the i:*<ediate issues prior to the
. .U» boycott in June* As noted earlier in this study,
one© the railway strike was underway* at least one journal
said all discussion of the issues involved ^ust wait until
the "rebellion** was suppressed i
Pullr,ian > s Refusal to Arbitrate
:/ did the Pullman workers insist on arbitrating
with the company? According to Arena , the ..en at Pui
were seeking something uore than simply higher wages and
reduced rents: they "claija that in the consideration of
the distribution of their joint product, they shall be
consulted . . . They de&onti that as producers of wealth
they shall possess some dogrea of rational control over the
distribution of that wealth*** interpretation is
correct, then as Nation pointed out. workers were indec
professing the doctrine of the "ethical school" of political
economy*
Pullaian, la refusing to comply with requests to
arbitrate, said the company could not pa^ ore for the
manufacture of a car than the price he could obtain for it
from the railroads. A writer orth American accept r.
this assertion uncritically and declared, "Every business
27
man must adiait that this answer ic conclusive and logical.*-
Nation was absolutely positive there was no i^ay
Pullroan could have arbitrated the matter of wages:
.•
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A decision in favor of the employees would not put
the company in funds. It would not furnish new
orders for cars at higher prices than before . As
a decision adverse to the company could not be
be complied with in any event, an arbitration would
have been not merely useless but a downright
..kery. . . .2S (linphasis added.)
it was fortunate, reported Nation , that Pullman
refused to arbitrate with his men; had he not rejected the
"anarchistic conceptions'* of the grievance committee, it
. . . would have turned the whole controversy into
a question of details—as, for instance, whether
the rents of the houses were fair or not, whether
the company could have paid higher wages than it
did pay, or whether it would have been safe to
draw from its reserve fund. . . »**
Several journals commented on Pullman's rejection
of subsequent proposals to arbitrate . On each occasion,
as Forum noted, "The company declared that there was no
question that it could submit; that the men demanded higher
wages, and that it could not pay them except at a serious
loss.""^
Hone of the conservative journals, naturally,
presented much in the way of investigative reportii. ed
at assessing whether or not it was true that higher wages
for the aen would entail a "serious loss."
Once the railway strike had begun, nation suggested
that any attempt to secure arbitration in the midst of such
a "social convulsion" was absurd: there was
. . . intense excitement throughout the whole
country, and the general feeling that the exist-
ence of the Government and society was at sta
... to give in to the strikers ... at any
point would be a deadly blow to the liberty a
rights of property . • • •
-- J
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Hundreds of thousands of the best American citizens, de-
clared Nation , rejoiced that Pullraan was unyielding.
Harper* s leekly explained that if the Pullman
workmen had not heeded the advice of labor agitators, "most
of whom have nothing to lose by the disturbances they
foment, some sort of an agreement would be readily readied
between their and their employer." This particular judg-
ment is clearly deviant from available evidence; in view
of Pullman's deep-seated antagonism to organized labor, it
seems highly unlikely that Pullman would ever have reached
such an agreement
.
•y, even when the sayor of Chicago asked Pullman
to arbitrate, was the offer flatly refused? The answer,
according to Nation was that "labor disputes are generally
very simple, ard nobody can possibly settle them but the
parties to them.' pecificallv, the question of how much
loss the company could safely incur in any given period,
"must necessarily be left to the judgement of those who are
charged with the responsibility for its affairs, and not
to a mayor and a board of aldermen or any popular asse
blage."-3 -*
view of Reviews disagreed with Nation :
. Pullman owed it to the country to keep on good
terms with his employees: . . . upon the request of
the ayor and the Common Council of Chicago, he
should have been quite willing to consider some




Both Pullman and his associate, os, stressed
that they would not arbitrate because a principle was in-
volved: a man should have the right to manage his own
property. This theme was prevalent among conservative
journals. Independent expressed it this way:
The Pullman company cannot and ought not to
be conjpelled to arbitrate. ... A man who intends
to submit to the decision of arbitrators cannot
be forced to accept arbitration. One must decide
for himself the conditions on which he will work
or pay for work; otherwi have no liberty.
"
In contrast to the interpretations of Kation ,
Independent , and Harper's Weekly , which viewed the strike
from a laissez-faire perspective, were several journals
which regarded the dispute fro© a more "liberal* editorial
posture. These tended to be the I .eview , Arena and Outlook .
They argued on both moral and practical grounds that
Pullman ought to have, ai d could have arbitrated. Their
interpretations tend to match more closely those of the
strike Commission.
Review of r.eviews stressed Pullman* s moral obliga-
tion to arbitrate:
There can be no doubt whatever as to t
logical soundness of r. Pullman* s point of view.
But there are timer when it is an e
gracious thin^ to waive one*s rights. . . .
his own unbending and consistent standpoint,
Pullman could not have consented to arbitration.
• . • Under public laws permitting the creation
of commercial corporations, the Pullman Company
was invested with various privilege Aie extension
of the Pullman car service to more than a hundred
thousand miles of roads was made possible by the
public franchises granted to railway corporation
... To very many people it seemed clear that he
ought not to have allowed his local quarrel to go
-
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on unsettled • • • until it had assumed continental
proportions and brought wide-spread loss and harm
to the nation which had enriched him and hie
company*36
Arena asserted that Pullman had no excuse for not
helping his men financially. The corporation was not
"unable" to raise pay or lower rents. Pullman could have
drawn fron
. . . that immense reserve fund and those lai
dividends just paid, created out of the whole
Pullr^an corimunity in previous years of undenied
prosperity, re^ialnii Lely in the hands oi
Pullman and his associates. . . •-*'
Outlook , after owwarising the reasons Pullman
refused to arbitrate (from a press release issued by the
company ) , commented
:
. Pullman* s statement leaves some vital facts
out of consideration. . . . f.re there one, or two
or three corporations? boer. one and the same
organization . • . constitute the PbllttKB Palace-
Car Company ... the Pullman Manufacturing Company
• .
., and the Pull-ian Landlord Company . - . ?
If the latter be the case, it will be very diffi-
cult for Mr. Pullman to persuade the public that
he and his associates were acting otherwise than
in a wholly selfish way in reducing the wages
their men 25 per cent, and upwards, while keeping
the rents of their men unreduced, and declaring
a quarterly dividend on their stock of 2 per cent.
... it would appear that the Puliroan Company
imposed the losses of a hard season on its working-
men without taking its fair proportion of them
itself. . . . This does not • . • give the em-
ployees a right to deiiand arbitration. . . . iMt
it does subject the corporation which . . • takes
the profits of good times for itself, to public
obloquy. 3
2
As noted in the preceding chapter, the Ctr:




recognise and deal with organized labor, the implication
being that had he arbitrated with the grievance committee,
the strike could have been avoided. Arena suggested that
Pullman gave his wen no alternative but to join the A«ft<
. . laboring men have discovered that . . . [jLi
the co:npany3 they also nust act corporately as an
individual instead as individuals if they wish to
obtain any consideration at the hands of corporate
capital. . . . Labor organizations are as legiti-
• • •mate as any other social institution.
Underlying Issues
Paternalism
•—iliWi - -I —— li lWI
The extent to which inhabitants of the "model"
town felt the effects of corporate control was descri
by Independent in these tera
So far as I \U.lrjan is concerned, we suspect the
real trouble is that the tenants felt that tb
were too much taken care of and had too little"
liberty . Pullman lias been held up as a model
town; but tenar; ;uld rather have their own way,
than be compelled to submit to the better way of
sore one else. ... It was as If the State, owned
the land and houses, and ruled the people A°
. . . C .] felt themselves to be raere parts I
a machine, which, however kind in its intention,
was re2-3orselesQ in its action. . . . employees
felt that they were in a sort of serfdom, the
natural result of which was to aggregate every
wrong suffered and to intensify every feeling of
dissatisfaction.^1
Samuel Otwpers, in the North A/serican , said that
•sployees were forbidden to join labor unions ai:d were
entirely dependent *upon r. Pullman's generosity and
foresight in all things.*42






which explained the influence of the corporation upon
ents and their frustrated desire to own land:
The gereral complaint seemed to be that they were
too much under «*•• Pullman's thumb; there was
no room for individuality or independence. There
was a gentle but never ceasing Pullman pressure.
. . . The workman owned nothing except the clothes
on hie back and the furniture in his rented house.
. . . The cause of the discontent was lack o,
individual freedom, and opportunity to acquire
something of one's own. ... to hay$ and control
a bit of land was impossible. . . .4->
i.eviev of Reviews surprisingly defended the town
a worthy idea, splendidly executed, and supported the com-
pany's refusal to permit home ownership:
It is natural for men to wish homes of their
own; but that is no reason why the Pullman Company
should sell its houses. Hundreds ... of the
Pullman workmen have been incited to thrift and
to a higher standard of living by their experience
in the town ilman, and have gone forth . . •
to labor in other fields and to own homes of their
Own. • . .44
Providing a more general defense oj orate
paternalist was Harper's Weekly , which declared!
The village of Pullman has been criticised by
many. ... It has been said that the company
interfered too much with the personal freedom t
the inhabitants, and that many of the rules and
regulations in force te tied to destroy their
independence. . . .
The town is managed as a private estate, and
the rules and regulations are of ftlMNfc the sc
character as those voluntarily assumed by residents
in choice restricted suburban neighborhoods. . . .
oreover, none of the workmen is required to live
in the village. 45
Hone of the journals commented on such grievances




any specific mention of the "ten-day clause* to which
renters were subject.
Absence of Democracy
Accounts differed as to whether Pullman maintained
coercive political control over the town*
Harper's Weekly reported:
Mr- Pullman himself is a Republican in politics*
Yet in the town elections the Democratic candidate
is nearly always elected. The men are absolutely
free to vote as they choose, although canvassing
upon either side is discouraged. 46
A letter to the editor of Nation , however, more
accurately explained:
The promptness with which the whole town, pre-
viously Republican, voted the Democratic ticket
when £&• Pullman expressed a desire that they
should vote the Republican ticket, was no surprise
to observers who knew the employees personally.
The author of that letter u.lso pointed out that town resi-
dents **had nothing to do with the local government. . . • " '
There was no discussion in any of the periodicals
concerning the evident lack of freedom of expression for
those who might wish to speak out against company policies.
Forum presented an article which suggests the
Pullman Strike was essentially the product of faulty public
relations on the part of corporate managers, who failed to
heed the warning signals provided by employee "feedback."
Directors of the company, "if they have one ear Op«n to the
claims of the workmen • . ., listen with a hundred ears to
the demands of the stockholders whom they represent."
io , .- - ,i_A







This article said that if the company had provided
its employees more of a sense of democratic participation
in the policy making process, the strike might have been
prevented. The directors
• • • do not study the human hopes and needs which
agitate their employees. . . earnings decline,
no cut is made in the salary of the officers, but
they are instructed to reduce expenses. This
swans a reduced force, or wages or both. The
reduction follows the line of least resistance.
It falls upon the powerless employee. . . . The
employee . . » ifl under the domination of an
ployer with whora he has no voice, and fr-
whom he can expect no consideration. . % .
it not easy to comprehend that lack c uine
interest and ultimate antagonise, are bound to
take root where the tie of employment is a cold
balance-sheet on the one hand and an uncertain
monthly wage on the other?49
ialysis
Weeklies
In general the weeklies concentrated on the immediate
issues and neglected underlying Issuer
•
Harper's Weekly , Independent , and Nation approved
the Pullman Company and argued in these terms: a declining
market caused Pullman to lose construction contracts and
reduce the price of cars, v ages fell. Under no circua-
stances could Pullman have drawn upon corporate reserves or
the dividends of stockholders to increase wages. ftt would
have been bad business.
Pullman carefully regulated his town for the bene-
fit of employees. They had no real complaint. its were




or Pullman to have arbitrated would have been
absurd He was losing money on his contracts and labor
agitators were trying to foment a revolution. J\irtherraore f
as a property-owner, Pull:vsan had the right to run his
business as he saw fit. Ko one else had a right to tell
to arbitrate or pursue a financially ruinous policy.
These, essentially, were the arguments i^ade by the
"conservative 1* weeklies. They interpreted the immediate
issues from a laissez-faire theoretical franework . m
their enthusiastic defense of Pullirian, however, they de-
viated from historical evidence presented in Chapter III.
I. Harper's Weekly included these distortions in
its interpretation of the inaaediate issues; the Weekly
(1) implied Pullman was not making enormous profits;
(2) asserted workers had no real grievance
j
(3) gave erroneous facts concerning rents;
(4) suggested Pullman would have arbitrated, had it not
been for labor agitators.
II. .independent
(1) stated wages "seem to be all that could be afforded,**
yet gave no factual evidence in support of this view;
(2) suggested that rents would decline as the market fell,
a prediction that omitted Pullman' & intent to earn six per
cent, regardless of market conditions;
G) reported ft&laan's contention that workers were not
tq a «a
tm
upelled to live in the company town, ignoring the em-
ployees* belief to the contrary.
Ill* Mation
(1) asserted Pulluian had no control over ernployee wages,
yet provided no supporting evidence;
(2) implied that workers did not have starvation wages, yet
many employees were left with only several dollars after
rent was paid;
(3) said rents were as high as adjoining towns and workers
were free to live elsewhere;
(4) declared Pull-ran "could not*' aruitrate, an argument
based purely upon \f flft***
*
-£aire theory, unsubstantiated by
financial data.
Concerning the underlying issues, Harper* s ' re:.ly
was inadequate in two respects: (1) implying that town
regulations were no more severe than those in other "quality**
•ffHttnities; and (2) implying that town inhabitants were not
pressured to vote in accordance with Pullman's desire; .
The conservative weeklies were not, however, com-
pletely inadequate in explaining the issues. Independent ,
for example, was the only journal to explain the shop abuses
experienced by Pullman workers, iurtheruiore, it gave an
excellent summary of paternalism.
tion did not comnent directly on the underlying
issues, nevertheless, by printing a letter to the editor,





OutlooK differed sharply from the other weeklies.
A "progressive" journal, it emphasised humanitarian over
economic values.
In many respects, Outlook * s tone and reasoning was
ilar to that of the Strike Commission. Outlook
(1) emphasized the weaknesses in Pullman 1 s reasons for
refusing to arbitrate; (2) reported the extensive profits
earned by the company; G) explained why it appeared aa
though Pullman passed his losses on to his men without the
company bearing its fair share; (4) suggested that Pullman
could have adjusted wages or rents.
On the other hand, Outlook , in contrast to the other
weeklies, completely failed to discuss any of the underlying
issue
onthlies
In comparison to weeklies, the monthly journals
devoted proportionately far less discussion to the issues.
Arena and Samuel Gorapers in :<orth American explained
the strike from the laborer's viewpoint, but both articles
lacked the depth needed for a full understanding of the
issues.
Tke Review was "moderate" in perspective, loru
with articles from several authors, had no consistent
editorial viewpoint. Neither journal gave sufficient




trationj i orui, provided a thorough discussion of the lack
of democracy in Pullraan.
Arena interpreted the strike primarily in one
lengthy article by V alter ulackburn Harte. Mm n of
the immediate and underlying issues was extremely United.
(Harte concentrated his analysis upon the related issues
amtrging from the subsequent railroad boycott and strike
In coranienting on the "original" strike, Arena basically
made two poin. (1) that ?ull?ian could have given his
employees a financial reprieve by drawing upon corporate
reserves, and (2) that Pullman's aloof intransigence, in
effect, compelled his men to join the A.Ic.U.
The Kevievv of lieviewg explained the issues in
"Progress of the lorld, " by the editor, Albert Shaw. cr©»
his detached perspective, Shaw presented a balanced dis-
cussion. He was Mainly concerned with the effect oi the
strike on the entire nation.
The Review did not question PiiUbob** arguments for
reducing wages j nor did it analyze the financial condition
of the company to determine whether Pullman could have
adjusted wages or rents, it even defended Pull: is1 refusal
to allow private ownership of property. Nevertheless, the
Review argued editorially that Pullman ought to have arbi-
trated with his man, that soue reduction in rent should
have been made.
frorth American covered the strike in a four author






mentioned the issues. At best his explanation was extremely
shallow
.
Forms also conducted a symposium. V>ith the exception
of one article, however, discussion of the issues was quite
superficial. One author pointed out that while employee
wages declined, the salaries of managers were unreduced.
Another writer denounced the assertion that workers were
paid starvation wages. Nevertheless, of all the journals,
Forum presented the most comprehensive analysis of a major
source of discontent—the inability of employees to have a
voice in managing the corporation.
General Inadequacies
Aside from Outlook , the journals avoided any serious
interpretative reporting that could have assessed the full
financial condition of the Pullman Company. Such an analysis
would have contributed toward answering the question of
whether Pullman could have raised wages or reduced rents.
Two factors may have inhibited such a discussion.
First, the prevailing free enterprise ethic, so prominent
among conservative journals, may have restrained any re-
porter or author from initiating the difficult task of
procuring the necessary information. In 1#94, muckraking
was still a latent force in journalism. A "full-blown"
expose of the Pullman Company's economic posture may have
been inconceivable to most editors.
•




econd, none of the journals were so financially
secure thenselves that they could afford to field the
quality or mater of reporters that might be required to
conduct such an invest i^atic
^t is doubtful that ar^y of the weeklies even assigned
reporters to Pullman, Illinois, during the early phase?
the strike. None of the journals discussed such abuses as
the "ten-day" rental clause, the "two-check" pay systc
or other related particulars, even though voting and home
ownership received son;e attention* Moreover, there was no
discussion of restraints to freedom of expression, another
indication that few, if any, reporters seriously investi-
gated conditions in the company town.
1 >---.
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THE JOt KTERPRET THE STRIKE
t
LATED ISSl."
The Minn Strike became a topic of isajor ir?por-
tance after the Azaeriean Hallway Inion and the General
3flanager»s Association turned it into a nationwide boycott
and railway strike.
Literary Digest on 21 July 1^94 ceofflented, nHm
strike within recollection has involved so oany important
questions, legislative, Constitutional, industrial and
sociological, as has the strike of the American Railway
Union."1
This chapter analyzes the eifectivene the
journals in explaining the related issues enjerging from the
original strike at Pullrian, Illinoi
The Chicago Boycott and .^trilp
How did the A.E.U. arrive at its decision to boycott?
General riles, writing in North African , assert- ^at
MBsbers of the union had been "rdsled by the harangues of
professional agitators. . . .** into an attitude of insurrec-
tion, c'orun said the A.R.U. convention failed to £ive other




the travelling public) a hearing prior to the boycott
2decision.
Evidently, I iles considered presentation of
grievances against Pullman to be a "harangue . The fojr
writer* s criticism of the A.. .1 . convention was apparently
based upon a belief that the union deliberately planned to
paralyze transportation, thereby interfering with the
rights of the public and the governments obligation to
protect interstate commerce. There is no basis in histor-
ical evidence for such a belief*
Harper's V'eekly . Nation and Independent declared
that Debs ordered the boycott and/or strike. Outlook
initially reported the A.E.I', decision was a "decree"
formulated by a "secret cominittee." In a later accou
however, Outlook said "the strike [boycott] was not ordered
until the delegates of lour hundred local unions had
4
unanihiously approved of it. . . » w
Once the boycott began the ... ... resisted and a
strike followed. Three journals gave relatively accura^
assessments concerning the causes of the strike.
As the Arena pointed out, a basic reason for the
strike was sympathy among the railroad workers for Pullman
5
employees.
A#F.L« leader Samuel Gonqpers in florth American








... to redress grievances not oi their own, but
of other workmen, who, having become thoroughly
enervated and impoverished, without organization
or previous understeading, la sheer desperation
threw down their work. . •
Outlook correctly reported, however, that relations
between railroads and their employees had been previously
strained, "partly by acts of real injustice perpetuated by
some corporations . • , partly by the fact that the law
provides no remedy for such injustice except through a labor
7
animation. . . . n '
Gompers also suggested, as the Strike Commission
observed, that the government was responsible for the strike,
since it had failed to regulate corporations and remedy
labor abuses, in Ijorth American , Croppers wrote,
Labor has no standing nor protection in the economy
of our life* ... If the ctate refuses to deal out
some degree of justice and guarantee protection tc
labor, what interest has the laborer in the state
The Strike Commission suggested that both Pullman and
the G*M«A« were partially responsible for the railway strike.
As indicated above Arena and Gompers implied the
A.R.U. strike/boycott would have been avoided if Pullman
had acted to resolve his workers* complaints. The Review of
Reviews also blamed Pullman; as noted in Chapter IV", the
Review coesatntec, "He ought not to have allowed his local
quarrel to go on unsettled • . • until it had assumed con-
tinental proportions. . . •'
The Review did not hold the G.U.A. responsible.
Outlook, however, suggested the strike could not have
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happened if railroad Managers had been fair to their
•aployees. As will become evident, Arena was the one
journal to explain the 9«K»a**fl role in precipitating the
Who ordered tlie strike? Historical evidence in-
dicates the strike was not ordered, but was a spontaneous
phenomenon among local unions and individual railway eie-
ployees. It appears to have been triggered by .; . .A.
decisions to fire iaen who would not handle Pullman cars,
to i.^port replacements, and to hire deputies. Contrary to
this evidence, the journals-—except Arena , Outlook and
Qcapera! '-pyy-- - x !>,•;^n article—aseertee that Etekt and/cr
the ,' • • . "ordered" the e
.
F.ven Review of lieviews , normally soniewhat syinpat lu-
etic to labor, declared, ";4r» Debs, as autocrat of the new
Aaerican Railway Union, adopted the policy of e: tending tl
strike and of attacking the unoffending railway corporations
and the . . . world of traffic and travel. ..." lie.
injured the public.
The historical record shows the purpose of the
boycott was to penalize Pullirian until he would arbitrate.
G.M.A. resistance brought on the strike, which was partially
responsible, with niob violence, for iinpeding the ;aoveaient
of trains. As noted earlier in this study, the rnanagers





create an inpression that strikers were totally responsible
for inconvenience to the public.
An article in i-orun , whether intentional or not,
seems to have clearly articulated the impression which the
railroads sought to establish:
The leaders of this Union (~ *1 issued an order
to their followers to refuse to work £or" railroad'
companies that should . . . continue to haul tl
Pullman cars. As no railroad companies ceased to
carry out their contracts with . • Pullman . . .,
ome of the trainmen . . . obeyed the order, and
refused to love trains to which Pullman cars were
attached. or this reason the railroad companies
discharged them, and tried to fill their place.
Thereupon a general strike was ordered by the
Union, with the intention of putting a stop to
all railroad traffic until their demands were
iplied with.1 *- (I^phasis added.)
florth American interpreted the strike in a s,
by four authors, pers presented the labor view-
point. General Mile lained the dispute as an insurrec-
tion against government authority requiring arued. forces.
Two other writers discussed the strike the oint
of the railroad : imagers t V.ade Hampton, I . . . Commissioner
of £&ilroads, and Harry P. Robinson, editor ox uailway A;;e .
Two monthlies ( iiler, .on, and Robinson in North
American , and one foruir, article) and three weeklies (Nation ,
xndependent , and Harper's Weekly ) seriously ^misinterpreted
the nature and 'intent" of the striLe.
Robinson, for example, rejected the reasons for the
strike given by Gaspers, Arena and Outlool: . He said the
cause of the dispute was neither sympathy for the men at




the strike was a pre-planned decision to precipitate
. • « a general industrial rebellion, through
which . . the labor organizations of the country
proposed to obtain control or the legislative and
administrative machinery of . • • government* • • .
[The conflict was] an insurrection of certain
sections of the wage earning class against con-
stituted society »3->
General miles had a ar view} the striice was a
contest between:
• anarchy, . . . unwritten law, mob violence,
and universal chaos under the . lag of social-
in • . * {jkn63 the side of estabiishe- era-
ment, supremacy of lav/, maintenance of good order,
universal peace* absolute security of life and
property. . . **e
Hampton, in a slightly less extreme position, said
the intention of the striking k* A . members "was the
destruction oi' the railroads and of property of all other
descriptions*"1 ^
lar to lies, Robinson and Hampton in viewpoint
were Hat ion , Harper's \aekly . and Independent *
tlon asserted the striice was a contest between the
A»B«U« and federal authority for "national supremacy, w and
charged the union with levying a public war to redress a
private grievance*
Harper* s \ -eekly reported the avowed aim of the
A»J 4 . MM "to subjugate the people of the United States,
to extort from the nation the control and management of its
highways* . . ." The union intended to paralyse industry





lawful authorities . . . ; and the / . ... was doing all
this "on the pretext that the railroads Bight
coerced into compelling the Pullman Company to open ito
shops at full wages* ...•' (Emphasis added.)
Independent , following this view of tho strike,
claimed that A.I . ;ers had no complaint against the
railroads; "The only reason for the strike was that the
panics would not agree to refuse to liaul Pullman car:
Fjoreover, the purpose of the strikers "was to stop every
railroad train, to prevent the resumption of passenger
freight traffic until their demands were granted. 1' The
'
.
. . undoubtedly hoped "to construct ... a combination




in the following paragraph, forum surasiarized on
behalf of the railroads, an aralvsis nearly identical to
the interpretations of I lies and Robinson in Morth American ,
and the views of Nation , Independent , and Harper's Weekly *
. . . the railway unionists . . . -co . the po
tion that they would interrupt the business of
the country, subject thousands of innocent passen-
gers to delay and annoyance. . . Their attitude
was essentially that of anarchists. . . . They
deinanded that their will . • be recognized as
superior to the law of the land, and this revolu-
tionary deisand, together with the evident sympathy
and practical encoujv.
:
c eat of the State and city
magistrates, is what gave the strike its signifi-
cance .iy
in suaraary, five journals (exciudin f
article in North American) asserted that Debs had ordered
.*(=>'•.
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the strike In a pre-planned, deliberate attest to paralyze
traffic and obtain national supre over government
authority. Ml these journale Tailed to substantiate their
clai-".; with facte*
Thus far, discussion has centered upon why A. -
maabers declared a boycott and went on strike* The Joumt
also explained why the G#M*A. fought the A.f .U.
idependent gave several reasons for G.-'.A. resist-
ance: (1) the railroads were asserting their right to
manage property for the benefit of the public and the
stockholders; (2) it would have bee* in violation of moral
obligations to join in such a boycott; (3) *it would have
been a violatit contract!* (4) it be cane evident to the
atfiagers that the purpose of the A.R.U. was "to use the
Pullrrian controversy as a pretext for forcing upon the rail-
20
roads recognition of its Union. . . .' ~ (Emphasis added.)
Furthernore, conr-iented Independent , the . did
not exist solely for the purpose of "subduing atterspts of
the eisployed to better their condition. ather, the funda-
mental idea of the association was arbitration. "It is only
when there is no possibility of averting trouble that the
coramittee whose duties are the handling of strikes and
21disturbances is called to take charge. n
lependent ' s analysis of G.M.A* resistance to the
strike is obviously inconsistent with the evidence. Clearly,





central reason A.i A . delegates voted to boycott Pullman
cars* iirtherraore , as the : trike Commission concluded, the
fundamental purpose of the G..1.A. in 1894 was to "crush"
organized labor; at no point did the managers consider
negotiating their opposition to the boycott with Debs*
Outlook reported the G.M.A. resisted the A. •
because of its "preposterous" demnd to nearly all the
railways to join in the boycott of the Pullmans, under
22
penalty of a tie-up.
(view of Reviews explained that the managers were
"compelled . . to conspire . • . against labor unions"
23because the A.R.U. had conspired to paralyse traffic. x
- our journals argued strongly that the railroads had
no alternative but to resist the strike because contracts
h Pullian were involved. Forum said it would hiave beenMMMMWWNW
flppossible lor the companies to accede to the boycott; such
an act would be "unlawful and subject them to damages. . .
The companies . , . were therefore required to put tho»-
solves in distinct opposition. ..." iphasis added.)
Independent , Outlook and Hampton's article in Itorth American
25
made similar arguments. **
According to the evidence, the railroads were by
no rieans "required" by contracts to haul Pullman cars. This
argument originated from the G.ll.A. in an apparent attempt
to gain public support.




so successful in gettin views into print? Aside frost
the probability that conservative journals would be particu-
larly interested in seeking out the G.i-i.A. rationale, the
managers had an excellent public relations apparatus. As
the Independent noted, the G.M.A. .fought the strike with an
efficient press bureau.
There is no evidence that Debs had such a means of
publicity. Perhaps thi: at explain why comparative
little of the A.R.U. interpretation of the strike appeared
in print. Of all the journals, only Outlook presented both
fjebs* defense of the union strike as well as the G.;;.A.*s
27
reasons for opposing it.
The "Orrjiibus" Injunction
As might be expected, the "pro-labor*" Arena , in
Walter B« Harte , s lengthy analysis, presented an extremely
critical interpretation of the federal injunction. Goaspers*
liorth Airterican article, and Albert 5haw f s commentary in
Review or f:eviews also denounced the injunction.
Outlook devoted little attention to the injunction
but was opposed to its use "for the purpose of punishing a
crime against the peace and order Ox the community .
"
Among the other weeklies, surprisingly the nation
was as outspoken against the injunction as were the ;aorc
"progressive" journal
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How adequately did the journals explain the back-
ground of the injunction? The keview , IJorth American
(Gorcpers t article) and Arena argued against applying the
Interstate Coiamerce Law to restrain organized labor.
Tne Review argued in these terms:
The Interstate QtMHTM law was in fact not
enacted to restrain labor but to restrain capital*
Its object was to bring railway nanageinent under
control in the public interest. Yet the railwa
nagers have notoriously and habitually violated
its provisions, ^t would be a 3trange reversal of
the purpose and the spirit of that law if t
Federal Courts should join hands with the railway
nanagers to uce it as an instrument to destroy
labor organizations.2
9
This particular analysis, though it fails?, to coi»-
pletely make a positive connection between the court and the
G,.UA», seems quite perceptive when compared to the evidence.
Gonpers, in &orth American , said it was strange that
the Interstate Coroaerce Law
. . . should be perverted from its true purpo
and made to do service as an instrument to oppress
the parties to whom it was never intended to apply,
workingnen engaged in a contest to redress
grievances.''-'
Arena declared the A.R.U. *is not In ar.y sense a
restraint of trade j it is simply a moral union, to sustain
wa^ec, the ilniiiiua at which
1
1
m v.-ill perv-it control or tLc-ir
labor and faculties »•*
As noted earlier in this study only slight coverage
was given to the appointtnent of Kgan as strike tianager and
Walker as special I • . attorney. lione of the journals




the G.H.A. and the federal judges collaborated in creating
the injunction.
Ilorth American (Compere* article), however, suggested
a similarity in values between the G. . . and Judge Grosscup:
the U. S. Array was ordered into Chicago,
... by the order of the President to enforce
injunctions, restraining "everybody" from even
writing a letter, issued by the judge who only a
few days before expressed the conviction that the
growth of labor organisations must be checked by
law .32
(Judge Grosscup, on 30 1 &y 1&94, had declared that "the
growth of labor unions must be checked by law.*)"*"*
Godkin*s Kation attacked the "omnibus" nature of
the injunction and alluded to the fact that it created an
impression the court was a tool of the railroads—an im-
Lon the j£a£ion wanted to disspell. The injunction was
not only against specific persons, but also against
the members of the A.i;..U. "to the number of thousands, and
•all other persons whomsoever 1 . No satisfactory precedent
exists for injunctions of such wide scope as this." The
true reason for issuing such a court order was to meet the
Chicago emergency, because the process of arrest and in-
dictment was slow.
Nation feared
... that many of the common people • • . enter-
tain the belief that the courts have allied them-
selves with the great corporate interests of the
country . . • It is eminantly desirable that this
belief should have no sound basis*
If there is no other way of repressing crime
except by treating it as contempt of court, our
jurisprudence must be reconstituted upon models
... which prevail under despotic governments .3
5









Nation suggested that the injunction, as a means
of inducing federal armed intervention, may have been
"wholly superfluous
.
H Since federal statutes authorized
the President to use the U. S« Army in quelling domestic
violence, there was no need to have relied upon an injunc-
tion restraining such activities. The use of regulars by
the President, in "the prompt discharge of his constitutional




There was little discussion among the journals con-
cerning the relationship between the injunction and the
mails. None of the periodicals suggested the clause pro-
hibiting obstruction of mail was not needed when the in-
junction was drafted. The first occasion on which the
mails were probably seriously obstructed was after the
injunction was read by larshal Arnold to the crowd at Blue
Island. None of the journals reported (as the evidence
indicates) the section concerning U. S. mail was probably
deliberately included by Walker to provide the official
excuse—sought by the G.M.A.—for federal armed intervention.
In general, the journals seem to have accepted the common
assumption that the mails were being obstructed, hence that
troops were needed.
Arena , however, made this interesting interpretation
concerning the mail:
Neither law nor society can enjoin a man from
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to do likewise, whether such action inconveniences
society or interferes with contracts between
government and certain railroad corporations or
not. In case the withdrawal of men prevents the
railroads from carrying the mails according to
contract, then the government has a purely civil
case for breech of contract against the railroads,
and the latter must find new agencies for the
fulfillment of their contracts with the govern-
ment.-''
Arena was the one journal to emphasize that aspect
of the injunction which stated that it was a conspiracy to
induce men by persuasion to quit work or refuse to handle
Pullman cars; in this respect, Arena 's position fore-
st
shadowed that of the Strike Commission i^
This judicial muzzle was a menace • . . an
audacious threat from the state; • . • it denied
the laboring poor the right • • • to meet and
exchange ideas, to find and make a community of
social opinion by the ordinary methods of dis-
cussion . . .; it denied the right of free
thought and free speech.^
Federal Intervention
*—^— mm ip . Hi »»wwwm wimwi ! in
Did the journals comment upon the relationship
between the railroad menagers and the federal armed forces?
Hone of the journals pointed out that special U. 3.
deputies had been authorized by Attorney General Olney,
elected and paid for by the railroads*
Concerning the use of federal troops, however, Arena
criticized the government for acting as though the railroads
alone had "rights.*1 Arena pointed out that the "function
of federal jurisdiction is most essentially that of a judge











state. • • ••* The government acted unjustly because it
sought to guarantee freedom of contract to capitalists and
40deny it to laborers.
Arena 's explanation of federal armed intervention
closely approximates the historical record. Once the rail-
roads experienced lawlessness and difficulty in running
their trains, said Arena , they
• • • should have immediately notified the properly
constituted municipal and state authorities and
placed the protection of their property in their
hands. By not doing so they seemed to indicate
that they did not regard themselves amenable to
the state authorities .^1
In perhaps a slight overstatement, Arena clearly
revealed the connection between the G.M.A. and federal
attorneys. Instead of appealing to local or state officials
for assistance,
. • . the railroad companies through their
attorneys, who were in constant consultation with
the United States district attorney, made a requisi-
tion upon the federal government for United
States regular troops. The President at once
responded, thus recognising the claims of the
railroad companies as superior to the rights and
dignity of . . . Illinois.
*
2
More accurately stated, Arena could have pointed out
that U. S. Marshal Arnold, acting on behalf of federal
attorneys (who were in constant contact with the G.M.A.)
neglected to appeal to local authorities but instead re-
quested federal troops.
Despite Outlook ' s support for Cleveland's policy












which expressed the view that the government was not wise
in the way it intervened. Federal authorities
• • . ought to have been wise enough to see that
back of the riot and violence on the part of the
mob there was a lawful and law abiding action on
the part of the workingmen against the railroads.
The workingmen may have been in the wrong; but
they who, at least outwardly had not broken the
law should not have been practically identified
with the lawless, and condemned before they were
tried.
The Government . . . should have said: "Of
the real question between the railroads and the
men we cannot at this time judge; there is evi-
dence of a large following on each side of the
case; the presumption is that there is truth on
both sides. . . • But of that we cannot now
judge. Our first duty is to preserve the peace.
We shall then appoint ... a committee of in-
vestigation or arbitration. • . •*• If Government
had said that ... [It] would not be . . .
declared by thousands ... of peaceful working-
men to be a mere tool and creature of the
corporations. . . .^3
Kow did the journals, which supported President
Cleveland's policy, justify federal intervention?
According to historical evidence, the situation in
Chicago on July 3 did not warrant a call for federal or
state troops. The principal disturbance had been at Blue
Island—beyond the limits of Chicago. Some property damage
and violence had broken out after the G.It.A. inspired in-
junction was read to the crowd. Police were available but
not requested*
In contrast to the evidence, Independent claimed
that
... on July "}& all the roads were experiencing
more or less trouble in moving trains and many of





moving freight had been abandoned and officials
• • • were making heroic attempts to keep the
through passenger trains moving. . . . riotous
mobs, supposedly led by the strikers, began to
destroy property, derail trains and block the
tracks with overturned cars.
Thus it came about that the railroad[s]
presently found their property in the hands of
the mobs? their men at the mercy of thugs; • • .
the municipal authorities temporizing, and anarchy
imminent. Then it was that appeals were made to
President Cleveland to send the soldiers .44
On what basis did the Indepenaent arrive at this
Hit of the situation? One answer was suggested in
a Forum article. The author declared, **In view of the
reports then [July 3] appearing in all the newspapers, it
was evident that disorder did exist to a serious extent.
45
•
+"^y If, indeed, newspapers were the major source of
news from which the journals derived their stories, what
was the quality of newspaper reporting during the boycott?
According to Almont Lindsey, "The newspapers of the
nation were inclined to be very hostile toward the American
Railway Union;*' sensationalism and misrepresentation were
in metropolitan newspapers* "Controlled by capital-
istic influence, these publications were unable to view the
struggle in a detached or disinterested frame of mind« w^
Similarly, in John Finnegan*s study of the newspaper
press and the strike, he characterized strike reporting as
sensational, non-objective and often erroneous.
Mfcny of the errors in strike reporting probably
were the result of confusion, sloppy reporting,
inexperienced men and deliberate lies told by news










in the strike were run verbatim with no apparent
effort to verify the facts* News copy was pumped
full of speculation, rumor and personal bias.^'
Finnegan concluded that by the time violence broke
out in Chicago, the newspapers had already "convicted" Debs
and the A*R*U* Similarly, Lindsey reported the press
shamefully distorted the facts and greatly magnified trivial
incidents; by these means the newspapers were able to
generate far more support for intervention than circum-
4S
•tances justified*
If newspaper accounts of the situation in Chicago
were exaggerated, distorted and based to some extent upon
news releases prepared by the §« >A« press bureau, a public
impression could easily have been formed that circumstances
clearly demanded the use of troops, and that Governor
Altgeld failed to act accordingly*
Altgeld, in his July 5 protest to President Cleveland,
commented on the situation in Chicago prior to the arrival
of federal troops:
• . • troubles were local in character and could
easily be handled by State authorities* The
newspaper accounts have in many cases been pure
fabrications, and in others wild exaggerations .49
The author of the Forum article, who based his
analysis upon newspaper stories, asked how it was that
Altgeld came to be ignorant of "the fact" that disorder
did exist to a serious extent*
The only possible answer is that the governor did
not consider the presence in the railroad yards
I m
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and about the trains, of crowds of men • • . as
anything unlawful. • • . Such being the case, it
would have been a futile proceeding for the rail-
road companies to appeal to the governor for the
assistance of troops.^
Because Altgeid issued a second protest on July 6,
when violence increasingly justified the use of troops, the
Review of Reviews probably reflected public sentiment when
it declared:
Governor Altgeid • . . cut no enviable figure
in writing elaborate arguments to President
Cleveland against Federal interference at the
very moment when rioters were in control of the
railroad yards, were stopping mails and were
burning loaded cars. 51
How did the journals interpret the legal issue of
federal intervention?
Arena argued strongly that Section 4, Article IV of
the Constitution was applicable and ought to have been the
basis for President Cleveland's action. As Arena remarked.
*M% 01ney f s and J4r» Cleveland»s whimsical ideas of their
functions and authority are at variance with the constitution
of the United States."52
Arena sharply attacked one presidential reply to
Altgeid es "perhaps the most absurd and unworthy utterance
made during the whole conflict •" Cleveland could not
satisfy the constitutional objections raised by Altgeldj
the President "puts his scorn upon temperate discussion
53
and reason in order to carry out his will." '
--







President Cleveland, by forcing troops into
states without any demand from and against the
will of the governors of the states, violated the
spirit if not the letter of the constitution. He
out-Hamiltoned Hamilton .5*
One North iimerican article countered the ar|
that Cleveland should have relied upon the Constitution:
. . . those who criticize the acts of the President
forget that Congress has enacted laws which confer
on the chief magistrate larger and wider powers
than those given to Congress by the Constitution
•
The authority for the exercise of these powers is
found in Sections 5298 and 5299 of the Revised
Statutes.^
Outlook, rorusi and Nation , in varying degrees of
detail, also discussed these statutes, but made no mention
56
whatsoever of the applicable section of the Constitution.
Mation. supporting Cleveland, c
Section 5299 ... was fortunately framed so as
to meet a contingency which could hardly have been
forseen—the occupation of the governorship by a
man who sympathised with the law breakers and who
would not use the power of the State against them. ^7
(.' ::ipnasis added.)
i&tion failed to substantiate this assertion with
facts. To say that Altgeld "would not" use state troops is
to imply that, knowing troops were needed, the governor
deliberately refused to provide them. Historical evidence
provides no support for this interpretation.
Forum commented, "it is obvious that the proper
authorities to act first in suppressing a riot are those
that are present at the scene. . • The President suppressed




Harper's ; eekly reported that Altgeld opposed the
use of federal troops "because he wanted to stand well with
the lawless men who had Incited riot, and to secure their
votes."^
The Review asserted that Cleveland was guilty of no
usurpation* "His use of federal troops was strictly within
the bounds of federal authority
.
H
Evidently the journals, with the exception of Arena ,
were little inclined to question the G.I1.A/newspaper
rationale that circumstances dictated the use of federal
troops since loeal officials had ignored or "refused*' to
cope with the situation.
Violence
Historical evidence suggests that violence in the
strike was an effect, resulting from the irritating in~
junction, the presence of IU S« troops, frustration with
railroad raanagement and usob contagion. But most journals
explained violence as a planned means to obtain the goals
of the A.I" .1.
Independent said the leaders of the A.l-i.U. intended
to paralyze the traffic of the nation by exploiting mob
violence t
Debs did not expect to gain his purpose without
violence. He sympathized with the violence which
prevented the operation of the railroad train
He wanted that violence to succeed; and the brain
of an idiot ought to have seen that neither nation







Forum expressed the same view. Harper's Weekly
remarked that Debs' announcements that the A.R.li. intended
no violence were impudent falsehoods, "taken seriously by
MM journal L:,w;:-, v;hoce creouiity ir tec "xe.it to he
sincere." 'oreover, while Debs was making these pronounce-
ments, he was nall the time secretly instigating outrage
and brutality • "
Outlook declared that Debs may not have deliberately
planned to use violence, but the tragedies of July 5 to 7
fully prove that violence was at least the ally of the
union* J Outlook 's explanation of the conflict was among
the least emotional of all the journals.
These views are a direct contrast to the finding of
the U» S» Strike Commission—that officers of the A.n.l.
did not advise or participate in violence and property
destruction.
As for the strikers, Nation called them "rioters and
incendiaries, lawbreakers, and trainwreekers." According
to Hampton's North American article, when the G..M.A. decided
to resist the A. - ., strikers became "enemies of the public
peace, and resorted to violence, robbery, and bloodshed, to
enforce their lawless demands."
Most of the journals, however, credited the so-called
"lawless elements" with contributing to the violence.
Harper's Weekly * in an initial sensational account,
reported that strikers "established a reign of terror. . . «
v 99Wtl




On every line affected by the strike violence was used or
threatened. . . •** Subsequently, in a more dispassionate
tone, the \ eekly commented, "The discontented working-man,
the fanatical trades unionist, the enemy of social order
• • • the criminal • . . all saw the opportunity to . . .
65
win advantage by rushing to the attack upon wealth" #
Likewise, Independent reported that all rioters
were not strikers, but many strikers were rioters* It
should not Hbe assumed that all or even a majority of the
strikers countenanced . . . violations of the law." never-
theless, many Members of the A. , . did not even pretend to
maintain law and order (as Debs had urged), "but were
unnjoved lookers-on, connivers with the actors, and abettors
of all the itllUlf ii * • ."
Forum explained that the criminal classes and some
of the strikers began to destroy cars and other property}
these lawless elements had been "tempted by the impunity
with which they had trespassed upon the property of the
railroad companies and interrupted the movement in trains.
• •
uch of the violence that attended the strike,
according to the Review
»
was the work of "a bad class of
immigrants, " an assertion also made by the Strike Commission*
Nevertheless, tlie Review did not exonerate Debs. To
attribute acts of lawlessness
. . . directly to Tr. Debs and his associates would





evidence • But the dangerous incitement that
his • • • strike would give to cranks and
Anarchists was one of the things that ?&•• Debs
ought to have taken into account •°8
The Review* s interpretation of strike violence
differed little from that of the Outlook Both journals
expressed concern, and avoided the excessive emotionalism
that characterised the analyses of other periodicals.
General i11esf in Korth African , expressed the view
that violence was instigated by strikers, and executed by
foreign born anarchists* I'ob violence, said Miles, was so
severe that it necessitated the use of federal and state
troops. "Slew the people can judge whether the acts which
drew forth these expressions are in the interest of organised
labor, or whether it is red-liot anarchy, insurrectionary
and revolutionary!*'
None of the journals suggested that violence was
indirectly a consequence of Pullman's refusal to arbitrate,
or, more directly, to the determination of the managers to
defeat the strike*
Outlook, however, featured a letter to the editor
which asserted that labor "has a right to a living wage,"
and that the cause of violence was labors inability to
gain its right reward* The writer blamed Pullman and other
millionaires for their refusal to pay fair wages and called
70these corporate leaders "the mainsprings of anarchy. **'
Perhaps an interpretation relatively close to the





the role of the federal judicial authorities in precipi-
tating violence* The threats to freedom of assembly and
expression contained in the court injunction,
I « • provoked and exasperated the lawless and
destitute and ignorant elements of society in
Chicago to that blind resentment that defeats its
own ends in the destruction of property. . . .71
End of the Strike<———M—
—
m in l i m ii li —fOw »i m il
Harper's Veekly « Independent and to a lesser extent,
Ration discussed reasons for the strike* s end* Among the
monthlies, North American and Forum also contributed
explanations. In combination, the interpretations of these
journals generally parallel those of the historical record*
Reasons given for the collapse of the strike were:
(1) The action of the federal courts, the injunction, the
72
arrest and confinement of Debs (Independent )*
(2) Circumstances did not favor a strike? a large number of
men were out of work and sought employment (Independent *
Harper's Weekly)*73
(3) The A.FUU* failed to obtain the full support of the
brotherhoods and other unions (Independent * Harper's Weekly )*
Morth African explained that "the leaders of sorae of the
other organisations, while entirely in sympathy with the
aim of the American Railway Union, doubted the wisdom of
74
making the insurrection general. "'
(4) Organized labor constituted only a comparatively siaall





sympathise with labor so long as labor is just in its
demands and law-abiding in its conduct* . . .," declared
Warper '•-: cc.'J.: > M IN strikers failed Lo petal DM
sympathetic support of public opinion. The conservative
forces of society were determined to end violent inter-
ference with lawful pursuits* As Kfttion put it, the
patriotic response of the Aserican people, swift and un-
75
aistakable, "quelled and conquered the frenzied mob.*"
(5) The armed forces played a crucial role in ending the
strike* According to Ration and Independent , the U* 3.
troops were decisive * For Harper's \ eekly it was the
state militia which "with one volley cut the spinal cord
of the riot;** and secondarily* the police under the direc-
tion of i'ayor Hopkins* One writer in Forum eaid police
were unable to control the violence f implying that troops.
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either state or federal had ended the strife.
(6) The General Manager* a Association* a primary cause of
the violence, was given full credit for its role in forcibly
ending the strike. Harry P* Robinson, editor of The Railway
Affle. had contributed to the Korth American symposium* A
short time later, he also wrote in Porwa* again expressing
full support for the railroad managers
s
Dl]ad the lines in Chicago failed to "act unitedly*
as they did, the destruction of life and property
and the danger to society would have been incal-
culably worse than they were* Next to the President
• . . and the military which did its duty in
Chicago, it is to the General Manager 7 sociation

















Harper's Weekly . Independent and Kation viewed the
strike from a conservative perfective. In general, they
seriously misinterpreted the nature and origin of the
strike* They sympathised with the railroad managers and
the national government. To these weeklies the strike wee
a threat to free enterprise and to "law and order.**
Taken as a group, these journals explained the
strike essentially in these terms t the American Railway
Union was, in effect, a subversive organisation bent on
obtaining national supremacy, replacing government author-
ities with union "dictators.** The union, therefore, used
the Pullman dispute as a "pretext* for attacking the rail-
roads, la a deliberate attempt to paralyse national
transportation, Debs declared a nationwide insurrectionary
strike. He intended to obtain this objective by having
his strikers incite violence among the "lawless element:
Under these circumstances* it would have been absurd
for the G.M*A* to arbitrate with the union the issue of
hauling Pullman cars. Governor Altgeld, who had pardoned
anarchists, was in "complete sympathy" with the A.R.U. and
the rioting mobs. Despite the "fact** that riots and
property damage were "prevalent" in Chicago on July 3»






railroads and federal officials, therefore, had no other
choice but to seek federal assistance*
In effect, this was the interpretation given by the
weeklies, with the exception of Outlook *
Having shown great interest in suppressing the
strike, Harper's weekly . Independent * and Nation (along
with North African and Forma ) explained why the strike had
failed. Collectively they pointed out that the federal
injunction, armed forces, the large number of uneiaployed,
the conservative labor unions and the weight of public
opinion all contributed to defeating the strike.
Aside from the similarities in their interpretations
of the dispute, each of these weeklies had its peculiarities.
Harper's weekly pointed out that police and militia
were instrurr«ental in ending the strike.
Indfoxrodent argued that PuH&an contracts were a
reason for G.M.A. resistance to the A.B.U.
Ilation criticized the federal injunction as an
"omnibus*' that applied to nearly everyone reiaotely associated
with the strike, liation was also the only conservative
weekly to explain the federal statutes which authorised
President Cleveland's intervention.
Outlook was unique among the weeklies for its over-
all rational, coiaparatively unemotional discussion of
etrike-related issues. Outlook 's interpretation was not
comprehensive, but included several explanations not con-
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Although it confused the strike with the boycott,
Outlook pointed out that the course of action decided by the
union was not due to an order from Debs, but to a vote of
union delegates. Second, OutlooJg reported that grievances
among railroad employees were a factor contributing to the
strike. Third, it printed both Debs* defense of the
boycott/strike, as well as G»M»A» reasons for opposing the
union* Fourth, unlike the other weeklies, Outlook suggested
that violence wtts probably an "ally" of the A»R»U»—not its
primary method of operation*
Outlook also printed two letters to the editor, each
of which contributed to an understanding of the issues* One
letter said that Pullman's failure to pay his men a "living"
wage was responsible for the violence; the other pointed
out that the federal government created an impression it
was a •tool" of the railroad corporations.
One significant weakness in Outlook ' s commentary
was onroission of any explanation of Section 4, Article IV
of the Constitution. Fmphasis was placed exclusively upon
Sections 529# and 5299 of the Federal Statutes.
Outlook , like Independent , also printed the apparent-
ly common assumption that Pullman contracts required the
managers to resist the boycott.
.iontlilieg
Forum and 1,'orth American , despite their intent to
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providing diverse interpretations of the strike* The com-
bined articles of both journals, with the exception of
Gompers* analysis in I<orth African (which is examined
separately), were similar in tone, viewpoint, and explana-
tion of the strike.
Essentially, forum and North African interpreted
the strike In a manner identical to Harper* a v.eekly ,
Independent and nation : the strike was basically a contest
with government authorities for national supremacy. Con-
tracts required G.fl.A. resistance* Federal statutes
authorized the President to intervene.
North American , of these two monthlies, was unique
in that it explained that the 4UJ . . lacked the support of
other labor unions*
Fcrum argued that Altgeld knew the situation in
Chicago required troops, yet failed to provide them. More-
over, according to Forum, the American people should be
grateful to the G»i!.A. for firmly resisting the dangerous
A«R.U.
The only contrast to these interpretations was pro-
vided by Samuel Gompers in &erth American . Despite his mis-
taken assertion that sympathy for Pullman workers was the
only reason for the railroad strike, Gompers made several
ueeful pointst (1) the Interstate Commerce Act was not in-







had failed to treat laborers with justice} (3) Judge
Grosscup, who helped prepare the injunction, was "anti-
labor •
"
The Review of Reviews had the best explanation of
Pullman's responsibility for th© railway strike. Aside fr*i
Pullman, however, the Review blamed Debs for expanding the
strike. But the Review did not suggest the A.R.D. intended
to overcome national authority. Kor did it assert that Debs
pursued a deliberate plan of violence, though it criticized
Debs for having initiated a strike when conditions favored
violence. The Review opposed the strike primarily because
it inconvenienced the "unoffending* public.
Like Gompers, the lieview objected to use of the
Interstate Commerce Law to restrain labor unions. Jxi ton©
and perspective, the Review was far less emotional in
explaining the strike than most other journals. It dis-
cussed neither the applicable constitutional provision, nor
the federal statutes, but supported the President's policy
as legally authorized*
Arena was nearly as emotional in defense of the
A.R.U. and Altgeld as the conservative journals were in
denouncing the "rebellion." Nevertheless Arena made several
valid points concerning the collaboration between railroads
and federal authorities* (1) the failure of the railroads
to ask help from local or state authorities; (2) the
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mail contracts by means other than rail; (3) the federal
injunction enjoined union officials from even persuading
others to participate in the boycott; (4) the injunction
played a role in precipitating mob violence; (5) railroad
officials via federal attorneys requested federal troops*
One significant weakness in the Arena »s interpre-
tation was its exclusive emphasis on Section 4, Article IV
of the Constitution. The author made no mention of the
federal statutes under which Cleveland intervened.
General Inadequacies
Most of the journals failed to distinguish between
the boycott and the strike. None suggested that the
hostility of the managers toward the union, and the actions
taken by the G.i!»A. to defeat the boycott, precipitated the
strike and subsequent violence. Despite Arenas analysis,
most of the journals failed to clearly explain the inter-
relationship among U. S. attorneys Walker and Milchrist,
the federal judges, iiarshal Arnold, and the railroad
managers.
Although Gompers, Arena and Outlook asserted that
the federal government was apparently allied with the
railroad corporations, there was no suggestion that perhaps
the federal government ought to have (1) consulted Altgeld
prior to sending in federal troops, or (2) lent moral
support to arbitration when it became evident the A.R.U.
night expand the dispute.
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Even the relatively "progressive" journals fail*i
to document such evident facts as (1) Altgeld # s readiness
to send troops upon request? (2) the relatively low level
of disorder in Chicago prior to July 4; or (3) Attorney
General 01ney f s authorization or federal deputiesf selected
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This chapter evaluates the performance of the
journals of opinion in their coverage and interpretation
of the Pullman Strike and the issues as compared to the
historical standard. Differences between monthlies and
weeklies are noted; concluding observations concerning the
social role of the periodical press are discussed; and
suggestions for future research are presented.
Evaluation of Coverage and Interpretation
A Report to the National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence (.ass ifedia and Violence ) de-
clares, social strife must be set in context; "the public
must be given a representative view of events and an
explanation of their significance." Similarly, professors
William L. Rivers and V.ilbur Schramm say that "above all,
the news media must focus on why there is unrest, and
2
well before rioting breaks out."
Compared to this standard, the journals generally
failed to explain the Pullman Strike in its full historical
context. Beginning with the New York Times on June 27,
the metropolitan daily press in big cities across the
nation began to report the boycott and railway strike # In
bo* sv '
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early July, when federal intervention and violence were the
key issues, weeklies began coverage* By then readers of
the journals had been given little, if any, historical
perspective of the strike. Monthlies first commented on




The journals of opinion did not fully assess the
underlying issues * The journals generally neglected to
convey to readers the workers • frustration in dealing with
the corporation; they failed to communicate the depth,
severity, variety and pervasiveness of Pullman 1 s paternalist.
Omitted were explanations of such grievances as the "ten-day
clause," the two-check pay system, company espionage, and
obstruction of free expression. Independent , Forma , and
a letter to Nation were the primary sources of accurate
tnt on underlying issues.
Weeklies commented more extensively on immediate
than monthlies.
Despite Outlook 's assessment, the journals as a
group were deficient in analysis of Pullman's financial
situation. Such an evaluation, as performed by the Strike
Commission, would have enabled a more realistic appraisal
of Pullraan , s ability to settle the economic questions—wages
and rents—involved in the dispute.
Shop abuses were an issue ignored by all but

























Independent , which gave its interpretation only after the
Strike Commission had elicited relevant information*
Concerning related issue
s
» the background and
historical perspective of the situation prior to federal
intervention was either ignored or distorted. The journals
failed to comment on Governor Altgeld , e record during the
coal strike and the measures he had implemented to insure
preparedness to cope with strike violence as of July 3«
With the exception of Arena and a letter to Outlook ,
the journals made no evident attempt to explain the inter-
relationship between the railroad managers and federal
attorneys in devising the legal rationale and court in-
junction used to justify federal armed intervention.
Furthermore, in reporting the strike the journals
omitted two key stories: (1) the violation of Debs t con-
stitutional rights involved in the illegal seizure of his
personal papers by federal agents? and (2) President
Cleveland* s apparent disinterest in resolving the strike by
avoiding any attempt to urge a negotiated settlements—either
before the use of federal troops, or after the request of
the A.F. of L.
Outlook , Harper* s 'weekly and Independent were the
primary journals to report the landmark history of the
strike during the period June 26 to July IS. Nevertheless,
these weeklies neglected to report several important events.
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Fair buildings and the congressional resolutions. Harper's
V.eekly and Independent failed to report the appointment of
Edwin Walker as special U. S. Attorney, and the efforts of
mayors Hopkins and Pingree to induce Pullman to arbitrate*
independent also neglected to mention Altgeld*s second
protest and his use of Illinois militia.
Distortions and Inaccuracies
Immediate issues—wages, rents, and arbitration-
were thoroughly discussed; but the judgments of Harper's
Weekly , Nation and Independent concerning these complaints
were generally oversimplified and inconsistent with the
historical record. These weeklies asserted that workers
had no real grievances: rents were fair, wages were all
that Pullman could afford and were sufficient to prevent
starvation. Pullman was suffering a financial loss in order
to keep workers employed. He was unable to arbitrate; even
if he wished to adjust wages or rents, he had no right to
do so.
Concerning related issues, these weeklies and most
articles in Forum and North American generally mi sreported
the situation in Chicago before the 4th of July and/or
misinterpreted the nature of the railway boycott/strike.
These journals tended to view the strike as a rebellion
against society. They explained that Debs ordered the
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that he planned to paralyze railway transportation by
deliberately inciting and exploiting violence.
Independent justified federal intervention with the
claim that strikers had destroyed property at the rate of
two or three million dollars a day* This appears to be a
gross exaggeration. The only significant property damage
before U. 5. troops arrived on July 3 was at Blue Island,
where several overturned cars obstructed the rails.
Serious property damage began the following day and
climaxed on July 6.
Furthermore, Independent inaccurately used the word
"soldiers" without clarification in its story on the July 7
incident when state troops fired at a mob. (Review of
Reviews . the only monthly to report a chronology of major
events in the strike, raade the same error, but used the word
"regulars.") To readers it would seem the U. S. Army had
quelled the disturbance.
Coverage provided by Outlook and Harper's Veekly
revealed lesser inaccuracies. Outlook appears to have been
inaccurate in its report that a mob of 25.000 obstructed
tracks. (The evidence suggests mobs never exceeded about
10,000.) Contrary to the historical record, Harper's Weekly
asserted that Governor Altgeld had been reluctant to provide
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Objectivity and Fairnea*
Journalism professors Rivers and Schramm have said
that interpretation is objective if the reader 'cannot
discern from the report where the journalist stands with
respect to the issue or personality he is presenting. . • »•*
With the possible exception of Outlook and the
Review , the journals were far from objective in their
appraisals of the strike; interpretations were generally
loaded with editorial opinion.
Harper *s v.eekly , liation , Independent and most
articles in Forum and North American were generally emo-
tional—occasionally even sensational—in their explanations*
These journals, for the most part, approved of the Pullman
Company, the G.M.A., Cleveland and the federal attorneys,
but disapproved of the Pullman workers, Debs, the A.K.U.,
and Altgeld.
Arena was nearly as emotional as the conservative
Journals in its defense of Debs and the workers; it was
alarmed at Cleveland *s circumvention of the Constitution.
Discussion of the legal basis for intervention was
extremely unbalanced, .lost journals discussed the applicable
statutes but ignored the Constitution. Arena emphasized
Article IV but ignored the federal laws.
In contrast to the other journals, Outlook and the
Review revealed a tone of concern; they were less intense










They approved of the G.r-S.A. and federal authorities for
trying to end violence, but disapproved of Debs and Altgeld
for seeming to condone it. Un the other hand, Outlook and
tb* Review were somewhat favorable toward the cause of the
Pullman workers, but disapproved of George Pullman for his
refusal to settle the dispute before it became a national
disaster.
Of the four weeklies, Outlook provided the clearest
and most objective reporting. Despite an editorial stand
against the A.R.U., it tried to present the strike from the
perspectives of both labor and management* For example,
though disagreeing with Sovereign, Outlook gave his reasons
for urging the Knights of Labor to join the strike. More-
over, Outlook printed verbatim explanations of the dispute
from both Debs and the G.M.A. (See Appendix II.)
Incomplete Interpretations
Compared to the historical standard, Outlook , Arena
and the Review failed to adequately explain all the issues.
Nevertheless, these journals contributed interpretations
that were largely in accord with the evidence.
Outlook presented the most effective analysis of
Pullman* s financial situation and suggested he could have
afforded his workers some economic relief. Outlook also
discussed the A.B.U. delegate vote, railroad employee













Arena gave the clearest explanation of the G.M*A#'s
covert maneuvering to create federal intervention and its
subsequent collaboration with the government officials to
suppress the strike* Arena's emphasis on the G.M.A.'s
responsibility in provoking and exacerbating the railway-
dispute approximated that of the Strike Commission*
^^ Review neither misinterpreted the strike to the
am degree as most Forum and North American articles, nor
analyzed the issues to the same depth as Outlook or Arena *
Basically the Review explained that Pullman was responsible
for having allowed the strike to evolve to the point where
the American public became the chief victim*




Weeklies discussed the immediate issues to a greater
extent than monthlies* However, except for Outlook 's
analysis of Pullman's financial situation, and Independent 's
discussion of shop abuses, the weeklies largely misinter-
preted the issues of wages, rents and arbitration*
Weeklies provided far more reporting of the major
developments—the landmark history—than monthlies* Outlook
excelled in accuracy and completeness of coverage * followed
closely by Harper's Weekly * Independent * s reportage was
mediocre* Kation provided the least coverage*
Weeklies and monthlies were nearly equivalent in the
extent and adequacy with which they explained the related
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issues. Three weeklies (Harper's Weekly , Nation and
Independent ) and most articles in two monthlies (Korth
Aaerican and Forum ) generally failed to effectively inter-
pret these issues. On the other hand, one weekly (Outlook )
and two monthlies (Review and Arena ) provided partial
analyses with far less distortion than the other journals*
In summary, there appear to be a few significant
qualitative differences between weeklies and monthlies.
Kelther of these media was particularly effective in
explaining the strike in its full context. This finding
lends support to a conclusion stated in Robert Harper's
study of twentieth century interpretative reporting*
Harper concluded the chief weakness of the press appears to
have been its failure to place events in historical per-
4
apective.
An Explanation for Inadequate Coverage
This study suggests that four factors may have con-
tributed to the inadequate interpretations of the journals
of opinion: (1) inaccurate, distorted or biased sources
of news information; (2) readership expectations; (3) edi-
torial values; and (4) interest in advocacy rather than
objective interpretation.
Sources of Information
The journals first began their coverage of the strike





weeklies, or writers for monthlies, covered the situation
in Pullman prior to the railway boycott* Although Harper's
beekly covered the situation in Chicago, in part by dis-
patches frora correspondents such as Frederic Remington, and
Outlook probably had its own reporter, this study suggests
that the journals relied heavily on two sources of interpre-
tation? (1) press releases issued by the Pullman Company
and the G*;;.a*j and (2) newspaper accounts of the strike*
Pullman's press release explaining how he kept his
plant open for the benefit of his employees was evident
in several journalistic reports* The publicity bureau
established by the G*pUA. appears to have been the source
of much misinformation about the intentions of the A.E.U.
and contracts between Pullman and the railroads*
One Forum writer said he based his understanding
of the situation in Chicago prior to July 3 from newspaper
stories* Finnegan and Lindsey characterized these accounts
in the daily press as highly sensational and distorted*
At least one weekly also relied on newspaper stories*
Independent explained its difficulty in obtaining accurate
information about the strike*
The newspapers were filled with daily reports
of the occurrences and rumors of occurrences? but
it was difficult, if not impossible, to learn from
their voluminous and often contradictory accounts
exactly what occurred and what did not occur, to
judge in what degree the grievances of the strikers






in addition to corporate press releases and news-
paper accounts, a third source of interpretation—after the
strike—was provided by the hearings of the Strike
Commission. Independent and Outlook relied on testimony
from hearings for part of their understanding of the strike.
Independent obtained information about shop abuses and
paternalism from the testimony of Pullman workers. Outlook
gained its analysis of Pullman's financial condition
partially from his statements to the Strike Commission.
Readership Expectations
A second possible reason for less than adequate
interpretative reporting may have been the nature of the
audience, the characteristics of those who read the journals.
Frank Luther T4ott points out that the American middle class
was generally alienated from the labor movement in the mid-
nineties. Editors and publishers, in order to attract and
hold their readership, may have been inclined to explain
the strike the way they thought the majority would agree
with. It seems likely that most middle class readers of
journals in 1694 would be receptive to a conservative inter-
pretation of the strike such as that provided by Nation .
Editorial Values
Whether intentional or not, the editors and writers
of the journals seem to have ''selectively perceived" and
interpreted the strike according to their values. Con-
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servative editors who valued free enterprise and "big
business," for example, seem to have accepted information
from Pullman, the G. -'.A. and the daily press that fit their
mental stereotypes, rejecting or distorting information
that vwould cast corporate leaders in a less favorable light.
Conservative journals, for instance, neglected to mention
that V.'alker was legal counsel to the G.*4.A. when appointed
to represent the U» S. government*
An indication of the values of the journals can be
inferred not only from their coverage of the strike, but
also from editorial reactions to the Report of the Strike
Commission, which was relatively progressive in tenor.
Harper ' s V eekl
y
, Nation , Independent and most
writers in Forum and North American defended the status quo
and the prevailing values in laissez-faire economic theory.
They emphasized: (1) "law and order;" (2) property rights;
(3) business prerogatives; (4) the use of force, rather than
negotiation, in controlling social disorder; and (5) the
rights of the stockholder as superior to the rights of the
laborer. These journals collectively criticized the Report
of the Strike Commission as "socialistic, H "dangerous,*'
o
"biased** and "untrustworthy."
Outlook and the Review valued "law and order:" but
they also valued arbitration, social justice and the rights
of society. When the Report of the Strike Commission was
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and suggested the commission's recommendations were sensible,
^k* Review neither supported nor rejected the findings of
the commission, but urged its subscribers to read the jfraort
10for themselves and "to ponder each paragraph."
Arena was more insistent than Outlook and the Revley
in emphasizing the rights of labor as paramount* Had the
Arena carried an editorial column, it probably would have




Journalism professor John Schacht has said the major
purpose of a journal of opinion is "actively to shape the
course of the events it reports and comments on. . • • *
Each journal lias "a well-defined political, cultural and
sociological point of view, a theoretical concept to which
the journal hopes to make public practice approach and
12
ultimately conform."
This study supports Schacht • s conclusion and
suggests that the journals of opinion in 1394 interpreted
the Pullman Strike, not as a journalistic "end, but as a
means of advocating their own ideological or theoretical
concepts. The evidence indicates that each editor Intended
to promote his values, to change—or preserve—society on
the basis of his particular interpretation of events.
Conservative weeklies sought to keep labor subject
.-• ;,; n : •
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to the "iron law of wages, " to preserve the status quo and
to prevent progressive reform*
The editors of Forum and North American presented
symposiums through which, supposedly, a diversity of views
would be expressed . In their editorial selection of authors,
however, these monthlies emphasised the same perspective of
the strike as conservative weeklies*
On the other hand, Outlook and the Review appear to
have been more open-minded about the strike, viewing the
dispute from the perspectives of both labor and management.
These journals seem to have advocated a theory of social
responsibility in which both parties to a strike were
responsible to insure their conflict did not impinge on
the rights of society.
At an extreme position, Arena almost exclusively
sought to promote the rights of labor and a theory of social
and economic justice
i
In summary, advocacy, rather than objective inter-
pretation, seems to have been the primary editorial inten-
tion of the journals of opinion.
The Social Role of the Journals of Opinion
Before and During the Strike
The authors of Mass £ledla and Violence comment on





Whether conflict is resolved by violence or
cooperation will depend in part upon the actors'
perceptions of the world about them. Providing
an accurate perception of that world is the media f e
most important responsibility .13
This study has shown that several journals of
opinion attempted a retrospective analysis 6f the immediate
and underlying issues after the railway strike had begun,
nevertheless, to a great extent the journals failed to
provide readers with an accurate, complete explanation of
the historical background of the situation at Pullman and
later at Chicago*
When Debs testified before the Strike Commission,
he declared!
I am impressed with the conviction that if
the people of America had understood the truth,
if the press had given them the truth and the
facts, the people of this country would have been
overwhelmingly with us [the A.R.U. and Pullman
employees] from beginning to end .3-4
To the extent that Debs* charge may have been
directed at the journals of opinion, which is not probable,
it mac likely that even if they had interpreted the strike
with complete accuracy and fairness, the public still would
not have supported the A.R.U. The national mood in 1^94
seems to have been sufficiently against organised labor to
have precluded any such "overwhelming** support for the
strikers.
Moreover, the journals cannot be blamed for not
having covered the conditions in Pullman prior to the May 11















have recognized that a major civil disturbance was in the
making. However, if the editors had been monitoring the
Chicago press from May 12 to mid- June, prior to the railway-
boycott, it seams likely that they would have detected
sufficient social unrest to merit coverage.
This study suggests that if the journals had
alerted their readers to the situation in Pullman and
Chicago during the month preceding the boycott, when dis-
content was zaounting, the subsequent violence might have
been prevented. Investigative reporting during the early
phases of the dispute could have provided readers with an
understanding of? (1) the nature and severity of grievances
felt by Pullman employees; (2) whether workers had been
reasonable in trying to negotiate their complaints? (3)
whether Pullman could have met and resolved the grievances.
Evan though only a relatively few readers of the
total population might have read the articles, presumably
the 'opinion leaders** might have generated sufficient in-
terest in the general public to create a climate of concern
for the workers. An aroused public opinion might have
prodded officials into correcting economic and social in-
justice before the A. decision to boycott.
Full coverage of events during the period June 26
to July 3 would have resulted in a more accurate public
understanding of provocations directed at union members;







role in precipitating the railway strike and stimulating
violence
•
By neglecting the historical context, and during
the strike, by largely misinterpreting the related issues,
the journals appear to have helped structure a public




As the strike began to collapse, the journals in-
creasingly turned to a discussion of proposals aimed at
improving labor-management relations. Inspection of
Appendix III, "Recommendations ilade by Journals to End or
Prevent Labor Disputes," reveals that a majority of the
weeklies, and articles in monthlies, suggested or endorsed
proposals, the balance of which were relatively progressive.
Harper's Weekly * Nation and North American continued
to emphasize economic values and business prerogatives.
Independent , which had interpreted the strike in
much the same manner as Elation and Harper's l.eeklv » shifted
somewhat to a more progressive orientation. After the
strike, Independent continued its support for free enter-
prise, but suggested more humanitarian means of dealing with
employees; businessmen could do as they pleased so long as
they were fair with their workers.
Similarly, Forum , which had interpreted the strike
-.











mainly by conservative writers, continued its symposium but
included authors that advanced more progressive recommenda-
tions*
Outlook and the Review continued to emphasize the
rights of society* These journals sought to protect the
public from the inconvenience of railway strikes; and they
favored proposals aimed at a balance of power between labor
and management*
Arena * s single recommendation emphasized the rights
of labor over those of management.
As a group the journals seem to have contributed
substantially to the discussion of proposals designed to
prevent or minimize the effects of future strikes* Six
proposals would perpetuate the prevailing lai3seg-faire
values; but twelve suggestions advocated more humanitarian
treatment of employees, a greater balance of power between
labor and management, and respect for the rights of society
16
as a whole. A majority of the recommendations were aimed
at recognizing and dealing with employee grievances before
violence became inevitable.
The Journals of Opinion in
the ^ld-isgffTs
*
In 1894 the journals pointed out that the Pullman
Strike was a symptom of serious discontent. They suggested
that corporations, as well as laborers, were responsible
for that discontent. And they advanced various proposals
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During the raid-nineties, the journals of opinion
seem to have contributed to the social education of the
American people* One Forum writer summed up the effects of
the journals for the decade preceding 1#9S J "Higher views
of industrial relations, of education, of political rights
17
and duties are gaining ground. •••*'
Historian C. C* Regier notes that the magazines of
the 1^90 , s displayed tendencies toward muckraking that
g
became so conspicuous in the next decade. Outlook 's
analysis of Pullman's corporate wealth, and Arena 's expose
of the G.M.A. seem to resemble closely the style of
journalistic attack for which muckrakers later became noted.
According to David Chalmers, the muckrakers after
1900 were greatly concerned with "the public, whose in-
terests had to be protected against both labor unions and
capitalistic trusts. r This same concern for the public
was evident in Outlook and the Review in 1694.
Theodore Peterson asserts that magazines have been
"responsible in some measure for the social and political
reforms of the first fifty years of this century
*
M He
further states that the magazines which carried on where the
muckrakers left off were chiefly the journals of opinion.
This study suggests that several of the journals
of opinion in the raid-nineties, those which exposed Pullman
and the G.M.A. as well as those which advanced progressive
labor relations proposals, may have provided the catalyst






















To the extent that public opinion and government
action shifted after 1900 away from the axioms of laissea-
faire and in the direction of progressive reform, thea*
journals of opinion in the raioV-nineties may have played a
significant role in paving the way for that change.
Suggestions for Future Research
The interpretative and social functions of the
periodical press have not been sufficiently studied, par-
ticularly from an historical perspective.
Interpretative Function of the
Periodical Press
Robert Harper has suggested there may have been
21different forms of interpretation prior to World War I.
This study has evaluated the interpretative reporting of the
journals of opinion in 1#94 • The journals appear to have
explained cause and effect relationships in the manner best
suited to promote various editorial social theories. More
research is needed to determine the existence of other forms
of interpretation.
Several scholars have noted that magazines often
provide a fuller interpretative treatment of news than other
22
media. But there is a need for more intensive study of
magazine interpretation, particularly during the period
1900 to 1920, an era during which "objective w forms of news











The extent to which trained reporters are used in
covering an event seems to be an important factor in
effective news interpretation. Harper believes that re-
porters may have provided the same interpretation of events
after 191$ which press releases and official investigations
23had presented before V<orld War Z« This study suggests
that few reporters were used by the journals in 1^94 to
cover the Pullman Strike. :<5ore research is needed to assess
the developing role of the interpretative reporter.
Social Role of the Periodical Press
The journals of opinion in this study evidently
relied extensively on the daily press as a source of in-
formation for interpretative treatment. The relationship
between the daily and the weekly press needs to be more
fully assessed* Each medium plays a role in shaping public
opinion; but little is known about the interaction of these
media. How extensively does the daily press influence the
weekly press? Do the interpretations generated by journals
of opinion filter into the dailies of mass circulation, and
thus to a vast reading audience?
This study also suggests there may have been a
close relationship between certain journals of opinion and
subsequent muckraking magazines of mass circulation. A
comparative historical study assessing similarities and
differences in content between these two types of magasines












John Ochacht has asserted that journals of opinion
to play an important role in social change • The
periodicals in this study suggested a number of progressive
reforms. A follow-up study could attempt to assess the
apparent social effects of these proposals, determining
if and when they were discussed in the daily press, and in
Congress; and what specific legislation may have indirectly
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LANDMARK HISTORY OF THE
PULLMAN STRIKE AND BOYCOTT
(26 June-l3 July, 1^94)
First Week
(1) The A,E.l'. orders a boycott of Pullman cars.
(2) The G.M.A. decides to fire employees who boy-
cott Pullman cars*
(3) A sympathetic strike begins on the Illinois
Central
(1) The boycott is extended to all the principal
railroads entering Chicago.
(2) Chicago police are ordered to total readiness.
Thursday, June 2$
(1) The boycott is extended to the V/est, about IS, 000
workers on strike.
(2) The G./I.A* initiates measures to deal with the
strike •
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Friday. June 29
(1) The G»M.A. decides to fight strikers with
blacklists; to seek injunctions
•
(2) U. S» District Attorney Ililchrist cooperates
with the G«M*A«
Saturday, June go
Attorney General Olney appoints Edwin Walker as




(1) Walker and itilchrist draft federal injunction
at the request of Attorney General Olney and the G.-'UA.
(2) An estimated 50,000 men are on strike.
(1) V# S* Circuit Court issues a sweeping injunction
against strikers.
(2) Debs ignores injunction.
Tuesday, July 3
(1) Federal officials in Chicago request u. 3. Array
troops to enforce court injunction.
(2) Cleveland orders troops from Fort Sheridan to
Chicago
.
ib & bam ttaLLtM {




U* ig troops are in Chicago under the command of
Gen. riles*
Thursday, Ju3.v ?
(1) Governor Altgeld protests the use of federal
troops* Cleveland replies.
(2) Pitting mobs are active along railway lines in
Chicago; freight cars are overturned at stockyards, ob-
structing trains*
(3) Mayor Hopkins issues a proclamation.
(4) Seven World's Fair buildings are destroyed by
fire.
Friday July 6
(1) Altgeld wires second protest? Cleveland replies*
(2) Altgeld orders out state troops in support of
the mayor.
(3) Fire destroys 700 cars? 13 Chicago railroads
are obstructed*
?at;ur<iay t July J
(1) Militia fire on a mob at Chicago: 4 killed,
20 wounded*













(1) President Cleveland issues a proclamation:
rioters must disperse*
(2) Chicago trade unions vote to seek arbitration
with Pullman*
Monday, Ju,ly ?
(1) The Pullman Company refuses to arbitrate.
(2) Rioting and disorder begin to subside.
Tuesday, Ju}y 10
Debs and several other A.K.U. officials are arrested
and. charged with conspiracy to obstruct the mails.
y» July 11
(1) The Senate approves a resolution endorsing
Cleveland^ action in regard to the strike.




(1) Kayor Hopkins presents the Pullman Company with
telegrams from 50 other mayors urging arbitration. Vice
President l.'ickes refuses the offer.
(2) The .. • of L. rejects Debs 1 request to convey
an A#R»U. proposal to the G*tf«A*
















At Debs 1 request, Mayor Hopkins conveys to the
A* an A.E.U. offer to declare the strike off if the
railroads will rehire the strikers. The G.iM.A. refuses to
consider the proposal.
The A.R.U. begins losing support.
Fourth Week
^onday« July 16
The House of Representatives adopts a resolution
supporting the President's actions against the strike.
ffiffsday t July 17
Debs and three other A»R*U. officers are arrested
and jailed (after declining bail) on charges of contempt
in having violated the federal court injunction.
Friday. July 16
The Pullman Company begins rehiring non-union men.
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EXTRACT FROM OUTLOOK'S STRIXF COVERAGF*
"In order to give our readers the fullest statement
from both sides of the present issue, we have obtained
directly frm **. Debs, the President of the American
Railway Union, and from the General Manager's Association
• • . their respective statements of the present strike*
Neither statement differs from those already familiar to
our readers through the daily press* Vie give, however, so
much of the former statement as may be regarded as a defense
of the boycott. After reciting the history of the Pullman
strike, substantially as we gave it last week, r. Debs
adds:
Convinced that injustice was being done to labor
by the Pullman concern, the American Railway Union
determined to come to the aid of the strikers by
declaring a boycott upon Pullman cars. This we had
hardly done when we discovered that ail the rail-
roads, those not using Pullman cars equally with
those affected by our boycott, had entered into a
combination, not merely to defeat our present
purpose, but to smash labor organizations among
railroad employees. The General :anager , s Association
makes no concealment of its purpose. Necessarily,
therefore, the contest for justice to the Pullman
employees lias developed into a struggle for existence.
We have had to extend the boycott until it now holds
twenty-one lines in its grasp \'e may have to call
out allied workmen in the trades and on the inter-






urban railways i liave absolute confidence that
we will win this battle, win it without violence
and in spite of the obvious conn- • of the
United States authorities and courts* 1 understand
how serious a disaster to our cause violence or
lawlessness would be, and I am commanding upon all
my lieutenants 5 regard for the law and respect
for property right s*
"The General Manager 9 s Association* s briefer state-
ment we give in full*
The General ,ianager*s Association is fighting
the strike instituted by the American Hallway
Union, because they fail to see the sense, reason,
or justice of an attempt to club the Pullman
Company over the heads of railroad companies which
have no control over i'r* Pullman's affairs, either
private or corporate, or any connection with the
Pullman manufacturing interests. The question of
Pullmanism is not recognized by the railroad
companies. Rone of the railroad employees who
have gone out on strike have any grievance that is
Icnown of against their employers* If they have
any such grievance, they have not made it known to
the railroad managers* The strike is purely a
sympathetic strike. The General Manager's
Association of Chicago does not propose to allow
the American Hallway Union to dictate how the
railroad business shall be run, neither does the
General Manager's Association propose to assist
the American Railway Union in settling its
difficulties with the Pullman Company. The
General Manager's Association is a unit, and no
man in it lias any thought of compromise* The
fight must be fought to a finish
i








RECO*§ffiNEATIONS NUB BY JOURNALS TO
END OR PREVENT LABCE BOMB
. LEGAL PROPOSALS
tion:
Proposals that would balance the power
between labor and raanaKeKtent t
1* Accord labor unions the same rights











2* Insist upon orderly alteration of the
law to insure that statutes are just
and not exceptionally favorable to
ployers
.
Require the use of binding contracts
between employers and laborers}
whichever party violates such a con-
3tract would be liable for damages.
eekly
T&tTon
mm n - ii n
Fprum
i.eview
4» Institute compulsory arbitration of





(Comment: Harper's V.eekly * Independent , Nation ,
and two writers in Fprun strongly opposed this reeomstenda*-
tion. Conservative journals and authors also opposed









the "socialistic idea" of a .urn wage for employee -
Moreover, Hampton, in North Ai.Terican was against any
legislation that would attempt to remedy the condition of
workers whose labor did not yield proper renujeration. )
Proposals that would protect
society irom the inconvenience of railway
strikes:
5. Amend the lav; to require railroad
employees to give adequate notice
7before quitting work.
Outlook
6* lake it illegal for trainmen to
quit work in a body for the
purpose of stopping railroad
traffic
Outlook
. iscellaneous le^al proposals;
Amend the law to eliminate the





8. Amend the law to stop the impor-
tation of immigrant laborers.
I^orth American
9- Authorize an increase in the
11






II. RF(\ JATIOWS TO GOVERW/,:
Proposals emphasizing economic values
and business prerogatives :
10. Government should ensure the
supremacy of law and protect
12property at all hazards.
11 • When employees are dissatisfied
with their working conditions or
wages they should quit work. When
they join in unlawful combinations
and threaten the rights of others,







Proposals emphasising humanitarian values
and the rights of the public and labor :
12. Government should intervene not only
to protect railroads against un-
justified strikes, but to protect
trainmen against unjust treatment by
railroad corporations.
Outlook
13* Government should intervene to
prevent the disturbance of society.
The individual who precipitates such
inconvenience to the public should
be held responsible to the govern-
15
raent. (This could also be con-
sidered as a legal proposal that would
protect society from the inconvenience
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14 • Government shoulc compel railroads,
public servants, to run their
trains regularly and to serve the
people, regardless of what wages the
companies are obliged to pay in order
to retain trainmen and perform their
public duty.
m.
Proposals er, -conomic values
and business prerogatives :
15 • Fmployerc should treat workers
as businessmen fully capable of
17
managing their own affairs.
Nation
16. ailroads should never hire a
man who will not bind himself
absolutely to abstain from par-







17 • liployers sliould observe a con-
ciliator-/ attitude toward their
ployees and keep in touch with
their workers, not ;ly deal
19
with them through foremen*
Independent
1&. Corporations should enable em-
ployees to become stockholders,
sharing in the prosperity and
adversity of the company, having
20 '-
a voice in its management »
Fox
w'.- lli
i m&mm .. 3 .
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IV. ]_ TQ LAM
19» V'hen employees arc dissatisfied
with their working conditions or
21
wages they should quit work.
"
(This is also listed as #11 •)
l.orth American




20. The workingman should patiently
build his individual character.
He should be industrious, grow
more skillful in his trade,
acquire self-control, and make
the best of such economic foot-
2?hold as he may posr >
Lev.
21. Labor unions should not encompass
men of all trades. ' ach trade
should have its own union. Fach
union should be locally self-
governing and promote industry,
not strike warfare*23
Outlc
V. GENERAL ).„ L . flOJJS
22. Councils of conciliation should be








23 • . ociety, in educating its young, r'orura
should emphasise the importance of
private property, contract, the
manager's function, the lav; of
natural selection, free enter-
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